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With this thesis I have made some order within the growing literature on territorial 
rights, and I have provided one alternative approach that addresses the problems 
revealed by existing theories. I have developed a proposal that draws in the strongest 
arguments provided by the literature. The existing literature shares the intuition that 
territorial rights are accorded to protect individuals’ fundamental interests in 
developing and pursuing their separate and collective goals. My proposal also appeals 
to this principle and makes it the central focus of a theory of territorial rights.  
In the first part of this work I offer an account of the existing theories and show the 
problems that each view carries. I explain that they either fail to address the 
particularity requirement or they incur in the in rem problem, and I propose possible 
solutions to make the authors’ strategies more appealing. In the second part I 
propose a conventionalist theory constrained by a legitimacy threshold. I argue that 
communities acquire territorial rights if these rights are determined by their social 
norms. Social norms have the role of ratifying the expectations of the community’s 
members and promote peaceful and stable social relations, even when they are unjust 
and illiberal. However, a community may demand exclusive titles to territory only if 
its system of norms meets four requirements of legitimacy. The community holds 
exclusive titles regarding territory only to the extent that these titles are necessary for 
maintaining a system of norms that is legitimate. I apply my proposal to the case of 
secession and show that the parties to a conflict over territory ought to recognize a 
reciprocal duty to compromise. My theory endorses a political conception of 
territorial rights that are determined by the interaction of communities and by the 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
Territorial rights are at the core of many current international and internal conflicts: 
secessionist movements have to do with the control of a contested territory; the lives 
of people in resource rich countries are endangered by oppressive governments that 
exploit the resource curse; the international community soon will face the crisis of 
environmental refugees; and international relations are already strained by the current 
refugee crisis, the cause of which in part has to do with political groups fighting for 
the control of natural resources and land.  
These complex issues are closely associated with the theoretical uncertainty 
obscuring the reasons why some agents’ interests in territory should be worthy of 
special protection. Disagreements, as often happens, are exacerbated by the lack of 
clarity on the matter of contention and on the demands parties are permitted to 
make against each other. A theory of territorial rights must offer such clarity and 
standards to evaluate the permissibility of territorial demands. This work offers a 
view on whether current territorial holdings are legitimate, and whether those who 
challenge them have spotted a fundamental limitation in our current assumptions 
regarding national states’ territorial possessions and the distribution of land. 
One may ask whether we could sufficiently address territorial issues with a nuanced 
theory of political authority. Control over territory is ultimately control over what 
people can or cannot do with and within it. However, territorial rights confer a 
special kind of authority and, similarly to property rights, they deserve a theory 
carved specifically for them. Rights on territory and resources are, indeed, normative 
incidents that regulate people’s behavior, but they focus specifically on the 
conditions under which the use of land and resources is permitted, and the 
conditions under which the right holder can legitimately exclude others from the 
enjoyment of a particular territory and the resources within it.  
The focus on territory makes this a limited work. Just like a theory of property rights 
does not offer a comprehensive view on political justice, a theory of territorial rights 
will leave unexamined many issues, such as our obligations to the global poor, or the 
limits of political authority over people. The subject of this work is limited to the 





order of territorial rights, which, I argue, protects chiefly the value of stability and 
peace. Throughout the following chapters, I will mention how my proposal may 
affect our theories regarding these fundamental questions. Nevertheless, my proposal 
constitutes only a brick of a bigger theoretical structure that will have to address 
other difficult moral questions. For now, I only wish to offer a new perspective on 
territorial rights to unravel the existing assumptions about rights and their role in 
territorial disputes, and about states and political organizations, that I believe are 
holding our moral and political capacity back.  
 
1 The Proposal 
 
I propose that a community has territorial rights when these rights are specified by 
conventions. The territorial rights thus acquired are protected by immunities against 
competing powers and by claims that others do not interfere with the enjoyment of 
these rights in so far as the conventions meet some minimal requirements of 
legitimacy, and to the extent that the protective claims and immunities are necessary 
to maintain that minimum level of legitimacy. This proposal carves a very small space 
for exclusive rights to territory and resources, and it is in contrast with existing 
international law on the territorial privileges of nation states. However, I show that 
my theory is largely in harmony with international practice, and I provide examples 
that I hope will demonstrate that the legitimacy-based conventionalism that I 
develop is not unfeasible. 
I believe that a theory of territorial rights must take seriously the effect that the use 
and control of a territory and its resources have on the lives of individuals, but also 
that its solutions to territorial conflicts must be sustainable and realistic. Our interest 
in issues regarding territorial rights emerges importantly not only from the pursuit of 
theoretical rigor, but especially from the awareness that conflicts on territory and 
resources have for long infected our chances for a peaceful system of international 
relations. A theory of territorial rights must have a wide applicability, and it must 
appeal to as many actors as possible, without losing sight of its commitment to 
justice. 





In light of this, I suggest that groups’ territorial rights are accorded chiefly for the 
protection of their members’ fundamental interest in individual self-government, 
which relies on the stability of expectations and possessions and on the protection of 
basic fundamental rights. More extensive freedoms to use resources found within a 
community’s borders and extensive powers of territorial jurisdiction may be acquired 
on the basis of more inclusive values, such as self-determination or national security. 
However, I argue that a group may assert protective claims and immunities in 
protection of these freedoms and powers only if exclusive territorial rights are 
necessary to secure a minimal standard of legitimacy. I believe that legitimacy is a 
composite standard that can be achieved by meeting different requirements in a 
variety of satisfactory combinations, and that is sensitive to community specific 
values and narratives regarding groups’ attachment to territory. The fulfillment of the 
requirements of legitimacy must be assessed empirically, with reference to the 
complex and rich knowledge we have achieved in the fields of political economy, 
sociology, legal studies, and the like. I will argue that this concept of legitimacy makes 
my proposal acceptable to many diverse communities. 
This thesis was written for those who uphold liberal principles of individual freedom. 
It offers a view on what liberalism tells us about how we should treat others when 
our relations with them are affected by territorial conflicts, whether the conflict 
involves fellow liberals or not. However, in some important ways, this thesis is also 
written for non-liberals, and it aims to offer them reasons to accept a system of 
international legitimacy of territorial holdings and solutions to territorial conflicts 
that will satisfy their liberally minded opponents. I offer in fact a minimalist theory of 
territorial rights, which leaves ample space for debate on grounds that do not appeal 
necessarily to principles of individual freedom and equality. 
This is above all a thesis about rights. The focus is on rights not because they are the 
only moral consideration that one should make regarding territory. There are 
principles, aims, and values that do not properly fit within a theory of territorial 
rights but that play an important role in determining our actions. Rights are also not 
the final result of the moral calculations that we ought to make when confronted 
with territorial conflicts. They cannot resolve all conflicts, and there can in fact be 
conflicts regarding competing rights. Rights are in some important sense only one of 





the products of our moral deliberations, and they are one step towards the resolution 
of disputes. Like many other complex fields of human interaction, territorial disputes 
lie on an intricate moral background, which requires a sensible approach to rights, 
but also to goals, principles, and values, if we are to find reasonable and sustainable 
solutions. 
Nevertheless, if solutions violate people’s rights, they will certainly be considered less 
than satisfactory. Rights after all are the strongest moral protection that we can give 
to an agent’s interest, and they are invoked as a dependable assertion of one’s role in 
society. This makes it all the more important that we avoid the unnecessary 
proliferation of rights, which may make territorial conflicts more likely to threaten 
people’s entitlements. Overcrowding international relations with territorial rights 
would certainly increase the chance that solutions to territorial conflicts may never be 
entirely acceptable. Thus, it is imperative that we avoid dispensing rights that are not 
firmly grounded in theory. This thesis is an attempt to find the proper place for 
rights in the debate on territory to increase our chances for the fair and sustainable 
resolution of disputes. 
 
2 Outline of the Thesis 
 
To understand the complex system of titles that diverse communities may have with 
regards to territory, it is useful to distinguish the different normative incidents that 
make up our understanding of territorial rights. In Chapter 2 I offer a conceptual 
analysis of territorial rights and divide them into a list of normative incidents using 
the Hohfeldian analysis. I show that when we speak about territorial rights in general, 
we refer to a set of claims, freedoms, powers, and immunities that have to do 
principally with an agent’s control of land and territory. In particular I distinguish 
between powers to control and freedoms to use a territory, and the immunities and 
claims that protect these powers and freedoms. I also explain why I focus on the 
issue of territorial jurisdiction over people regarding territory and resources and not 
on every aspect of political authority over people within particular borders.  





In Chapter 3 and 4 I address the existing theories of territorial rights. I try to offer a 
sympathetic account of these theories and I show as neatly as possible the problems 
that each strategy carries. I explain the reasons why the theories discussed fail to 
address the issue of territorial rights, and I propose possible solutions to make the 
authors’ strategies more appealing. I identify two major problems with the literature: 
the in rem problem and the failure to address the particularity requirement. The in rem 
problem and the particularity requirement demand that a theory of territorial rights is 
able to identify the primary holder of territorial jurisdiction within a particular 
geographical location. Failure to do that makes a theory unfit to address the most 
fundamental requirements of a theory of territorial holdings and to provide a 
solution to territorial disputes.  
I divide the theories in direct and indirect, and show that the direct approach to 
territorial rights is to be preferred. Direct theories maintain that an agent acquires 
jurisdictional powers regarding territory and resources because these powers in 
themselves protect the agents’ fundamental interests. For some direct theories, 
territorial jurisdiction regarding resources protects individuals’ interests in self-
government, or happiness; for others it realizes the value of collective self-
determination. However, the agent’s title to territory may be restricted conditional to 
the fulfillment of some requirements. On the contrary, indirect theories maintain that 
the agent acquires territorial jurisdiction within a particular territory because control 
over territory is instrumental for the establishment of effective or minimally just 
political institutions, which in turn are necessary to the protection of fundamental 
interests.  
I also argue that most theories struggle with three issues that make them less 
appealing: the need to provide a theory of original acquisition, the inability to 
properly address the demands of global justice, and the failure to offer an account of 
territorial rights that is sensitive to community specific values and narratives 
regarding attachment to territory. 
I introduce Legitimacy-Based Conventionalism (hereafter LBC) in Chapter 5. LBC 
pursues a direct strategy and maintains that communities acquire jurisdictional 
powers regarding territory and resources because the control of a particular territory 
protects their members’ fundamental interest in being sufficiently respected as 





project pursuers. Individuals must rely on a stable system of expectations regarding 
their possessions and others’ behavior to develop and pursue their life plans. I argue 
that social norms that emerge within a community have the role of ratifying these 
expectations of the community’s members and promote peaceful and stable social 
relations, even when they are unjust and illiberal. However communities can only 
acquire exclusive rights to territory if they fulfill some minimal requirements of 
legitimacy.  
Because only the people occupying a particular territory may hold territorial 
jurisdiction there, LBC has no problems determining the primary holder of territorial 
jurisdiction within a particular geographical location. Moreover, LBC relies on a 
conventionalist theory of territorial rights and it is not concerned with addressing the 
origin of territorial holdings, but only with evaluating whether current territorial 
rights reflect the social norms of the community that uphold them, and if they 
protect a stable system of expectations. A conventionalist theory of rights is chiefly 
concerned with actual and existing interests, and, in the case of LBC, with ensuring 
that exclusive territorial rights protect a stable and peaceful order of norms that 
sufficiently respects individuals as project pursuers.  
Once the agent has acquired territorial jurisdiction regarding territory and resources 
somewhere, I argue that a community may demand exclusive titles to jurisdictional 
powers and resource rights only if its system of norms meets four minimal 
requirements of legitimacy. Moreover, the community may hold exclusive titles 
regarding territory only to the extent that these are necessary to the protection of a 
system of norms that sufficiently respect individuals as project pursuers. In 
distinguishing between powers and freedoms to respectively control and use a 
territory, and the protective immunities and claims that make these powers and 
freedoms exclusive to the agent that holds them, LBC is able to explain the 
limitations of the territorial rights established through conventions, and how these 
limitations protect others’ relevant interest in the same territory.  
In chapter 6 I introduce the legitimacy threshold and I explain why I believe that it 
should be minimal and negative, and that legitimacy is a composite concept. In my 
view, communities uphold legitimate social norms if these meet the threshold of 
legitimacy by sufficiently satisfying four requirements: the protection of basic goods, 





the protection of freedom of expression, the protection of freedom of association, 
and the protection of basic economic rights. Because LBC is committed to allow 
communities to protect their special narrative regarding their attachment to territory 
as far as possible, the threshold of legitimacy can be met in different ways, as long as 
the community meets a satisfactory overall level of protection of its members as 
project pursuers. For this reason it is not important that all communities meet the 
four basic requirements to the same extent.  
If, for example, a community is particularly good at protecting its members’ freedom 
of association, but not very good at defending their freedom of expression, it can still 
meet the threshold of legitimacy, as long as the balance between the two 
requirements is sufficiently positive in favor of individuals’ interest in self-
government. Similarly, the successful protection of basic economic rights is more 
important if the community does not meet its members’ basic needs through, for 
example, a system of social solidarity. The legitimacy threshold allows us to evaluate 
whether social norms sufficiently respect individuals as project pursuers, and it 
indicates to what extent communities that uphold systems of social norms may 
demand exclusive titles to the control and use of land and resources. 
By setting demanding requirements for the acquisition of exclusive territorial 
entitlements, LBC is also able to respond to our intuitions about the limited claims 
one agent may have in a world affected by environmental and humanitarian crisis, 
leaving ample space for the demands of global justice. If the territorial rights that the 
community has established there through its conventions are not necessary for the 
fulfillment of the minimal requirements of legitimacy, then the community holds 
only powers and freedoms regarding that territory that are not protected by claims 
that others do not interfere or by immunities against others’ powers. Unprotected 
freedoms and powers tell us that the agent upholding them has some relevant 
interests in the use and control of those territories. These interests, however, do not 
grant exclusive protection, and the community’s titles may be permissibly limited by 
others’ legitimate demands on the basis of subsistence, equality, self-determination, 
and other principles that may ground individuals’ and nations’ global obligations. 
In the final sections of Chapter 6, I offer some examples of what these demands may 
look like. I suggest that the global poor might have a claim that the community 





allows them to settle within their territory if they are fleeing oppressive and violent 
regimes. Moreover, I argue that above the threshold of legitimacy, communities’ 
resource rights may be significantly limited by the demands of the global poor, as 
well as by the competing important interests of others that have legitimate territorial 
demands in the same territory. Depending on their nature, these interests may grant 
other agents a freedom to use or a power to control a territory and its resources, but 
not also protective claims or immunity. For example, if the community’s social 
norms continue to be legitimate even when a wave of immigration enters its territory, 
immigrants may still have freedoms to enter and use the community’s territory on the 
basis, for instance, of their interests in enjoying better employment opportunities 
there. In this case the immigrant’s interest in entering the community’s territory is 
not protected by a claim that the community should let him enter and he community 
and the immigrant have overlapping freedoms to settle within the same territory. 
Possible overlapping freedoms and powers are determined by the special values and 
principles that the community and the individual respectively hold. LBC makes no 
attempt at judging the value of the two competing demands at this stage. The 
conflicting narratives regarding the territory at issue will have to be evaluated through 
a process of compromise between the community and others who hold competing 
and relevant interests. The compromise will pursue mutually beneficial agreements 
on the basis of the strength of the interests at stake. It is likely that such compromise 
will require the mediation of an independent third party, and, possibly, the 
establishment of institutions that will address disagreements of this kind. The duty to 
compromise is a duty of global justice, and it applies to cases where different agents 
demand powers or freedom to use the same territory on the basis of their special 
interests, such as a state’s national prosperity and security, a group’s self-
determination, or individuals’ broader ability to pursue plans and objectives. These 
overlapping interests may or may not conflict, and when they do, the parties ought to 
achieve a mutually beneficial agreement on the resolution of the dispute. 
I engage with the dynamics between competing non-fundamental titles to territory in 
Chapter 7. There I try to show in detail the implications of LBC in cases where two 
or more communities uphold overlapping titles that are not fundamental to the 
protection of either party’s minimal standards of legitimacy. To do that I examine the 





issue of secession and I put forward two ideas: the first is that secession is in 
important ways an incident of territorial rights and not necessarily the achievement 
of full sovereignty. The second idea is that communities may permissibly secede, and 
thus take control of their territory, if they hold jurisdiction regarding the territory that 
they assert as their own. However, the seceding group’s claim that others do not 
interfere with its use of the territory and its immunity against others’ jurisdictional 
powers over the same territory are limited to the group’s achievement of minimal 
standards of legitimacy of its social norms. 
I suggest that when the parties to a secession share important but non-fundamental 
interests in the same territory they have towards each other a duty to compromise. 
The parties’ titles that are defined by their conventions, but that are not protected by 
claims and immunities, will constitute the bundle of demands that will be evaluated 
in the process of compromise. At the outset of secession, it is likely that the parties 
will have conflicting freedoms and powers, given that they have shared the same 
territory and have relied on it for their fundamental interests before separation, and 
that their conventions have established territorial rights there. The community’s 
reliance on a territory for objectives that are not protected by the minimal standards 
of legitimacy is still defended by freedoms and powers emerging from the 
community’s values and practices within that territory. The unprotected freedoms 
and powers that a community’s conventions establish will identify not only the 
parties that should participate to the compromise, but also the object matter of the 
compromise. At the outset of secession the duty to compromise applies to legitimate 
and illegitimate communities alike, and it is aimed at protecting primarily individuals’ 
most fundamental interests by ensuring that the separation does not cause the 
sudden and radical worsening of people’s wellbeing. Finally, Chapter 8 offers 
concluding remarks and possible avenues for further research. 





Chapter Two - Conceptual Analysis 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the concept of territorial rights. I offer a list of incidents 
that make up for what we generally refer to when we speak of territorial rights. I 
identify territorial rights using the Hohfeldian analysis and suggest that we should 
speak of them as a combination of powers and freedoms with regards to the control, 
management, and use of a territory and its resources. These incidents are sometimes 
protected by a series of immunities and claims that others do not interfere with their 
enjoyment. 
 
1 The Form of Rights 
 




Primary rules concern physical actions and are allocated to indicate whether an action 
is permitted, required, or forbidden.2 
- Claims: A has a claim that B phi if and only if B has a duty to A to phi 
For example A has a claim that B pays him a sum of money in virtue of a contract of 
sale. Or A has a claim that B refrains from entering her property without permission. 
Claims are passive rights that regulate others’ actions. They always correlate to a duty 
in one or more duty bearers. If everyone has a duty to A not to steal from her, for 
example, then A has a claim in rem that others do not steal her property. 
                                                      
1 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1919). 
2  Wenar, Leif, "Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/>. 





- Freedoms: A has a freedom to phi if and only if A has no duty not to phi 
Freedoms are active rights and concern their holder’s actions. For example, A has a 
freedom to fish in a river because A has no duty not to do so. This also means that 
there is no person who has a claim that A does not fish there. Moreover, freedoms 
do not necessarily come accompanied with protective claims.3 Thus, A may have a 
freedom to fish in the river but lack a claim that B does not interfere with her fishing 
there. For example, B may have the same freedom to fish there and at the same time. 
 
Secondary rules: 
Secondary rules indicate how agents can create and modify primary rules.4 
- Powers: A has a power if and only if A has the ability to alter her own or another’s 
Hohfeldian incidents. 
Like freedoms, powers are active rights that concern the holder’s abilities. For 
example, A has the power to allow B to trespass her property, thus creating upon B 
the freedom to cross the borders of her property and cancelling her own claim that B 
does not trespass. Powers can also create and modify secondary rules. So for 
example the Parliament has the power to issue a law that gives land owners the 
power to decide who enters their properties and under which conditions. 
- Immunities: A has an immunity if and only if B lacks the ability to alter A’s 
Hohfeldian incidents. 
Immunities are, like claims, passive titles. For example, A has an immunity against 
the state modifying her ownership title by expropriating her property. 
 
The Hohfeldian analysis enables us to say something about the form of rights and 
how they behave mechanically. The incidents are arranged in opposites and 
correlatives according to their logical relations. 
                                                      
3 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 269. 
4 Wenar, Rights. 






A has a claim  à A lacks a no-claim 
A has a freedom  à A lacks a duty 
A has a power  à A lacks a disability 
A has an immunity à A lacks a liability 
 
Correlatives: 
A has a claim  à B has a duty 
A has a freedom  à B has a no-claim 
A has a power  à B has a liability 
A has an immunity à B has a disability5 
 
The analysis does not say anything about rights’ nature, their scope, who holds them, 
or why they are accorded. However, it allows us to identify which relations between 
normative incidents are logical necessities and which are not. A claim necessarily 
correlates to a duty of others to perform or refrain from performing an action. 
Differently, a freedom does not correlate with a duty of others to refrain from 
interfering with the agent’s freedom. For example, Anna may have a freedom to 
grow her own vegetables, but her neighbor Ben does not have a duty to provide 
Anna with a garden to exercise her freedom. In fact, Ben may not even have a duty 
not to interfere with Anna having a garden. Ben may complain to the authorities that 
Anna’s garden attracts pests, and may request that her activity stops or that it is 
regulated. 
Similarly, a power is always correlated with someone’s liability that his or her 
normative incidents are subject to change. However, it is not necessarily always 
protected by an immunity from others’ powers. Consider in fact that Italy has the 
power to control its borders, but does not also have an immunity against the 
European Union imposing rules regarding the quotas of refugees that each state 
member has to host. The conflict between these two powers must be regulated by 
                                                      
5 Ibid. 





agreements between the two institutions. On the other hand, the United States of 
America hold both the power to control its borders and an immunity against the 
European Union powers to regulate immigration, given that the European Union 
does not have the power to decide the quota of refugees that the United States ought 
to host. Also, powers can also appear as jointly held: Anna has the power to elect her 
representatives in Parliament, but her power must be exercised conjunctively with 
the same power of her fellow members of society. 
Moreover, powers that do not necessarily come accompanied with an immunity 
against another’s power may overlap and coexist. For example, Michigan allows the 
farming and use of medical marijuana. However, at the federal level marijuana is 
classified as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act, making its 
distribution a federal offence. Thus the state may not prosecute the use of marijuana 
in Michigan, but the federal government may. In this case Michigan has the power to 
allow the use for medical purposes of a controlled substance within its territory, but 
has no immunity against the federal government’s power to make the use of 
marijuana a criminal act within the same territory. Like powers, freedoms may also 
overlap, and different people may hold freedoms that cannot be exercised at the 
same time, and that are not protected by a claim against interference. For example 
Anna and Ben both have a freedom to take a free glass of wine at a reception; 
however, they cannot drink the same glass of wine at the same time.  
Territorial rights are complex systems of Hohfeldian normative incidents that 
indicate what the holder and others may legitimately do with regards to land and 
territory. I propose that territorial rights should be understood as a set of normative 
incidents combined in three broader categories: 
a) Territorial jurisdiction: powers to legislate, enforce, and adjudicate 
regarding people and regarding land and resources of individuals present 
within the relevant borders. These include the right to tax and regulate 
privately-owned property, as well as the management of non-privately-owned 
property. These powers may be protected by immunities against other states, 
sub-groups, individuals, or federal institutions exerting territorial jurisdiction 
within the same area. 





b) Resource rights: freedoms to use and powers to manage land and 
resources within the territory. These can be primary and secondary rules, such 
as the freedom to exlpoit a resource or the power to sell it. The freedom to use 
land and resources may be protected by claims that others do not use the same 
land and resources. Powers to manage territory may be protected by 
immunities against others’ powers to manage the same land and its resources. 
These protective incidents may include claims that others do not trespass the 
borders of territorial holdings. 
c) Meta-jurisdiction: the power to transfer territorial jurisdiction to other 
agents.6 
 
I have not listed border control as one of the categories of territorial rights because 
border control is a combination of territorial jurisdiction and resource rights. The 
agent that can control borders has either only a claim that others do not enter a 
territory without its permission (an incident of resource rights), or also powers to 
grant freedoms to enter and join the activities of the community (incidents of 
territorial jurisdiction). In this work, I will refer to how a theory of territorial rights 
may affect rights to control borders. However, I do not focus on this issue because 
the right to exclude others from a territory is grounded in part on the agent’s 
territorial rights and in part on considerations regarding our global obligations.7 The 
justification of the claim against others entering a territory requires, thus, a thorough 
analysis of political authority and of global justice that falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. In this thesis, unless stated otherwise, I assume that an agent that has 
territorial jurisdiction and resource rights also holds rights against immigration.8 
 
                                                      
6 The incidents listed have associated immunities, according to which others lack the power to change 
the right-holder’s normative situation. 
7 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201-
230. 
8 For a discussion on territorial rights and the right to control borders see Lægaard, S. “Territorial 
Rights, Political Association, and Immigration.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, no. 5, 2013, 645-670, and 
Clara Sandelind, “Territorial Rights and Open Borders” in Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 18, no. 5, 2013, 487-507. 





2 Territorial Rights in Detail 
 
2.1 Terr i tor ia l  Jurisdic t ion 
 
Territorial jurisdiction comprises powers to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce general 
rules of conduct over people, and regarding land and resources within a territory. 
The entitlements that fall under this category allow the agent to set rules of conduct 
within a particular territory, and to create and modify secondary rules (powers and 
immunities) and primary rules (claims and freedoms) regarding people and regarding 
land and resources. A state, in fact, does not have a liberty to set rules of conduct. It 
has, more correctly, a power to legislate within a certain territory, and thus the power 
to, for example, accord to its subjects the right to acquire property and the power to 
sell it, or the right to express their ideas publicly. Jurisdictional powers also allow the 
state to appoint tribunals or special commissions and to accord them powers to 
legislate or adjudicate regarding land and natural resources among other issues. 
Territory in this case is primarily used as a criterion according to which every 
individual residing (permanently or temporarily) within the area of influence of the 
agent that holds these rights, and every resource and land within the borders of the 
area of influence, are subject to that agent’s authority. 
All rights, including territorial ones, refer to a relation between people, and not 
between people and objects. Objects, in fact, may not hold any normative incidents. 
Thus, when we speak about territorial jurisdiction regarding land and resources, such 
as the power to settle rules for the exploitation of an oil well, we speak of a 
normative relationship between the right holder and other agents regarding the use 
and control of the oil well. Territorial jurisdiction regarding land and resources is, 
thus, a type of territorial jurisdiction over people. The former concerns normative 
relations between people with regards to the control, management, and use of natural 
resources, borders, and land, but does not include also powers to legislate with 
regards to, for example, people’s rights to freedom of expression, to associate, to 
access education, and the like. In this work I concentrate on territorial jurisdiction 
with regards to land and resources. 





The reason for focusing on territorial jurisdiction regarding land and resources and 
not on territorial jurisdiction over people in general is that the latter pertains less to 
territory than it does to political authority over people in general. Territory in the 
case of territorial jurisdiction over people in general serves only as a way to identify 
the scope of the agent’s jurisdictional powers. But jurisdiction over people does not 
necessarily need to be territorial: many institutions have authority over people 
regardless of their location. For example, the Roman Catholic Church can be 
considered a non-territorial authority, as it exerts its powers over its members 
regardless of whether they reside. Similarly, citizenship is a type of membership that 
transcends the location of the state’s subjects and allows the state to control and 
protect its subjects in virtue of their membership in the community. 
In particular territorial jurisdiction over people in general consists of the powers to 
legislate, adjudicate, and enforce rules over subjects and over aliens within a certain 
territory. They include, for example, the power to accord rights to the protection of 
one’s life to people within the territory, the power to adjudicate in a case of assault 
occurred within the territory, or the power to give the right to vote to citizens, and to 
deny it to residents. Territorial jurisdiction over people in general may also include 
powers to accord or reject rights with regards to its subjects’ personal property. For 
example, a state can accord a right of its subjects to move some of their capital 
abroad, or reject aliens’ entry if they are transporting goods that the state deems as a 
threat to its community. 
Powers over aliens within the territory may include the power to accord (or reject) 
citizenship or residency to individuals who enter the territory. Powers over aliens 
within the territory differ from the claim that aliens do not enter the territory because 
in the former case the state is according aliens with a right to stay or a duty to leave. 
In virtue of its territorial jurisdiction, the state can exercise its power to coerce aliens 
to comply with their duty to leave the territory if they are already present. Instead, 
the claim that they do not enter a territory without the state’s permission is an 
incident of resource rights, which concern the physical actions permitted or not with 
regards to the state’s territory. When aliens are outside the territory, in fact, the state 
has no power over aliens on the basis of its territorial jurisdiction, and it can only 
claim that they do not enter its territory if it holds such claim. 





Territorial jurisdiction over people regarding land and resources consists instead of the 
power to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce rules regarding agents’ use of land and 
natural resources located within the territory. These powers include those to regulate 
privately or publicly owned property, such as the power to determine rules of 
taxation regarding the use and management of property holdings or to establish 
conditions under which private owners can exploit a deposit of oil that belongs to 
the country. Territorial jurisdiction over land and resources also includes powers to 
regulate the discovery and appropriation of undiscovered resources. The state can, 
for example, establish the rules for original acquisition by setting a rule according to 
which every newly discovered resource deposit belongs to the state. 
Territorial jurisdiction over people in general includes jurisdictional powers regarding 
territory, but may occur independently and separately from incidents of territorial 
jurisdiction regarding territory. For example, the Republic of San Marino holds 
territorial jurisdiction over people having the power to accord residency or to tax 
capital investments made within its soil; however, it lacks the power to regulate the 
cultivation of tobacco, which is instead held by the Italian Republic. The Republic of 
San Marino is an example also of an agent that holds some territorial jurisdiction 
regarding territory, but it lacks some powers of territorial jurisdiction over people in 
general. San Marino has powers to tax property held within its borders, which is an 
incident of territorial jurisdiction regarding territory, but its powers to legislate and 
adjudicate regarding criminal activities within its borders is deferred to the Italian 
Republic. Moreover, territorial jurisdiction may be held together or separately from 
protective claims or immunities. San Marino, for example, has no immunity against 
Italy imposing criminal laws within its territory. And although it has a power to 
accord residency to aliens, it has no claim that Italians do not enter its territory. 
Territorial jurisdiction over people is largely part of a theory of political authority in 
general. It takes into consideration values and principles that do not have to do only, 
or exclusively, with territory and resources. So for example, a theory of political 
authority will be concerned with the conditions under which an agent may restrict 
and regulate its subjects’ freedom of expression or their right to associate or to vote. 
Territorial jurisdiction with regards to territory and resources, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the circumstances under which someone can buy property in land, or 





exploit natural resources found within particular territorial borders. Although I focus 
on territorial jurisdiction with regards to territory, in the following chapters I will also 
discuss how a theory of territorial rights may affect our normative theory of 
territorial jurisdiction over people in general. However, a serious attempt at 
examining territorial jurisdiction over people in general requires an encompassing 
theory of political authority that I do not offer in this work. 
Finally, I argue that in so far as territorial jurisdiction regarding resources spills over 
the domain of political authority over people in general, its exclusive exercise must 
be subject to some requirements of legitimacy. I define these requirements in 
Chapter 5. However, the picture that I paint there can only be incomplete, as it 
requires a fuller understanding of people’s national and global reciprocal obligations 
and a view on the conditions under which political authority can ever be exerted. 
 
2.2 Resource  Rights  
 
Resource rights are entitlements to access, manage, and use natural resources and 
land. Resource rights comprise primary and secondary rules. Primary rules, such as 
the liberty to use a deposit of oil, indicate whether an action is permitted, required, or 
forbidden with regards to land and resources within a particular territory. Secondary 
rules, like the power to sell a piece of land, indicate the ability of the agent to change 
his or another’s normative incidents with regards to that particular land. 
Resource rights may include, but are not limited to: 
- The right to possess a land or its resources and to exert physical control over it: for 
example, a claim that others do not enter the territory; 
- The right to use the land or its resources: for example, the freedom to exploit the oil 
deposit of a specific geographical area; 
- The right to manage the land and its resources: for example, the power to decide 
how and by whom the land and its resources can be used, or under what 
conditions others can trespass; 





- The right to the income from land and its resources: for example, the claim to the 
proceeds from land; 
- The right to the capital value of a land and its resources: for example, the liberty to 
exhaust a deposit of oil; 
- The immunity from expropriation; 
- The right to transmit the title to others, by sale or gift: for example the power to sell 
or donate a deposit of oil.9 
Resource rights may appear together with claims that others do not interfere with the 
exercise of some freedoms, or with immunities against other’s powers to manage the 
same land. For example, an Amish congregation may have a right to manage the 
water of a river by, for example, deciding who can use it for fishing, and how much 
water each family may draw from it every week. This power may be protected by an 
immunity against the neighbouring Amish community to control the fishing activities 
there. But it is possible that the two Amish communities share the power to manage 
the same river, and must take decisions jointly regarding fishing activities there.  
Supporters of the view that territorial rights are ultimately property rights call 
attention to the fact that owners may hold jurisdictional powers regarding resources 
and land. They argue that the owner has a power to regulate how people should 
behave within the borders of their property, like for example imposing on guests a 
dress code for a house party if they want to enter the property. Because property 
rights allow the owner to accord rights and duties to people on the basis of their 
location, they argue that property rights can include not only resource rights, but also 
powers of territorial jurisdiction.10 
However, territorial jurisdiction indicates powers to create and modify resource 
rights, and the two classes of territorial rights must be distinguished to clarify their 
                                                      
9 Resource rights are akin to property rights and for this list I have taken inspiration from Honoré’s 
list of incidents that comprise ownership (A.M. Honoré, “Ownership” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
ed. A.G. Guest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 18; Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private 
Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 49. 
10 A.J. Simmons, “On the Territorial Rights of States” Philosophical Issues, 11, no. 1(2001): 307; Hillel 
Steiner, “Territorial Justice and Global Redistribution” in The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, eds. 
Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34. 





relation. Blending the two categories of rights obscures the difference of the roles 
that they perform, and it muddles the debate on their moral foundations. Moreover, 
territorial jurisdiction and resource rights are independent from each other and do 
not necessarily appear side by side. In fact, an agent may hold territorial jurisdiction 
within a territory without also holding resource rights there. Consider again San 
Marino. It has territorial jurisdiction but does not have a claim that aliens, and in 
particular Italians, do not enter its territory without permission. An agent may also 
hold resource rights without having territorial jurisdiction. For example, a group may 
have the right to use a river for fishing and the claim that others do not use the same 
river without its permission. However, the group may also lack the power to legislate 
with regards to the limitations of fishing activities, which may be deferred to political 
institutions aimed at protecting the environment. 
 
2.3 Meta-Jurisdic t ional  Rights  
 
Meta-jurisdictional rights are higher order secondary norms that allow the agent to 
create and modify jurisdictional powers over people and territory. Meta-jurisdictional 
rights that are territorial allow their holder to accord territorial jurisdictional powers 
to others over an identified territory and to create and modify territorial jurisdictional 
units.11 The clearest example of meta-jurisdictional powers is the right to secede. 
When a group secedes from an existing state, it exercises powers to accord territorial 
jurisdictional powers to new political institutions. Moreover, the group also exercises 
the power to identify the territorial borders of the new political unit. Thus, we can 
distinguish two incidents of territorial meta-jurisdictional powers: 
- powers to determine who holds jurisdictional powers within a territory: 
An example is the power of the United States of America to accord to the US federal 
institutions some powers of territorial jurisdiction over their soil. These powers differ 
                                                      
11 Allen Buchanan, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say,” in 
States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries, eds. Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 235; Anna Stilz, “Why do States Have Territorial 
Rights?” International Theory, 1, no. 2 (2009): 206. 





from non-territorial meta-jurisdictional powers as they allow the holder to accord 
territorial jurisdiction with regards to land and resources. A non-territorial meta-
jurisdictional power, differently, allows the agent to accord jurisdictional powers that 
do not regard land and resources. For example, a non-territorial meta-jurisdictional 
power can be the power of the United States of America to accord to the US federal 
institutions powers to protect their citizens abroad through the activities of 
embassies and consulates.  
- powers to determine which territory is controlled by agents that is entrusted 
with jurisdictional powers: 
These powers allow the agent to identify the geographical extent of the validity of 
territorial jurisdiction. Territorial meta-jurisdictional rights include powers to control 
and limit dismemberment of the territorial unit, or to identify in the first place the 
extent of the territorial unit under an agent’s territorial jurisdiction. For example, 
Russia exerted its territorial meta-jurisdictional power by transferring to the United 




In the following chapters, I provide an analysis of the existing theories of territorial 
rights. I organize them according to the way they justify territorial jurisdiction and 
the way they identify the agent that can hold territorial rights. I use the terminology 
set up above to refer to each different incident, and I use the term territorial rights to 
indicate all the incidents in general. To a large extent, my terminology does not differ 
radically to that used by the literature. However, the literature does not distinguish 
between territorial jurisdiction and resource rights and the immunities and claims 
that protect these two classes of entitlements. For the most part, when other authors 
speak of territorial jurisdiction or resource rights they imply that they come 
accompanied with claims and immunities that make these rights exclusive to the right 
holder. For this reason, only in Chapter 3 and 4 do I use the terms ‘resource rights’ 
and ‘territorial jurisdiction’ to include also the corresponding claims of non-
interference and immunities against overlapping jurisdictional powers. However, in 





Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I will refer to resource rights and territorial jurisdiction as 
distinct from the possible protective claims and immunities that may accompany 
them. 
The inclination of the literature to speak of territorial jurisdiction and resource rights 
as exclusive reveals the intuition that for a right to be meaningful it must appear in its 
strongest form, as an exclusive title to something. If we can identify very strong 
entitlements to something, then our work in addressing conflict will, indeed, be 
much easier. However, rights play the role of strong moral considerations in favor of 
the right holder even if they are not protected by claims and immunities. Competing 
and overlapping freedoms and powers, even when left unprotected, tell us something 
about whose interests are worthy of protection and whose are not, and to what 
extent the protection of these interests must drive our decisions. Moreover, it is not 
always the case that coexisting and overlapping freedoms and powers will necessarily 
be in conflict. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I develop my proposal and explain why we do not need to 
speak of territorial jurisdiction and resource rights as necessarily exclusive. I rely on 
the distinction between powers, freedoms, claims, and immunities to show that a 
more nuanced account of territorial rights allows us to address territorial conflicts 
without neglecting the various and complex ways in which individuals and groups 













In this chapter I examine the literature on territorial rights and divide it accordingly 
to two justificatory strategies: indirect and direct. Direct theories maintain that an 
agent acquires territorial jurisdiction because the agent’s control over that territory is 
in itself necessary to the protection of some fundamental interests, such as collective 
self-determination, individuals’ ability to pursue one’s life-plans, or individuals’ 
happiness. Indirect theories, on the other hand, maintain that an agent acquires 
territorial jurisdiction because jurisdictional powers regarding territory and resources 
are instrumental for the establishment of effective or minimally just political 
institutions, which in turn are in themselves necessary to the protection of 
fundamental interests.  
Armstrong makes a similar distinction between direct and indirect claims to 
resources. Similarly he suggests that a direct claim to a resource states that an agent 
has a right to control and use a resource on the basis of “some feature of the agent’s 
relationship with that resource.” An indirect claim, on the other hand, is grounded 
on “prior claims such as claims to exercise control over land or over borders.”1 
Armstrong distinction differs from mine in so far as it refers to resource rights. For 
Armstrong indirect accounts of resource rights justify resource rights on the basis of 
existing titles to territorial jurisdiction. My distinction applies the same framework to 
territorial jurisdiction, and classifies theories on whether they propose that an agent’s 
powers of territorial jurisdiction are grounded on a prior entitlement to legitimate 
authority over its members, or whether they are justified because they are in 
themselves instrumental to the protection of fundamental interests.  
In particular, for indirect theories, jurisdictional powers on territory must be 
accorded to a political community that has established or is able to establish just 
institution within a bounded area, in so far as control over that area is needed for the 
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effective performance of the groups’ political institutions. If a state or a group is able 
to establish or has established justice within a territory, then it acquires territorial 
rights on that territory, including jurisdictional powers, resource rights, border 
control, a claim that others do not use their resources, and an immunity against 
others’ jurisdictional power within their land. For direct theories, on the other hand, 
communities or individuals acquire territorial rights if these are in themselves 
necessary for the protection of the agent’s interests, and regardless of whether the 
agent upholds legitimate authority. In this and the next chapter, I show that direct 
theories are preferable because they do not incur in what I call the in rem problem, 
and because they are better at addressing the particularity requirement.  
The in rem problem occurs when a theory does not succeed in offering a conclusive 
justification in favor of one agent’s territorial jurisdiction and against other agents’ 
competing jurisdictional powers. Because they suffer from the in rem problem, 
indirect theories must resort to some principle other than legitimate political 
authority to establish some agents’ interests priority over others’. Buchanan suggests 
that in some cases, like for instance secession, we must hold a precautionary principle 
against the unnecessary alteration of current territorial holdings, thus proposing that 
the existing group upholding just institutions is the primary holder of territorial 
rights.2  
However, a precautionary principle of this kind does not tell us why or how the 
group can legitimately take control of a territory and establish political institutions 
there. This strategy thus fails to address the particularity requirement, which demands 
that the theory is able to explain why an agent can take control of a particular 
geographical location and its resources. It would seem that the only reason why the 
agent that currently exerts territorial jurisdiction can continue to do so is that it has in 
the past successfully excluded others from establishing political institutions there. It 
is possible, in fact, that the establishment of functioning institutions is not 
instantaneous, and that to establish those institutions the agent must have physically 
taken control of the territory before it could legitimately do so. A theory that is able 
to address the in rem problem and the particularity requirement, on the other hand, 
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will offer an account of why and in what conditions an agent may legitimately 
establish institutions within some particular geographical borders, before it actually 
exercises de facto control of that territory. 
The indirect theories are subject to the in rem problem in two ways. First, some 
indirect theories require that an agent has established minimally just institutions that 
protect fundamental human rights within some geographical borders for it to hold 
legitimate authority over its members. If this is true, other agents that may have 
legitimate demands on the use and control of territory may see their interests 
unnecessarily frustrated. Think for example of states that are members of federations 
or confederations, but also of administrative authorities and large metropolises that 
in some cases exert similar powers to those of a state and effectively provide for the 
protection of their members’ fundamental rights. If two or more agents effectively 
protect fundamental human rights within an area, then it is unclear which agent 
should be given priority.  
Second, the in rem problem is particularly acute for those indirect theories that 
suggest that for an agent to establish territorial jurisdiction, it has to demonstrate that 
it is able to establish justice within a territory. In those cases, it is very likely that one 
or more agents may display the same ability. As I will show in this chapter, these 
types of indirect theories often resort to some account of attachment that ensures 
that those who legitimately occupy a territory acquire rights on the territory within 
which they have led their lives. However, for these theories attachment merely 
establishes that some individuals or groups have exclusive rights to use and occupy 
certain territories and does not provide the ground for territorial jurisdiction, as the 
latter must be acquired through the legitimate exercise of political authority. 
Because direct theories maintain that an agent acquires territorial jurisdiction when it 
has fundamental interests in a territory, they are more successful in determining a 
unique right-holder. For these theories, attachment to a land provides the basis of an 
agent’s title to that territory. In this way they settle unequivocally that the agent’s 
jurisdiction over the territory that it occupies overcomes other agents’ competing 
powers, when they do not also occupy and make use of the territory in any 
significant way. 





Direct theories are also better suited to fulfill the particularity requirement. The 
particularity requirement, as introduced by Anna Stilz demands that a theory of 
territorial rights explains not only how an agent can come to acquire a title to 
territory in general, but also why it has a right to use and control the particular 
territory that it asserts as its own.3 Theories that merely explain why an agent has a 
title to a territory in general do not necessarily address the issue of which particular 
territory is legitimately under the control of the agent.  
Direct theories rely on an account of attachment to territory to explain how an agent 
may have interests worthy of protection, on the basis of which the agent is accorded 
territorial jurisdiction. For these theories, an agent can acquire territorial rights only 
on the territory within which it has established a significant relation that realizes 
fundamental values. Some theories suggest that the fundamental interest that 
territorial rights protect is individuals’ self-government, or their happiness, or 
collective self-determination. There is only one type of direct theory that fails to 
address the particularity requirement: the utilitarian theory proposed by Sidgwick. I 
will suggest that this is so because Sidgwick, like supporters of indirect theories, 
employs a functionality principle to ground territorial rights.  
Depending on what type of agent can hold territorial rights, theories may perform 
significantly differently with regards to some of the requirements of a theory of 
territorial rights. For this reason I examine each direct and indirect theory according 
to whether the theory maintains that only states may have territorial rights (statist 
theories), or groups (collectivist), or also individuals (individualist). 
I argue that statist theories are subject to the charge of ethnocentrism. 
Ethnocentrism is “the risk, attendant on any achievement view, of smuggling in a 
culturally particular performance criterion,”4 such as the protection of a certain 
conception of property or of efficient use of territory. Statist views are achievement 
views in the sense proposed by Kolers: for these theories an agent acquires territorial 
jurisdiction in virtue of some type of performance that the agent must give, such as 
for example functioning as a state, or achieving some particular goals under certain 
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institutional settings. This approach leaves little space for different communities to 
express their system of values and their narratives regarding territory. In fact, it sets 
specific ways in which important values must be realized and imposes a limitation 
also on which values and relations with the land should be achieved and protected. 
The alternative view, the “status view,” holds instead that an agent acquires territorial 
rights in virtue of some characteristic that it holds. For example a group acquires 
territorial rights because membership in that group is at the center of its members’ 
identity or because it is a voluntary association of individuals. 
Undeniably, any normative proposal regarding the acquisition and enjoyment of 
rights will limit the set of acceptable agents that are able to hold titles on territory. 
Armstrong speaks in this regard of achieving a balance between “special claims” and 
“general claims.” The former are special because they are asserted only by some 
communities, and because these communities demand control of specific resources 
that are in some sense important only to those who regard them as such. “General 
claims,” on the other hand, are demands that outsiders to the relevant communities 
make on their resources, on the basis of deprivation, lack of opportunities for 
prosperity, or equality.5 
A theory that aims at reducing conflict and resentment among diverse individuals 
and groups, and at boosting the success of peaceful international and global relations, 
ought to strike a balance between universal normative requirements and the plurality 
of values that different agents may find worthy of protection. Imposing strict 
demands on what a group of people must believe regarding the value and importance 
of their relation to territory increases resentment towards cultural and political 
integration. I say more about this in Chapter 6, where I introduce my proposal for 
minimal and negative requirements of legitimacy. 
Collectivist theories, on the other hand, are generally very good at addressing the 
issue of ethnocentrism, maintaining that territorial rights should be identified 
through community specific interpretations of the idea of territory and resources. 
However, as Armstrong has suggested, this strategy risks leaving little space for 
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considerations regarding the demands of global distributive justice, whether the 
theory employs a direct or indirect approach. In most collectivist theories, special 
demands based on community-specific systems of values are given a central role in 
determining the scope and extent of territorial rights. This often results in the theory 
neglecting universally valid global justice demands, and failing to strike a balance 
between specific and general demands.6 
Finally, individualist theories are generally very good at addressing the particularity 
requirement and the in rem problem, given that the title to a territory is grounded on 
the property rights of a specific set of individuals and on the basis of a direct relation 
between them and the land that they occupy. They also have an advantage with 
regards to the global justice problem: in fact, individualist theories argue that 
individuals may acquire territorial rights regardless of their membership, and on the 
basis of fundamental interests that they may have in the use of territory and its 
resources, regardless of where they reside. For example, the left libertarian theory 
proposed by Steiner suggests that each individual has a general right to a share of 
resources, and a special – albeit limited – right to the resources to which he or she 
has access. However, individualist theories generally require an account of original 
acquisition and valid transfer, as they ground territorial rights on a theory of 
individual property rights. Because of their reliance on a prior theory of property 
rights, these theories encounter the challenge of offering a convincing story about 
original acquisition and valid historical transfer. In Chapter 5, I show that this 
problem can be avoided by employing a conventionalist theory of territorial rights. 
As I will suggest in Chapter 7, individualist theories also have problematic 
implications regarding secession, maintaining that individuals may be permitted to 
secede separately from each other. The individualist view is in sharp contrast with the 
way we commonly think of territorial holdings, and a theory holding such a view 
must go a long way to convince us otherwise. It is not the case that a theory must 
necessarily meet with our current intuitions regarding territory, nor with the current 
international practices or legislation. However, a successful theory of territorial rights 
must be able to convincingly balance our common intuitions and practices to avoid 
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being overly utopic or unfeasible. Although individualist theories may have a 
theoretical advantage with regards to some of the problems encountered by the 
literature, I believe they do not strike that balance, and they put forward an 
improbable and unworkable view of territorial rights. 
The correspondence between ethnocentrism and statist theories, between collectivist 
proposals and the failure to address the demands of global justice, and between 
individualist theories and the need to offer a convincing story about original 
acquisition is not a logical necessity. However, these relations are one factor that 
weights in the balance when evaluating the suitability of a theory of territorial rights. 
The table at 1.1 provides a summary of the analysis of the literature and of the 
challenges that it faces. 
In the next sections I discuss what I call indirect theories of territorial rights. Indirect 
theories are subject to the in rem problem and the particularity problem with few 
exceptions. The permissive theory proposed by Ypi is not subject to the in rem 
problem as it holds that only the state that is effectively exerting political authority 
and effectively upholding cosmopolitan institutions within a territory holds rights to 
that particular territory. As I will discuss below, although Ypi’s proposal resolves the 
issue of identifying a unique right-holder of territorial rights, the theory is unable to 
address the particularity requirement and the demands of global distributive justice. 
For Ypi, in fact, effectively functioning states acquire robust territorial rights as long 
as they meet some minimal requirements that do not also include the respect for the 
demands of a theory of global justice. 
Stilz’s occupancy theory and the Nine’s collectivist Lockean theory are both able to 
address the particularity requirement by holding that a group of people can acquire 
territorial jurisdiction within a particular land only if they also have previous 
occupancy rights (or resource rights) within that land on the basis of a fundamental 
relation between them and the territory they occupy. However, because these prior 
rights are not territorial jurisdictional powers, the theories do not successfully isolate 
one unique holder of the power to exert jurisdiction within specific geographical 
boundaries. I suggest that the collectivist Lockean theory also encounters the 
difficulty of having to offer a convincing account of original acquisition and just 





transfer, and – for one version of the theory – it also has trouble striking a balance 
between special and universal demands to territory. 
 




In Rem Particularity Original Acquisition Global Justice Ethnocentrism
It does not offer a 
conclusive 
justification in favor 
of  the group’s 
territorial jurisdiction 
and against existing 
competing 
jurisdictional powers.
It is unclear which 
exact territory is the 
object of  territorial 
rights and why it 
cannot be any other.
It requires a convincing 
account of  original 
titles to land and of  just 
transferal.




giving too much 
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values and narratives 
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Permissive (Ypi) √ √ √
Collectivist 
Lockean (Nine)
√ √ √ √
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because the state is the 
precondition for the 
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they posit that 
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Few indirect have this 
problem because property 
rights are established with 




Direct theories always 
succeed because 
territorial jurisdiction is 
acquired on the basis of  
the agent's special and 
unique relation with the 
territory.
Collectivist
Few direct have this 
problem, because title is 
closely tied to a 
particular territory.





2 Statist Indirect Theories 
 
Statist indirect theories maintain that only states can legitimately demand territorial 
rights on the basis of their power to exert political authority over people. Because 
political authority is necessary for the protection of individuals’ basic human rights, a 
political community that has established or can establish functional and minimally 
just political institutions acquires control of a territory. Once a state has established 
or can establish legitimate powers over people, and thus also legitimate territorial 
jurisdiction, it subsequently acquires robust rights to resources and claims against 
interference, the right to control borders, and immunities against others’ overlapping 
territorial jurisdiction.  
In this chapter, I refer to the combination of these four normative incidents as 
territorial rights in general and to each separate incident if the argument distinguishes 
between territorial jurisdiction, border control, and rights to the use and exploitation 
of resources. The theories I examine in this chapter make no distinction between 
territorial jurisdiction and the immunity against others’ powers on the same territory. 
In the following chapters, it will be clear that my account relies heavily on the fact 
that these two incidents are distinct and can appear disjunctively.  
However, for now I follow the classic terminology. Thus, when I speak of territorial 
jurisdiction I imply that it includes also immunities against others’ jurisdictional 
powers on the same territory. So for example, if we believe that the United Kingdom 
has territorial jurisdiction over its soil, we also assume that the European Union has 
no power to impose on its government that it accepts and integrates a quota of 
Syrian refugees, unless the United Kingdom has previously devolved to the 
European institutions such power. 
Statist indirect theories differ from each other with regards to the requirements for 
legitimate political authority, and the way in which they identify the scope of the 
territorial holding. The legitimate state theory proposed by Buchanan, and the 
occupancy theory by Stilz employ a functionality principle, which holds that a state 
acquires territorial jurisdiction if this power is necessary to secure minimal standards 
of performance. For Buchanan, a state secures minimal standards of performance if 





it establishes functional minimally just political institutions within a territory, and for 
Stilz it acquires territorial jurisdiction if it is able to establish minimally just 
institutions. 
Ypi’s permissive theory, on the other hand, uses the permissive principle according 
to which a state acquires territorial jurisdiction if this power is necessary for the 
establishment of cosmopolitan justice. Given that cosmopolitan institutions are 
difficult to fully realize, a state holds territorial jurisdiction only provisionally when it 
has established functional institutions that represent the general will of the people 
subject to them, and when is at least committed to the realization of cosmopolitan 
institutions. Territorial rights become conclusive if the state subjects itself to existing 
and just cosmopolitan institutions. The permissive principle is a type of functionality 
principle, holding that state institutions are needed for the realization of both internal 
justice and cosmopolitan principles. The functionality and permissive principles 
require that the agent give a certain institutional performance to be able to hold 
territorial jurisdiction. In this way the three theories restrict significantly the 
possibility that alternative values and practices from those realized by a theory of just 
state may be the ground for legitimate jurisdictional powers over territory, making 
the statist indirect theories subject to the challenge of ethnocentrism. 
In the next subsections, I examine the details of the three variants of indirect statist 
theory to show that they suffer from the in rem problem, that they do not successfully 
address the particularity requirement, and that their focus on states as the only agents 
able to hold territorial rights makes them liable to the charge of ethnocentrism. 
 
2.1 Legi t imate State  Theory 
 
The legitimate state theory maintains that states hold territorial jurisdiction as long as 
they establish minimal conditions of justice through state-like political institutions. 
The establishment of just institutions that effectively protect at least individuals’ basic 
human rights grounds the state’s territorial jurisdiction, as well as the state’s powers 





of political authority over people within the territory that its subjects occupy.7 
Institutions that are able to protect fundamental individual interests, Buchanan and 
Stilz argue, can only be a state-like actor that is able to establish the rule of law, and 
to ensure the protection of rights.8  
Stilz refers to the Kantian version of the problem of the unilateral will to explain why 
individuals cannot establish property rights in land without the prior establishment of 
state-like political institutions.9 According to the Kantian theory of right, individuals 
can take legitimate possession of some external object only if they are effectively 
subject to the general will, embodied in established political institutions. When an 
agent takes possession of some external objects, such as land, he can exert exclusive 
control over it only by means of imposing on others a duty to refrain from using the 
object of his choice. This imposition, however, cannot source merely from the 
agent’s desire to have that land for him. If the obligation of others was grounded on 
the simple unilateral imposition of the agent’s will, then the relation between the 
agent and other agents would be subject to the volatility of individuals’ or groups’ 
desires and ability to coerce each other into compliance.  
To avoid the unilateralness of acquisition, every agent should collect each other’s 
consent to act freely in the external world. This, however, is impossible, and agents 
are thus effectively hindered from exercising their natural right to freedom. It seems 
that an agent would be forced by necessity (to feed himself or to find shelter, for 
example) to violate other agents’ rights unilaterally, and thus to act unjustly. Kant 
suggests a way out of this problem by proposing that individuals’ unilateral will can 
be imposed with the condition that they subject themselves to the authority of the 
general will, and thus, to established and shared political institutions. The function of 
the state is that of establishing rights (and thus also property rights in land) among its 
citizens in virtue of the fact that free individuals have an interest in exercising their 
                                                      
7 Buchanan, The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, 233; Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 234; Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of 
Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 64; Cara 
Nine, Global Justice and Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 36; Stilz, Why do States Have 
Territorial Rights?, 204. 
8 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination, 374; Stilz, Why do States Have Territorial Rights? 199. 
9 Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
173; Anna Stilz, “Nations, States, and Territory,” Ethics, 121, no. 3 (2011): 581; Lea Ypi, “A 
Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,” European Journal of Philosophy, 22, no. 2  (2012): 303. 





external freedom, without being subject to the unilateral will of others. Only by 
means of establishing state-like institutions, then, can individuals and groups acquire 
legitimate titles to external objects. States’ rights, for this reason, are prior to 
individual rights. 
Similarly, Buchanan suggests that states can hold territorial rights if they effectively 
protect basic human rights through processes that themselves protect human rights.10 
The validity of territorial rights rests, thus, on the effective protection of human 
rights through legitimate political institutions. Moreover, individuals are under a 
natural duty to submit to just political association, to support just institutions that 
already apply to them, and to help ensure that everyone has access to minimally just 
political institutions. 11 According to this view, treating persons as moral equals 
require that we help them access minimally just institutions, because just political and 
legal institutions are necessary for the protection of human rights. 12  Although 
Buchanan makes no explicit reference to the Kantian problem of the unilateral will, 
the insistence on a natural duty of justice resonates with the Kantian argument of the 
necessity of legal and political institutions. 
States, thus, hold political authority in virtue of the interest of individuals in being 
subject to just institutions that effectively ensure the protection of a system of rights. 
For the system of rights to credibly represent the general will, the state is required to 
put in place mechanisms to ensure that every subject’s interests are met. These 
mechanisms must be reactive to the people’s beliefs and needs, and they must enact 
rules that its subjects would reasonably endorse. For this reason the political 
institutions that a state should have to hold territorial rights must pursue the values 
of political participation and freedom of expression, and they must ensure the 
respect of basic rights to life, security, and individual liberty.13  
States acquire robust territorial rights because these are functional to the securing of 
the required minimal standards of performance. It is important to note that the 
functionality principle is valid only to the extent that the institutions respect basic 
                                                      
10 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 247. 
11 Ibid., 27 and 87. 
12 Ibid., 88. 
13 Stilz, Nations, States, and Territory, 23; Buchanan, The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, 245. 





human rights and comply with democratic principles of political participation and 
individual freedom. This allows the legitimate state theory to limit the acquisition of 
robust territorial rights only to those states that respect some universal set of human 
rights. The proponents of the legitimate state theory do not expressly mention how 
their theory strikes a balance with the demands of global distributive justice. 
However, the limitation on the acquisition of resources leaves ample space for the 
demands of global distributive justice, especially if the functionality principle is 
intended to limit territorial acquisition to only what is necessary for the protection of 
minimal conditions of justice.14 
The legitimate state theory does not offer an explanation as to why states have rights 
on the particular territories they control. That a state is able to establish justice 
somewhere says nothing about the state’s entitlement to the particular territory that it 
occupies. As Stilz notes, it is not sufficient to show that the state has a right to 
territorial jurisdiction to explain why the state has a right to exert territorial 
jurisdiction within a particular territory.15 So for example, that the state of France has 
a right to territorial jurisdiction because territorial jurisdiction is necessary for the 
proper functioning of its institutions does not explain why France has territorial 
jurisdiction only over the territory of France and why its institutions could not be 
legitimately imposed or established somewhere else.  
To show that for instance the state of France has no right to Antarctica or that it has 
indeed a right to territorial jurisdiction within the territory its members currently 
occupy, a theory of territorial rights must show why the state of France has a 
normatively important relation with the particular territory it controls. The 
justification of the right to a particular territory should also tell us why no other agent 
has territorial jurisdiction on the territory controlled by the state of France.  
For Buchanan, the presence of a community in a particular territory is an arbitrary 
fact. This does not establish any normative tie between the group and the land. Thus, 
it is unclear why a group of people may not be able to carry out their natural duty of 
justice in any territory that is not already legitimately controlled by another group, 
                                                      
14 Armstrong, Against Permanent Sovereignty, 11. 
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even if they do not occupy that territory to begin with. The legitimate state theory 
does not offer arguments against benevolent colonialism or the annexation of 
territories that are not controlled by minimally just state-like institutions but that may 
very well be occupied by other types of political communities.16 
Moreover, the theory is not able to identify a unique holder of territorial jurisdiction 
and thus suffers from the in rem problem. If a state acquires territorial holdings 
because it effectively protects basic rights somewhere, it is unclear which state may 
demand exclusive territorial jurisdiction in the case of federations, confederations, or 
associations like the European Union. In these cases both the higher order 
institutions and the states members may uphold state-like institutions that are able to 
protect individuals’ basic human rights. The legitimacy state theory does not offer a 
principle that gives priority to one or the other agent in the case of overlapping 
functioning institutions. One could say that the relations between states and federal 
institutions, for example, are determined by the agreement of the member states, that 
will decide to what extent federal institutions may legitimately exert territorial 
jurisdiction within their territory.  
However, the theory does not help us understand why states had territorial 
jurisdiction to begin with and why their titles to jurisdiction take priority over other 
associations that may have emerged later in time. It would seem that the only reason 
why the states members of a federation enjoy territorial jurisdiction because they 
have successfully established political institutions somewhere at some point, 
obstructing others from doing the same. In fact it is probable that the establishment 
of the state’s functioning institutions was a process that involved physical control of 
the territory before the state could legitimately exert jurisdiction there. To justify the 
priority of the state that first established just institutions one must invoke the natural 
duty of justice and argue that subjects of a state have a duty to support just political 
institutions regardless of how they came to be established. This is Buchanan’s 
position that also entails that a group may never secede from a minimally just state. 
                                                      
16 Buchanan doesn’t offer any specific argument that justifies the particular rights to the territory that a 
state holds. His account implies that the location in which some states emerge and develop is a matter 
of chance. Although he doesn’t explicitly develop this argument further, it could be reasonable to 
think that he appeals to some inherent value in actual occupation of land as a precondition for holding 
territorial entitlements. 





On the other hand, Stilz argues that some groups may secede even if they are already 
subject to just institutions. In the next section and in Chapter 7 I explain why this 
concession leads to problematic implications and makes the occupancy theory liable 
to the in rem problem. 
 
2.2 Occupancy Theory 
 
The occupancy theory builds on the legitimate state theory, and uses a combination 
of the occupancy principle and the individual self-government principle to address 
the particularity requirement. For the occupancy theory, a state has territorial 
jurisdiction because this power is necessary for the state to secure minimal standards 
of performance (the functionality principle) and if it represents the people that are 
legitimately occupying that particular territory. 
For the occupancy theory a state has territorial rights if the requirements for 
legitimate political authority are satisfied.17 However, the state must also meet two 
other conditions: (1) the subjects of the state must have a legitimate right to occupy 
that specific territory, and (2) the state must not be a usurper. Condition (1) directly 
addresses the particularity problem and introduces the idea of occupancy rights. 
Condition (2) poses a further constraint on the legitimacy of state’s political authority 
that requires that the state to which a people is subject has in some ways authorized 
it. I will address condition (2) later in this section and suggest that the introduction of 
this condition makes the occupancy theory liable to the in rem problem. For now, I 
will examine the occupancy theory’s response to the particularity requirement and 
introduce two principles that make this theory an interesting and compelling 
proposal: the occupancy principle and the individual self-government principle. 
                                                      
17 Stilz divides this requirement into two: (1) the state is able to implement a minimally efficient 
system of law, and (2) the system of laws protects basic rights and provides for political participation. 
This second requirement is satisfied if the agent is a state and if the rule of law respects the principles 
of democratic participation. Stilz’s argument for democracy supports the primacy of the state as the 
only agent that can establish democratic institutions. The fact that the state is the only agent worthy of 
holding territorial rights is thus not a condition for territorial rights to be legitimate but a logical 
necessity for individuals to emerge from the state of nature: Stilz calls it a “natural duty to uphold just 
institutions” (Nations, States, and Territory, 38). Stilz’s theory is grounded on the same premises of the 
Kantian theory of inner freedom and the problem of the unilateral will explained in section 2.1. 





To fulfill condition (1), the subjects of a state must legitimately occupy that particular 
territory. Individuals have occupancy rights on a particular geographical location if 
they currently reside there or have previously done so (the occupancy principle), if access 
to that particular area is fundamental to the pursuit of their located life plans (the 
principle of individual self-government), and if the individuals’ relation with that area was 
established without wrongdoing on their part.18 In this view, the people legitimately 
occupying a territory have a prima facie claim that others do not displace them from 
that location and do not disrupt their life plans.19 
The principle of occupancy together with the principle of individual self-government 
recall a widespread intuition that the mere fact of occupation should have moral 
significance,20 in particular in relation to the expectations that it creates within a 
community, and with regards to the interests of the people who are thriving and 
planning their lives in that particular territory. Life plans are in important ways 
dependent on the specific nature of the area in which they were established and 
designed. So for example, for farmers to continue performing their activities it is 
important that they can rely on a suitable geographical area. Relocation to the 
Brazilian rainforest would mean a drastic change in their habits and plans and in the 
success of their venture. Geographical areas are also the location of religious 
practices, some of which may depend on the particular land in which they have been 
traditionally performed. The Black Hills have religious significance for the Sioux, and 
the Blue Lake is the center of the Pueblo Indians’ rituals.21 
Stilz notes that displacing people from one territory creates important disruptions in 
their lives, and the wrong that they suffer cannot be explained without making sense 
                                                      
18 Stilz call this last requirement the no wrongdoing constraint. I will not examine this element of her 
theory because it regards the issue of historical injustice, which I do not address here. Suffice to say 
that the no wrongdoing constraint poses that the legitimate occupiers of a land must not have violated 
the right of occupancy of previous occupiers through “no fault of their own” (Nations, States, and 
Territory, 17; Stilz “Occupancy Rights and the Wrong of Removal,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41, no. 
4 (2013): 352-353). It is not easy to define what exactly Stilz means with “no fault of their own” (Ypi, 
A Permissive Theory, 300). However, she explicitly rules out cases in which individuals are brought up 
with expectations that their people will one day conquer lands that they were promised or that they 
occupied in the remote past. According to Stilz, these expectations are too farfetched and detached 
from reality to be considered objective (Nations, States, and Territory, 585 n23). 
19 In fact, there may be competing legitimate titles to that same territory, for example those of 
populations that were unjustly displaced from there before. 
20 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1888] 1978), Book III. 
21 Stilz, Occupancy Rights, 335. 





of the special way in which individuals rely on a particular geographical area.22 The 
principle of occupancy pursues the values of stability of expectations, acknowledging 
a prima facie consideration for the arrangements that are currently in place.23 The 
success of pursuing one’s life-plans depends to a significant extent on the relative 
security of a person’s expectations regarding his or her assets and regarding the 
behavior of others with respect of those holdings. People think of their lives as 
protracting into the future, and live in the assumption that what they build today will 
not disappear tomorrow. An important aspect of Stilz’s proposal is that the ends that 
are worth protecting are only those on which many other personal choices depend, 
and according to which individuals structure their aims and values.24  
For the occupancy theory, then, individuals are at liberty (that is, they have no duty 
not) to establish their life plans within any territory that is not already legitimately 
occupied by other people. They also have a duty to respect others’ occupancy rights. 
This means that they have a duty not to remove the occupiers from the area and a 
duty not to interfere with their use of the space in ways that significantly undermines 
their shared social practices. This includes also leaving enough space for the 
occupiers to pursue their located life-plans.25 Moreover, as for the legitimate state 
theory, any state that may be established within the particular territory that 
individuals occupy must protect basic human rights and enact some type of 
democratic system of political participation. 26  Once existing institutions have 
                                                      
22 Many other authors share this intuition (Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics (London: Macmillan, 
1987); Jeremy Waldron, “Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy,” New Zealand Journal of Public 
International Law 1 (2002): 55-82; Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States; Tamar Meisels, Territorial 
Rights, 2nd ed. (Springer, 2009); Miller, Territorial Rights). However, within the indirect theories, only 
Stilz points at the characteristically territorial nature of life-plans (Occupancy Rights, 346).  
23 Waldron, Indigeneity?, 71. Quoting Grotius and Cicero, Waldron suggests that, although unreasonably 
conservative, the principle of actual occupancy has an intuitive strength that has survived the passing 
of time. 
24 Stilz calls them “comprehensive” (Occupancy Rights, 337) but I prefer to use Lomasky’s terminology 
of ‘directive ends’ (Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 57. 
25 There are a number of ways in which the requirement may be interpreted. One may argue that each 
individual should have access to equal space to establish and form one’s life plans. Another weaker 
interpretation of the requirement is that others must have sufficient opportunities to establish located 
life plans. This is the interpretation preferred by Stilz, who argues that others should enjoy access to 
“sufficient natural and social resources” before they can be subject to a duty to respect others’ 
occupancy rights (Occupancy Rights, 354). 
26 Ibid., 333. 





established justice somewhere and represent their subjects, they can legitimately exert 
territorial jurisdiction and their title may not be challenged.  
However, some groups may enjoy occupancy rights and also hold a residual meta-
jurisdictional power even if they are subject to just institution. In Stilz’s view groups 
that were once subject to the same minimally-just political institutions have an 
immunity against others establishing political institutions within the same territory 
because states, even if they are just, must not be usurpers (recall condition (2) at the 
beginning of this section). The groups that enjoy meta-jurisdictional authority must 
be a people that has a history of cooperation together. A people is not a naturally 
existing collective body: the individuals making up a people belong to the same 
group not in virtue of some cultural characteristic, but because of their common past 
participation in legitimate political institutions.27 These groups may not be at liberty 
to reject existing just political institutions, but only those that are illegitimate, or that 
are legitimate but foreign.28 In these cases, the group is permitted to revive the 
former just political arrangements that it once supported and possibly also secede 
from existing institutions. 
It is worth reminding here that the requirement for legitimate political authority 
imposes on groups some limitations on the political arrangements that they must 
hold if they wish to be holders of territorial jurisdiction. For the legitimate state and 
occupancy theories, individuals ought to establish democratic institutions like those 
of a nation state to be able to hold jurisdictional titles to territory. This reduces 
significantly the type of communities that may be eligible to hold territorial 
jurisdiction, excluding among others groups such as, for example, the Whanganui 
river Maori tribes in New Zealand that are currently being given some form of 
territorial jurisdiction even if they do not hold state-like or democratic political 
institutions. These powers are accorded to these communities on the basis of the fact 
that occupancy rights are not enough to protect their ability to uphold complex 
social practices, which depend also on upholding territorial jurisdiction within the 
territory that the community occupies. In the case of the Whanganui river tribes, it 
                                                      
27 Political groups, in fact, can only be established through the realization of institutions that represent 
their members’ general will (Stilz, Nations, States, and Territory, 579). 
28 Stilz poses three conditions: (1) their previous state has failed, (2) their previous state has become 
illegitimate, or (3) their previous state has been usurped by a foreign authority.  





was recognized that they had jurisdiction regarding the use and exploitation of the 
river Whanganui, on the basis of which the New Zealand central government had to 
recognize the river as a juridical person and refrain from development plans not in 
line with the tribes’ beliefs and practices regarding their waters. 
However, for the occupancy theory, occupancy rights do not include resource rights, 
or territorial jurisdictional powers. And in some cases, they also do not include meta-
jurisdictional powers. They, thus, do not offer a ground for territorial jurisdiction and 
a conclusive factor in favor of the occupiers’ legitimate territorial jurisdiction within a 
geographical area, and would not allow for the Whanganui river tribes to hold 
territorial jurisdiction. For the occupancy theory a group may hold territorial 
jurisdiction if it demonstrates the ability to establish minimally just institutions. Stilz 
suggest that this can be achieved if the group credibly protects its members’ basic 
rights through the establishment of partial institutions, which may emerge within the 
jurisdiction of another state like, for example, administrative divisions,29 and if the 
group has a history of political cooperation in the form of a state.30 But groups such 
as the Whanganui river tribes do not meet either of these requirements as they are 
organized in tribes and never formed a state in the past. 
Moreover, for Stilz a group with residual meta-jurisdictional powers may legitimately 
secede from a state that is currently upholding just institutions. This perspective may 
run into difficulties with regards to existing competing demands of territorial 
jurisdiction. For example, in a multinational state many groups may have a history of 
political cooperation and at the same time occupy legitimately the same territory.  
Think for example of North Italy. The area of Piedmont and Lombardy had been 
under the jurisdiction of respectively the French and Austrian states for large part of 
their history. The northern communities still assert the right to political 
independence on the basis of their cultural differences that, they argue, impacts 
significantly on the type of institutions that they would rather support were they 
independent. However, within the northern Italian regions that have a common past 
of political cooperation there are also smaller sub regions, like Trentino-Alto Adige, 
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Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Val d’Aosta, or Veneto. These regions assert an equally 
significant past of political cooperation, but they believe this past would be best 
honored, and their interest best protected, if they could join Austria in the case of 
Trentino and Friuli, or secede independently from the Northern regions of Italy in 
the case of Aosta and Veneto. This complex example of intertwined national groups 
shows that there is more than one group that may count a proud history of political 
cooperation and that may demonstrate the ability to establish just institutions. The 
occupancy theory does not offer any tool to navigate these complexities, and it fails 
to indicate a single set of jurisdictional powers over territory in cases that are 
complex but all too often common. 
Finally, the occupancy theory may allow a group to settle in a land that is occupied by 
people who do not hold meta-jurisdictional powers and who are not already subject 
to minimally just institutions, and take control of the territory that they occupy. 
Think for example of the case of West Sahara. Sahrawi people are poorly represented 
by a mainly military organization whose ability to establish just institutions is 
currently under scrutiny. For the occupancy theory, Sahrawi people do not enjoy a 
legitimate title to the land that they occupy because they cannot demonstrate the 
ability to establish just institutions. However, this does not seem to be enough of a 
reason to give Morocco or Spain any conclusive justification in favor of either 
country’s right to establish just institutions there. Both countries have historically 
controlled those areas and both demonstrate the ability to uphold minimally just 
institutions. 
Before I examine the Permissive theory, I must address one final issue with the 
statist indirect theories that has to do with the functionality principle. The 
functionality principle holds that a state has a right to a territory if this right is 
necessary for the state to secure minimal standards of performance. This principle is 
proposed by the supporters of the legitimate state and occupancy theory to hold that 
the value of territorial rights resides in them being necessary for the proper 
maintenance of the state’s basic functions. The justificatory role of the functionality 
principle is thus not constitutive of territorial rights, but it identifies the value that 
territorial rights protect when they are accorded. Moreover, as Armstrong 
persuasively argues, the principle can be used to limit the extension of territorial 





rights to the territorial holdings that are in fact necessary to the effective functioning 
of minimally just institutions.31 
The direction of the justification of territorial rights through the functionality 
principle goes, thus, from the establishment of just institutions within a territory to 
the validation of territorial jurisdiction and other territorial rights on that particular 
territory. The principle does not offer any insight on why or how the group can 
legitimately take control of a territory and establish political institutions there. In fact, 
it is quite plausible that the establishment and development of just institutions will 
not be instantaneous, and that the group will have to exclude others from the 
enjoyment and exploitation of a territory long before it is able to effectively hold just 
institutions there and achieve the goal of internal political justice. Recall also that the 
occupancy principle elaborated by Stilz does not offer a solution to this problem, as 
it establishes only a freedom to occupy a land and a claim that others do not displace 
them. The few people who hold a residual meta-jurisdictional right have this power 
because at a certain point in time they had established political institutions there. 
However, this leaves unexplained whether they had a right to acquire control of that 
territory at that time. 
In the following subsection I examine the permissive theory. I argue that it does not 
suffer from the complication related to the functionalist principle, but that this 
imposes on the approach another set of limitations. Namely, the permissive theory 
fails to address the particularity requirement and is largely insensitive to the demands 
of global justice. 
 
2.3 Permiss ive  Theory 
 
The permissive theory makes use of the permissive principle that holds that states 
have territorial rights if such rights are necessary for the establishment of 
cosmopolitan justice. According to this view, territorial rights are not justified in a 
conclusive manner, but they are justified provisionally and conditionally to the 
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establishment of cosmopolitan political institutions that fully realize the value of 
cosmopolitan justice.32 Similarly to the legitimate state theory and the occupancy 
theory, the permissive theory maintains that only a state can be the holder of 
territorial jurisdiction. The permissive theory shares with the previous two accounts 
the preoccupation that rights ought not to be the result of the imposition on others 
of a unilateral will. This requires that shared political institutions are established to 
ensure a system that guarantees that each individual in the relevant community is 
subject to the general will of the community, and that each state is subject to 
institutions that represent and protect the general will of the international 
community. 
The permissive theory differs significantly from the pervious proposals because it 
accepts that the taking of territory from states is a violation of the Kantian principle 
of right. According to this account, the taking of territory is not dissimilar to 
individuals’ acquisition of property and the problem of the unilateral will. I have 
exposed the problem of the unilateral will in section 2.1. In short, every individual 
action aimed at using or acquiring external objects can never be conclusively justified 
unless the individual subjects his will to the general will. The state, by being the 
exclusive legislator and enforcer of duties, acts as a collective and shared political 
institution through which the general will can be expressed. The submissions of 
individual claims and duties to the general will frees individuals from the risk of 
conflicting individual interpretations of entitlements. For individuals’ entitlements to 
be consistently valid, in fact, there needs to be one ultimate authority that ensures 
that individuals avoid mutual arbitrary interference in each other’s exercise of 
freedom. The arbitrariness of the imposition of a unilateral will, then, can be 
mitigated by the commitment of the individual to make his will consistent with that 
of others.33 
Ypi argues, however, that the establishment of nation states does not solve the 
problem of the unilateral will with regards to the appropriation of territories in the 
international community. Nation states establish collective rules of property only 
among the community that is subject to their legislation. However, individuals will 
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influence each other also at the international level, where the jurisdiction of nation 
states fails to establish collective shared institutions. This effectively means that any 
title to an external object established by shared domestic institutions is still not 
conclusive unless the title is recognized, specified, and enforced by a “universal 
union realizing the principle of right.”34 The universalization of the principle of right 
is equivalent to the establishment of cosmopolitan political institutions that are able 
to express the general will of the collection of individuals around the globe. Ypi 
suggests that such institutions will look like a free league of states performing 
regulative functions as well as giving support for members of the international 
community towards the development of just domestic institutions and international 
relations. In particular, cosmopolitan institutions will have authority within areas 
concerning the drawing of boundaries, the allocation of the burdens of migration, 
and the distribution of natural resources.35 
The legitimacy of the domestic, international, and cosmopolitan set of political 
institutions is interdependent to the extent that if one fails to enact the general will 
the other levels in which the general will is expressed will also lose their rightful 
character.36 Unilateral acquisition is permissible only if it is ascribed within a system 
of rights that expresses the united will of all individuals. Joining a particular state only 
gives individuals a provisional title to what they have acquired within the domestic 
system of rights. Their titles remain conditional to the establishment of global 
institutions that express the general will of all individuals around the globe and all 
individuals in time (including future generations).37 
Since the required cosmopolitan institutions do not yet exist, the taking of any 
territory is not just but is only permissible. States acquire titles to territorial 
jurisdiction on the grounds of the permissive principle according to which if to 
promote cosmopolitan justice one has to act in violation of cosmopolitan justice, 
then the realization of cosmopolitan justice can be suspended and its violation 
allowed.38 To establish cosmopolitan institutions able to enforce the universal will, 
                                                      
34 Ibid., 299. 
35 Ibid., 307-308.  
36 Ibid., 299. 
37 Ibid., 300. 
38 Ibid., 289. 





we must allow that groups of individuals organize themselves into domestic states 
that offer a first approximation towards the universalization of their separate wills.39 
This, however, constitutes a violation of the principle of cosmopolitan justice, which 
requires instead that appropriation is impermissible unless it is determined and 
enforced by cosmopolitan institutions. However, the permissive principle suggests 
that we can allow for something that is in violation of our goal as long as we commit 
to promote the ultimate value that would make our action legitimate. 
The principle in this form also explains why states are allowed to take control of 
particular territories. Given that taking control of a particular territory is necessary to 
establish domestic institutions, and given that domestic institutions are the first 
approximation to the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions, unilateral 
acquisition may be permitted, even if it is in violation of the principle of right.40 
However, until the states recognize the authority of universally inclusive institutions, 
these particular holdings (and the holding of the individuals within territorial 
jurisdictions) will remain merely provisional.41  
This means that state’s territorial rights are merely provisionally and conditionally 
justified in the present conditions. If, however, conditions were to change in a way 
that would make territorial rights useless to the achievement of cosmopolitan justice, 
then territorial rights would lose their rationale, and states would lose their territorial 
rights. The permissive principle, thus, does not provide states with a strong 
entitlement to the exclusive use of a land. It doesn’t in fact provide any agent with a 
conclusive and strong entitlement to the enjoyment of any of their rights until the 
cosmopolitan political community has been established. 42  The direction of the 
justification of territorial rights through the permissive principle goes, thus, from the 
merely permissible (but not just) control of a particular territory to the establishment 
of just national and cosmopolitan institutions, which then validate the territorial 
rights that until then had remained conditional. 
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The conditional and provisional nature of these entitlements have important 
implications for what individuals and states are permitted to do with regards to 
states’ provisional territorial holdings. Ypi identifies two non-ideal cases that may 
challenge the permissive theory: the first is the case of a minimally just state that 
refuses to submit to shared political institutions, the second is the case of a group 
that has failed to establish even minimal political institutions that are able to enforce 
the rule of law domestically. In the first case, Ypi argues, the existing state still retains 
some provisional entitlements to the territory its people occupy. Even if it refuses to 
conform to the cosmopolitan principle of justice, others states have no right to, for 
example, unilaterally annex the uncooperative state’s territory. Nor do other states 
have a right to coerce the recalcitrant state to submit to cosmopolitan principles of 
justice. The permissive principle is at work to justify territorial holdings, allowing us 
to establish some basis for the institutional promotion of cosmopolitan justice, such 
as the establishment of nation states. Once these bases have been settled, the 
obligation to overcome any wrong that the existing states may perpetrate falls on its 
citizens through the democratic system of decision-making and through the 
provisions of the rule of law.43  
Any disruption of the existing system of political authority – however far from the 
cosmopolitan ideal – constitutes a step back towards unilateralness that ought to be 
avoided. The priority of political institutions explains also why individuals may be 
coerced into joining state-like institutions, but states may not be forced to submit to 
international standards of cooperation. Only individuals must leave the state of 
nature by submitting to shared political institutions. Once this happens, they are 
themselves under an obligation to pursue the principle of right, and others may not 
undermine political institutions that keep individuals out of the state of nature. This 
effectively allows minimally just states to enjoy robust territorial rights even if they 
do not comply with the principle of cosmopolitan justice. For this reason, even if the 
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permissive theory poses demanding requirements for territorial rights to be fully 
legitimate, it effectively allows minimally just states to ignore the demands of global 
justice. 
In the second case, where communities fail to establish institutions that are minimally 
just, Ypi argues that communities have at least established actual possession. Actual 
possession, different from ownership, is the mere title that communities have to 
continue using what they physically control. However, once their members lose 
physical control over their land, they lose their possession. Since informal groups 
lack political institutions that mend their members’ unilateral acquisition, they cannot 
be considered having any collective territorial rights – not even provisional – and 
they can only enjoy possession on what they can separately and physically control. 
The lack of institutions that express the general will indicates that the group 
effectively has not left the state of nature and that rights cannot be legitimately 
established. The same is true for states that do not meet the minimal requirements of 
justice. These organizations may not assert any rights past what their individual 
members are able to physically control. 
But what normative incidents does possession entail? Ypi argues that unilateralness is 
a threat not only when groups that do not uphold minimally just institutions 
perpetrate it, but also when outsiders attempt to settle in regions occupied by them. 
Thus, either type of unilateralness needs to be mitigated to eventually realize the 
principle of right. Unilateralness from informal groups is mitigated by the fact that 
the occupiers’ possession title accords outsiders’ liberty to visit the groups’ land. 
Meanwhile, the outsiders’ unilateralness is mitigated because the current occupiers 
possession of their land includes a claim that others do not permanently settle or 
establish territorial jurisdiction in the territory they possess or force them to join 
their political institutions.44 
The permissive theory is not subject to the in rem problem because no agent has a 
robust and conclusive title to the land that they occupy and control. Although 
existing states may be permitted to enjoy robust territorial rights (even, to some 
extent, if they do not meet minimal conditions of justice), they ultimately may not 
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assert legitimate territorial jurisdiction anywhere until they have established and 
effectively upheld cosmopolitan institutions. For the permissive theory, these 
institutions accord to nation states territorial rights on the land that they possess, and 
validate any existing practice on that territory that represents a step away from the 
state of nature. 
However, like the legitimate state theory, the permissive theory does not explain why 
the group that establishes and upholds political institutions has a right to perform its 
natural duty of justice in the particular territory that it has come to occupy. In 
response to the particularity issue, Ypi introduces the right to possess a land. This 
right gives to occupiers a claim that others do not permanently occupy or establish 
territorial political institutions on the land that they possess, and a freedom to occupy 
and use the possessed territory to the extent that their physical capability permits. 
The right to possess, however, does not exclude that outsiders may be able to settle 
and establish political institutions on territories that current individual members of 
the occupying group do not physically control.  
For the permissive theory, then, Europeans had a freedom to settle and a power to 
establish institutions within the borders of areas that nomad populations of Native 
Americans used for their sustenance, in particular when these populations were not 
present in the same geographical area where the Europeans’ first settlements. Other 
possible scenarios would be that Morocco may be able to establish political 
institutions controlling the West Sahara, given that its occupiers would have a 
legitimate title only to the limited land that they are able to physically occupy and use 
for their activities. Much of the West Sahara is uninhabited, and no one has effective 
physical control there. Although Morocco may not be able to coerce Sahrawi into 
joining its political institutions, it would be permitted to extend its territory and 
annex land that could enhance its presence in North Africa, by including within its 
jurisdictional borders territories that are not physically used by the Sahrawi.  
Although the permissive theory includes a limitation on outsiders’ ability to establish 
territorial jurisdiction somewhere, this limitation applies only to the land that is 
physically controlled by individuals occupying a limited area and not to the territory 
that these individuals may need to protect their social practices. Until the group is 
able to meet the standards of internal justice and cosmopolitan justice, in fact, social 





practices do not enjoy any particular protection, and a group’s right to carry out its 
natural duty of justice there, and not somewhere else, remains unaccounted for. 
Given that the permissive theory does not explain why the group has a right on a 
particular territory, and not another, it fails to address the particularity requirement. 
 
3 Collectivist Indirect Theories 
 
Collectivist indirect theories maintain that groups, and not only states, can 
legitimately demand territorial rights if the territorial jurisdiction there is functional to 
the establishment of minimally just institutions. For the collectivist indirect theories a 
group has a power of territorial jurisdiction if it can demonstrate that it can establish 
just institutions that represent the shared conception of justice of its members, or if 
it has established functional institutions that distribute the benefits of cooperation to 
their subjects. Such requirements constitute the minimal standard of performance 
that a political institution should perform to hold legitimate political authority over 
people. Having established justice, or the ability to do so, accords the group 
legitimate political authority over its members. Subsequently, a group acquires 
territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the functionality principle, given that territorial 
jurisdiction is necessary for the exercise of legitimate authority over people. In this 
way, a group also establishes rights to resources and to control borders.  
I examine two versions of the indirect collectivist theory: Nine’s collectivist Lockean 
theory and Wellman’s freedom of association theory. The former employs the 
principle of labor mixing, the principle of efficiency, and the principle of self-
determination to establish an independent justification of the title to particular 
territories. I argue that this approach successfully addresses the particularity 
requirements, but nevertheless it fails to offer a conclusive justification of territorial 
jurisdiction against competing demands. However, as it will become clearer when 
discussing direct theories, the cost of employing the labor mixing principle is that the 
theory needs an account of original acquisition.  
For the freedom of association theory, the presence of a community in a particular 
land does not determine any entitlements to that land but is a matter of chance. 





However, on the basis of their right to form political associations the occupiers may 
establish political institutions and then acquire territorial rights there. Because of the 
fact that occupancy is arbitrary and does not give rise to any entitlements on the 
particular territory occupied, this approach does not offer a compelling reason as to 
why occupiers of a territory may legitimately take exclusive control of a particular 
territory. I will also show that the theory does not manage to address the in rem 
problem.  
At the end of this section, I suggest that the choice of allowing communities, and not 
only states, to hold territorial rights allows these theories to meet the challenge of 
ethnocentrism. However, collectivist indirect theories are also sensitive to the 
demands of global justice, particularly when territorial rights are limited to only those 
titles that are functional to the establishment of justice (for the collectivist Lockean 
theory), or for the effective functioning of institutions that are able to distribute the 
benefits of social cooperation (for the freedom of association theory). 
 
3.1 Col lec t iv i s t  Lockean Theory 
 
Nine argues that groups that fulfill some basic requirements may legitimately held 
territorial titles, even if they do not constitute themselves as states.45 The rightful 
holders of territorial jurisdiction must show the ability to uphold institutions that 
meet minimal standards of justice, and their members must share a conception of the 
good. 46  Groups must not necessarily share a national identity, nor they must 
necessarily have a long-standing history of cooperation together. They must, 
however, share a basic understanding of what it means to establish minimally just 
institutions and share “common political sympathies.”47 
The collectivist Lockean theory offers two separate arguments: the first aims to 
justify a general right to territory, while the second focuses on grounding titles to 
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particular geographical areas. The argument for a general right to territory relies on 
the functionality principle, which pursues the establishment of minimally just 
institutions.48 Nine argues in this regard that the satisfaction of basic human needs in 
conditions of scarcity is impossible for single individuals to meet, but it requires a 
complex set of goods that are achievable only by means of a collective effort.49 Thus, 
an overarching authority is needed to ensure stable access to water and food, and 
also to meaningful social interactions based on mutual trust, to ways in which one 
can express his ideas, and so forth.50 Nine appeals to a capability theory, for which 
individual basic needs cannot be considered merely as the material need to 
nourishment and shelter, but they include a more complex set of goods that allows 
the individual to flourish and pursue happiness by controlling their own 
environment.51 
Nine argues that the scope of territorial holdings must be limited to taking into 
consideration other individuals’ natural rights to preservation. Because territorial 
rights exclude others from the enjoyment of land and resources, they are in some 
sense similar to the acquisition of property.52 The acquisition of land must respect 
the competing demands to territory and resources that others advance to pursue the 
satisfaction of their basic needs, and is thus limited by a version of the Lockean 
proviso on acquisition.53  
The argument for a particular title to territorial rights draws more distinctively from 
the Lockean theory of property, with the difference that Nine’s argument defends 
the right to territory of an irreducibly collective political community and not of an 
individual. The theory uses the principles of labor mixing, efficiency, and self-
determination to justify acquisition of resources and territorial jurisdiction. 54 
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According to Nine, an agent worthy of territorial rights must be able to change the 
land, creating a relationship with it that is morally valuable. The value of the 
relationship to the land that a political community establishes lies in the realization of 
the values of desert, efficiency, and collective autonomy protected, respectively, by 
the principles of labor mixing, efficiency, and self-determination. These principles are 
all necessary elements of a legitimate title on territory, but neither is sufficient to 
establish that title. 
To hold a right to a particular territory, a community must be able to change the land 
and create a relationship with it through the labor mixing principle. In its original 
formulation, the labor mixing principle holds that an agent has a valid property title 
in a territory if the material value of that object is attributable to the agent. Nine, 
however, suggests that since the ultimate function of territorial rights is that of 
establishing minimal conditions for the satisfaction of human needs, the value that 
the collective must realize in the territory is that of justice.55 A group, then, has a 
legitimate title in a specific territory if its actions change the land to effectively 
establish and maintain just political institutions, which Nine identifies as the ability to 
“provide secure access to the objects of basic human needs for members and to 
respect the basic human rights of all persons.”56 
This special relation with the land gives rise to property-like limited entitlements on 
the use and exploitation of resources within that territory. Even if the people 
occupying a territory fail to establish and uphold minimally just institutions, their 
occupancy there enjoys some protection. Others may not legitimately freely use the 
group’s resources or annex their territory.57 However, these claims against others 
settling within the group’s territory are conditional on the group’s ability to 
demonstrate some type of political unity and the desire to cooperate as one political 
agent to enjoy their right to collective self-determination.58 In fact, creating mere 
material value on the land one occupies, on the basis of continuous use and 
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exploitation, may at best generate property rights in that particular land, but not also 
jurisdictional powers.59  
Attachment for Nine is, in Kolers’ terminology, a “performance” type of attachment. 
This is clearer in her discussion of overlapping people with competing right to 
collective self-determination. To hold legitimate territorial titles, a group that has a 
right to self-determination must be “big enough (and small enough) to have the 
capacity to establish minimally just institutions,” and the level of independence from 
other territorial just political institutions will depend on the capacity of the group to 
maintain minimally just institutions.60  
The collectivistic indirect theory is subject to the in rem problem in the same way that 
the occupancy theory is. Recall the example of the independent movements in North 
Italy. Those regions have demonstrated the ability to uphold just institutions by 
means of their activity as special regions of the Italian Republic. Moreover, they 
certainly share a similar commitment to self-determination and a conception of 
justice that they express through their cultural unity and their political movements 
for independence. In that scenario, it is unclear which community in Nine’s theory 
should be given territorial jurisdiction and, possibly, a right to secede. Does the 
league of the Italian northern regions have a legitimate right to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction, given their demonstrated ability to organize themselves as a unitary 
political movement with demonstrated administrative ability to uphold minimal 
standard of justice? Or should each region that desires more independence, and that 
also shows the ability to administer justice, be accorded territorial jurisdiction on the 
territory that overlaps with that demanded by the northern Italian regions’ league? 
The attachment account gives an explanation as to why a group that is able to 
establish just institutions acquires rights on a particular territory, given that the 
particular territory occupied is a necessary condition for the establishment of justice. 
However, it remains unclear which group and which individuals have a title to 
territorial jurisdiction in situation of conflict. 
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One way to address the uncertainty regarding who holds territorial jurisdiction in a 
particular territory is the principle of efficiency. The principle holds that all other 
things being equal, “if a system of collective territorial rights makes the most efficient 
use of land, then it is to be preferred.”61 Nine makes use of this principle to 
strengthen the argument for the acquisition of particular territory, and to identify 
which among the groups that may establish territorial jurisdiction somewhere should 
be given priority. In its original formulation, the principle pursues the value of 
human preservation. All things being equal, Locke suggests, a man who can use his 
property more efficiently is making the land more beneficial for him and his family.62 
This alleviates the burden of satisfying his basic needs from the resources held in 
common, and it allows more people to flourish. 
But the value of a land for a community is not easily compared to the value of a land 
for another community.63 For some groups, a river may be the source of inspiration 
and religious attachment, for others it may represent an essential source of 
sustenance and transport. Nine suggests, however, that some benefits related to the 
use of land are universal and can be enjoyed by anyone, regardless of their cultural 
affiliations. For example the more food, water, natural resources, shelter, and other 
means of subsistence are extracted from the land, the more people can benefit from 
it.64 The collectivistic Lockean theory offers efficiency as a tool to balance the 
community-specific narrative regarding the value of a land, and the universal 
standard of efficiency according to which territory protects universal human needs 
and goods. The theory gives, thus, ample space for a community to develop its own 
conception of the good and of the valuable ways in which territory may be used, 
addressing successfully the challenge of ethnocentrism. However, it also ensures that 
the use of land and the exclusion of others from a territory respects some universal 
idea of prosperity and protects individuals’ fundamental interests. 
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Nevertheless, the balance between universal needs and community specific 
understanding of territory is significantly in favor of the community and how it 
prefers to organize itself. In fact, the principle of efficiency cannot be thought of as a 
maximizing principle. If we had to always maximize efficiency, Nine argues, 
territorial rights would be extremely instable. Every time a community is able to 
make better use of a land, territorial holdings should be redesigned. Maximizing the 
principle of efficiency would fail to promote the value of human preservation, 
because the disruption caused by the continuous remodeling of territorial holdings 
would deprive individuals of the stability needed to pursue their basic interests.65 
Because the principle may not be used as a radical argument in favor of remodeling 
territorial holdings, efficiency does not provide a factor in favor of one or the other 
group that may demonstrate the ability to uphold just institutions. It seems that, in 
the case of the Northern Leagues of Italian regions and the separate regions of 
Trentino, Friuli, Aosta, and Veneto, we may not take a decision on the basis of their 
ability to efficiently use the territory, as long as each candidate is able to use the land 
to some level of efficiency. In the case of Italy, one may argue that, since the Italian 
Republic is able to uphold minimally just institutions and use the territory with some 
acceptable level of efficiency, the principles of efficiency, labor mixing, and self-
determination may simply work in favor of the Italian government maintaining 
robust territorial control of those regions. However, if Italy were not minimally just, 
the collectivistic Lockean theory would fail to point at one preferred candidate 
among the different regions and the league, given that all these groups display the 
ability to uphold efficient and minimally just institutions. 
Finally, because the theory relies on some account of acquisition of territory, and 
because efficiency does not in fact give us any reason to interfere with existing 
territorial holdings (as long as who holds them upholds minimally just institutions), 
the theory is in need of some account of original acquisition. In fact, with the 
exception of some circumstances when a group’s right to self-determination takes 
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priority over existing territorial arrangements,66 territorial jurisdiction is securely left 
to those who legitimately uphold it and who have acquired it through the labor 
mixing principle or through legitimate transferal.67 Giving an account of original 
acquisition is, however, prominently difficult, especially in the case of collective 
territorial holdings. In fact, few existing states may be considered the first legitimate 
acquirers of territory, and even fewer can recount a flawless history of legitimate 
transferal of territory from the original acquirer. 
 
3.2 Freedom of  Assoc iat ion Theory 
 
Wellman develops the freedom of association according to which a group holds 
territorial jurisdiction because jurisdictional powers over territory are necessary for 
the effective functioning of legitimate political institutions. Legitimate political 
institutions are those that protect individuals’ freedom of association, and that 
distribute the benefits of cooperation to all members of society.68 Given that the 
group needs jurisdiction over the territory that its members occupy to effectively 
distribute the benefits of cooperation, then the group that upholds effective 
legitimate institutions also upholds territorial jurisdiction.  
Because the theory employs the functionality principle, it faces the same 
complications that burden the legitimate state, occupancy, and collectivistic Lockean 
theories. First, it fails to provide a conclusive argument in favor of the territorial title 
of one group or the other, in case of conflict. If the requirement for territorial 
jurisdiction is that the group has chosen to associate, and if it effectively upholds 
minimally just institutions in that territory, then different groups that share the same 
territory – like the ones occupying the Northern regions of Italy – may be rightful 
candidates for the same title. One further complication that this theory encounters 
with regards to the in rem problem is that the groups that may legitimately hold 
territorial jurisdiction need not be only states. They only need to be groups that are 
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large enough and dense enough to uphold effective institutions that distribute the 
benefit of cooperation among their members, and that enjoy the approval of the 
majority of their subjects.69  
This widens considerably the class of possible right-holders that may effectively 
establish political institutions within a territory that they share with other groups. 
These types of institutions, in fact, often coexist with one another. Consider for 
example the tribal subnational groups like the Whanganui river tribes who are 
subsumed under the central government of New Zealand and share the territory with 
its citizens, but that also uphold institutions such as tribunals and legislative bodies to 
regulate the use of natural resources. In the case of disputes, the freedom of 
association theory provides no tools to determine which of these groups may be 
considered having territorial jurisdiction over shared geographical areas. 
Moreover, for the freedom of association theory, the functionality principle only 
identifies the value that territorial rights protect when they are accorded. This means 
that exclusive territorial control of an area is validated once it is instrumental to the 
proper functioning of political institutions. Even in this case the functionality 
principle does not offer any insight on why or how the group can legitimately take 
control of a territory and establish political institutions there. This leaves open the 
possibility that a group may forcibly exclude others from the enjoyment and 
exploitation of a territory long before it effectively holds political institutions there. 
The second issue with the theory is that it does not address the particularity 
requirement. For Wellman, the presence of a group in a particular territory is an 
arbitrary fact that has no normative importance. It is unclear whether the group may 
legitimately establish institutions precisely there and exclude others from the 
enjoyment and control of that particular territory. 
Finally, the theory is able to address the challenge of ethnocentrism by ensuring that 
the collective that holds territorial rights upholds institutions that benefit all its 
members and that are ultimately chosen and supported by the majority of its 
subjects. As territorial rights are functional to the exercise of individuals’ freedom to 
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associate, they also protect political associations in the way they are intended by their 
subjects. In fact, the theory does not pose requirements regarding the type of 
institutions that must be established or the type of benefits that these institutions 
must secure for their members, as long as they are compatible with the demands of 
basic human rights.70 However, it is unclear to what extent groups that have achieved 
rights to territorial jurisdiction may exert powers regarding resources within their 
borders and have exclusive freedoms to use and exploit those resources. Unless the 
principle of functionality is used to limit the extent of resource rights, the freedom of 




In this chapter I have examined indirect theories and their shortcomings with regards 
to the in rem problem and the particularity requirement. I have showed that all the 
indirect theories suffer from the in rem problem with exception of the permissive 
theory, and that they fail to meet the particularity requirement, except for the 
collectivistic Lockean and the occupancy theory. However, for all indirect theories 
the functionality principle poses an important limitation that is related to the inability 
to explain and justify the exclusiveness of the title to territorial jurisdiction of existing 
territorial rights holders. The functionality principle maintains that territorial 
jurisdiction is justified because it is functional to the effective functioning of just 
institutions. However, a group may not legitimately demand territorial jurisdiction 
unless it is able to establish or has establish just institutions somewhere. It seems, 
thus, that to establish just institutions or to acquire the ability to do so a group needs 
territorial jurisdiction, but that territorial jurisdiction is only justified when the group 
has achieved justice or the ability to establish just institutions.  
For indirect theories the functionality principle provides the moral justification of 
existing territorial rights, but fails to explain whether the group had a right to control 
a territory to begin with. To acquire territory a state or group has to necessarily 
forcibly take control of it unilaterally, before it can develop the ability or establish the 
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institutions needed to uphold justice there. Although the functionality principle may 
suffice to provide a justification of existing territorial holdings, it does not address 
sufficiently those cases where territorial holdings are being created because new 
people acquire uncontrolled territories, or where existing territorial holdings are 
challenged by radical demands of groups that have the aspiration to pursue their own 
idea of justice. 
For completeness it is important to mention that indirect approaches may not be 
individualistic. The reason is that for indirect theories, the validity of territorial rights 
rests on the fact that the group holding territorial rights has political authority over 
its members. An individualist indirect theory would suggest that individuals could 
hold territorial rights only if they have established political institutions there, or if 
they can demonstrate their ability to do so, to realize the collective goal of justice. 
Those who favor the indirect approach share the intuition that territorial rights 
realize collective values, such as the effective distribution of the benefits of 
cooperation. Perhaps Wellman’s freedom of association theory is the closest to an 
indirect individualistic theory. He could argue that to realize the value of self-
determination of a voluntary political association each individual needs to have 
property rights in resources and territory. This would be a difficult position to hold, 
given that associations that rely on non-territorial jurisdiction, like religious ones or 
the group of citizens of a nation that live abroad, may be said to have a right to self-
determination, even if they do not express such right through the exclusive use and 
control of a territory. 










In this chapter I discuss direct theories of territorial rights. For direct theories, an 
agent acquires territorial jurisdiction because control over a territory in itself protects 
fundamental interest, such as happiness, self-determination, or individual self-
government. Most direct theories make use of some theory of acquisition of property 
that explains how an agent comes to have robust titles to territorial jurisdiction. For 
this reason, most of the accounts examined in this section will face the challenge of 
offering a convincing account of original acquisition and just transfer. The only two 
exceptions are the utilitarian theory and the self-determination theory, which do not 
rely on a concept of property acquisition.  
For the self-determination theory, a group acquires fundamental rights on a territory 
because it relies on it to pursue its right to self-determination, and because its 
members currently have a significant relation with it. The account of attachment 
proposed by the self-determination theory is not an historical one, nor does it rely on 
the idea of just transfers to explain how current occupiers came to have a title to 
territory. 1  The utilitarian theory also avoids the issue of original acquisition 
maintaining that the presence of a state within a territory is an arbitrary fact that has 
no normative implications, and that the state does not properly own a territory, but 
that it can only exert there political authority. Although the theory does not require a 
theory of property rights, it is the only direct theory that is not able to properly 
address the particularity requirement. In the next subsection, I will explain also why 
the utilitarian theory fails with regards to the issue of ethnocentrism and global 
justice. 
Direct theories perform better than indirect ones with regards to both the in rem 
problem and the particularity requirement. For direct theories the title to territorial 
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jurisdiction within a particular geographical location is justified on the basis of a 
relation of the group with the particular territory it occupies. For the collectivist 
theories, territorial jurisdiction in itself protects the groups’ fundamental interest in 
self-determination or in its members’ identity, and only the occupiers of that 
particular territory can demand territorial jurisdiction there. The collectivist theories 
for the most part are sensitive to community specific conception of territory and for 
this reason they are not subject to the charge of ethnocentrism, but I will show how 
they are liable of neglecting the demands of global justice. 
For the individualist theories, control over territory protects individuals’ interest in 
being self-governing. The individualist theories employ the self-government principle 
to ground both individuals’ territorial jurisdictional powers and meta-jurisdictional 
powers. Both individualist accounts examined in this chapter perform well in 
addressing the challenge of ethnocentrism and the demands of global justice, as well 
as the particularity requirement and the in rem problem.  
In particular, the individualist Lockean theory maintains that territorial rights are 
limited by the Lockean proviso. This allows the theory to restrict the scope of 
territorial rights to only those holdings that are necessary for individuals’ sustenance 
and prosperity, and to the extent that acquisition does not limit significantly others’ 
chances to acquire as much and as good. Similarly, the left libertarian theory relies on 
the proviso to limit territorial rights but interprets the proviso as an egalitarian 
requirement, according to which all individuals are due the same share of territorial 
rights. Both theories maintain that only those who occupy a particular territory can 
demand territorial jurisdiction there, and that the titles that individuals acquire are 
protected by claims and immunities against others’ interference. 
By the end of this section, I will suggest that although the individualist theories offer 
an interesting avenue for the resolution of the challenges faced by theories of 
territorial rights, they have problematic implications regarding our intuitions about 
territorial holdings and our current international practices. These complications will 
appear more striking when I will address the issue of secession in Chapter 7. 
 





2 Statist Direct Theory 
 
The statist direct theory suggests that only a state can acquire and enjoy territorial 
rights and that it can do so because a state’s control of territory is in itself necessary 
for the protection of the citizens’ fundamental interests in happiness and peace. This 
approach rests on the assumption that state-like institutions are in themselves 
necessary for the maintenance of peace and the protection of citizens’ happiness, 
regardless of their compliance with some ideal of justice. 
In the following section I examine the details of the utilitarian theory, which is the 
only statist direct approach. I show that it is also the only direct approach that fails to 
address the particularity requirement. In fact, Sidgwick justifies territorial rights using 
a functionalist argument, which focuses less on the importance of individuals’ 
relation with a particular territory, and more on the goal achieved by according some 
territorial rights to their state. 
 
2.1 Uti l i tar ian Theory 
 
For the utilitarian theory, only states may legitimately hold territorial rights. States, in 
this view, are a community of human beings that acknowledges permanent 
obedience to the same government.2 Sidgwick argues that what distinguishes the state 
from other corporations is that its members believe that they belong to one another, 
and, if their political institutions were to disappear, they would “tend to hold firmly 
together.”3 The theory makes use of the functionality principle to hold that territorial 
rights are necessary for the state to perform as an effective political organization, 
protecting and ensuring its subjects’ wellbeing. As long as this is true, states should 
be accorded robust territorial rights of the kind that they enjoy in international 
practice.  
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Differently from statist indirect theories, however, the moral ground of the 
legitimacy of territorial demands is directly justifiable with reference to its positive 
effects on the wellbeing of the community. The functionality principle, in this 
proposal, maintains that territorial rights protect the fundamental interest of 
individuals in peace and happiness. Additionally, Sidgwick notes that territorial 
entitlements are collective entitlements, and they are not reducible to any singular 
property title of the state’s subjects. The title to territorial jurisdiction is thus acquired 
directly by the state on the basis of its role in securing the happiness of its subjects 
and preventing wrongdoing among them.4 Happiness in this view is intended as an 
aggregative concept, which refers to the wellbeing of the whole community. 
Sidgwick argues that it is impossible to ensure that every subject of the state complies 
with the rules if the state doesn’t have any control over its subjects’ properties and 
over the space in which the subject resides.5 The citizens of a state with no control 
over its territory would be left with a state unable to ensure that the law is respected, 
and to secure peace. This is an intuition well received in indirect statist theories as 
well. However, Sidgwick relies on it to ground robust territorial rights without the 
requirement of political justice. This implies that almost any existing state may 
legitimately hold robust territorial jurisdiction and resource rights, as long as it is able 
to secure peace. 
The utilitarian theory does not suffer from the in rem problem because for Sidgwick 
the state that currently relies on some territory for the effective protection of its 
subjects’ wellbeing is the only agent that can legitimately hold territorial rights. 
Subnational groups, or foreigners, may not legitimately take control of the same 
territory, as long as that geographical area is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state that enforces some degree of peace. 
On the other hand, the theory does not offer any explanation as to why the state may 
legitimately take control of the territory that its subjects occupy, and not, for instance 
of an uninhabited territory or any territory that is not already subject to a state. In 
fact, as long as it maintains peace and order within geographical borders, the state is 
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able to demand exclusive control of a territory. However, it is not important where 
the state is performing its functions and which territory it controls. If, for example, a 
group were to conquer a piece of land and quickly establish a sufficiently effective 
state, then the functionality principle would allow this belligerent group to have a 
right to that territory. It is unclear why the state may be able to acquire a particular 
resource rich territory, or a territory of strategic military importance, thus excluding 
others from the enjoyment of its resources and location.  
Moreover, the utilitarian theory does not meet the challenge of explaining how 
territorial control was legitimate before a state had effectively established control of a 
geographical area. At the point in time in which a group takes control of a territory, 
until it has established a functioning state, the group does not hold a right to that 
particular territory, rendering its presence there at best disputable. As for the other 
theories, the functionality principle fails to offer a justification of the territorial title 
before actual control of that territory has been established, whether control over that 
territory is functional to legitimate political authority or to achieve peace and some 
protection of the rule of law. 
The theory is also subject to the charge of ethnocentrism because communities that 
organize themselves as non state-like political units, such as indigenous tribes or 
religious associations, may not assert any legitimate title of territorial jurisdiction. 
This restricts the club of right-holders to a very particular type of political 
organization.  
Moreover, states that effectively maintain peace and the rule of law acquire robust 
territorial rights of the kind that are currently protected by international practice. 
This leaves little space for the utilitarian theory to consider and address the demands 
of global justice, especially those that have not yet been recognized by international 
law. To better deal with the demands of global justice one could argue that the 
functionality principle should limit territorial titles only to those rights that are 
actually necessary for the pursuit of the collective good of peace and stability. 
Sidgwick recognizes that territorial rights must be limited, but the conditions that he 
mentions do not sufficiently address global justice obligations. For Sidgwick, 
territorial rights are limited in three ways: first, if territorial holdings are no more 





conductive to desirable consequences because of a change in conditions, then they 
must be abandoned. For example, Sidgwick argues that, in a period when piracy is a 
serious problem for the security of merchants, states are allowed to take control of 
the open sea. This is, however, an entitlement that is justified only in virtue of a 
specific danger that afflicts the state’s subjects.6 Once the dangers of piracy are 
reduced, it is in fact desirable that the state’s control retreats to the “narrow belt of 
water along the coast of a state’s territory” to ensure the maximum degree of free 
right to “peaceful navigation.”7 
The second requirement is that the state must maintain a set of rules that is at least 
“not unjust” towards its subjects.8 Sidgwick suggests that the law is “not unjust” if it 
does not favor the interests of some at the expense of the interests of others on 
arbitrary grounds, and if it aims to the greater common good.9 It may seem that 
Sidgwick’s account resembles an indirect theory. However, if the state is unjust it 
does not lose its claim to territorial jurisdiction, like in the case of indirect theories. If 
the state is outstandingly iniquitous it only loses control over the portion of territory 
or over the resources the control of which fosters instability and the unhappiness of 
its members.  
Sidgwick in this regard offers the example of secession of cultural minorities: a group 
has a right to secede only if it can demonstrate “some unjust sacrifice or grossly 
incompetent management of their interests, or some persistent and harsh opposition 
to their legitimate desires.”10 The division of a state in two smaller states has 
disrupting consequences both in the domestic sphere and in the international 
relations. Domestically, secession leads to discontent on the part of those who, until 
the seceding party was successful, considered the territory rightfully theirs. And in 
international relations the reduction of the size of the state results in the loss of 
strength and prestige of the original state. These are costs that a society should not 
have to bear unless in urgent and serious cases of oppression and injustice. 
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The state, then, loses its territorial jurisdiction not because its institutions are unjust, 
but only if the injustice of its political institutions creates costs to peace and 
happiness that are higher than those incurred if subgroups were to secede. Injustice 
is thus not in itself the reason for the state’s lack of territorial jurisdiction, but 
compliance with justice makes the political institutions more robust against threats of 
secession and revolution, and territorial titles more likely to maintain their validity as 
circumstances change. 
Finally, the third limitation to territorial rights is that they must take into 
consideration also to the happiness of individuals who are not members of the state. 
Sidgwick suggests that with regards to the appropriation of land and resources, 
state’s territorial holdings cannot be considered unlimited, but they must be subject 
to the same limitations that we would apply to the exclusive right of a private land 
owner.11 State’s holdings, thus, should be limited by considerations regarding “the 
general claims of humanity” to resources and ultimately to happiness, particularly 
when the territorial holdings of a state are already sufficient to the flourishing of its 
citizens. 
These three requirements allow the utilitarian theory to offer a more nuanced theory 
of territorial rights, making some room for the demands of global justice. The space 
for global justice and the rights of subnational political and cultural groups is, 
however, significantly limited. Territorial rights in this account must merely make 
space for all individuals to participate in a community that protects their interest in 
peace. More extensive human rights play no role in limiting states’ territorial 
holdings, which must be respected and which the state holds exclusively. 
 
3 Collectivist Direct Theories 
 
Collectivist direct theories maintain that groups, not only states, can legitimately 
demand territorial rights if they have established with the territory a special relation 
that is fundamental to their cultural or national identity, or to their right to self-
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determination. I will examine two versions of the collectivist direct theory. The first, 
Miller’s liberal nationalism theory, suggests that the acquisition of territorial rights 
from a community is akin to the acquisition of property from an individual. For this 
approach, the group acquires territorial rights if that particular territory is of primary 
importance to the identity of the group, and if the group has enriched the territory 
with material and symbolic value.  
Moore’s self-determination theory, on the other hand, maintains that a community 
acquires territorial holdings on the basis of the role that that particular geographical 
area has in the protection of the group’s right to self-determination. Together with 
the self-determination theory, I discuss also Kolers’ plenitude theory. The two 
proposals are very similar for what matters in my discussion. The difference between 
the theories regards the identification of the right-holder. For the plenitude theory, 
communities that can hold territorial rights share a common social ontology of the 
land and a distinctive pattern of use. Differently, Moore suggests that a group can 
hold territorial rights if it allows its members to pursue the political aim of collective 
self-determination. The two theories, however, share the same commitment to the 
value of self-determination, and they aim at respecting communities’ narratives 
regarding their attachment to territories to the largest extent. 
Because collectivist direct theories rely on the relation that a group has with a 
particular land, they are fit to address the particularity problem. For these theories, 
the group must have established a significant relation with a precise geographical area 
to legitimately exert territorial jurisdiction there. So for example, for the liberal 
nationalism theory, France may not legitimately exert territorial jurisdiction in 
Antarctica unless its people have worked on that land and have developed a relation 
with it that has shaped their identity. Similarly, for the self-determination theory, 
France must occupy Antarctica and demonstrate that territorial jurisdiction there is at 
the basis of its people’s right to self-determination. 
The direct collectivist theories are also able to respond to the in rem problem by 
suggesting that the significant relation with the land gives rise not only to property 
rights on the resources within their borders, but also to territorial jurisdiction there. 
Once the theory has identified the group that has established a significant relation 
with the territory, the theory can point us to the holder of both resource rights, and 





territorial jurisdictional powers. As long as the theories do a good job in defining the 
right holder, then, they provide a conclusive argument in favor of the group’s 
territorial jurisdiction and against existing competing jurisdictional powers. 
Collectivist theories are particularly sympathetic to community-specific values, and 
they suggest that territorial holdings should for the most part be defined according to 
the demands of the group who has a significant relation with a particular land. Both 
versions of the theory take the challenge of ethnocentrism seriously and accord 
territorial rights on the basis of the group’s specific values and narratives about 
territory. This, however, tilts the balance of considerations significantly in favor of 
the community’s special interests, reducing the space for the demands of global 
justice. This implication could be mitigated applying a functionality principle to limit 
the scope of territorial holdings, but neither theory commits to such a strategy. The 
result is that groups acquire territorial rights that are as robust as their understanding 
of the role of territory for their identity or for their self-determination allows. 
With regards to liberal nationalism and the plenitude theory, I also argue that their 
identification of the right holder is problematic. The former excludes many types of 
political groups from the club of the right holders, assuming that only national 
groups may offer the basis for individuals’ identity. The plenitude theory instead 
offers two standards that may be at times in conflict and that make the identification 
of the right holder challenging. Finally, I argue that the liberal nationalism theory 
must also meet the challenge of offering a robust theory of original acquisition of 
property, given its reliance on a Lockean theory of collective property. 
In the next three chapters, I develop my own proposal, which I call the Legitimacy 
Based Conventional theory of territorial rights (LBC). I place my account among the 
collectivist direct theories as it maintains that groups, not individuals or states, are the 
rightful holders of territorial rights. I share with the theories that I examine below 
both the direct strategy and the collectivist approach. However, to address the 
limitations of these theories I make use of a conventionalist theory of acquisition of 
territorial rights and of a functionality principle to limit the scope of territorial 
holdings. The result is a theory that does not suffer from the in rem problem, that 
sufficiently addresses the particularity requirement, and that does not need an 
account of original acquisition. In fact, LBC relies on a conventionalist theory of 





territorial rights that for the most part favors the group that has a current significant 
relation with a particular territory, and that is not concerned on how the group has 
originally acquired territorial rights. Moreover, by making use of the functionality 
principle to limit the scope of territorial rights, LBC is sensitive to the wider 
commitment to principles of global justice and legitimacy. Even if territorial rights 
are defined and established on the basis of community specific values and practices, 
the theory is able to limit these titles to the role that they serve in pursuing the 
community’s legitimate goals. 
 
3.1 Liberal  National ism 
 
For the liberal nationalism theory groups acquire titles to territory if that specific 
territory is of primary importance to the identity of the members of the group, and if 
the group has mixed its labor to it and created material and symbolic value there.12 
Liberal nationalism considers national groups and their territorial holdings worthy of 
protection in virtue of the function they play in developing and protecting 
individuals’ identity and, thus, also their wellbeing. Liberal nationalism is a direct 
theory because it considers the legitimacy of collective territorial rights as basic, and 
not dependent on any prior entitlement of political authority. However, only groups 
that present specific characteristics can be considered holders of territorial rights. 
First, the group must be an agent able to transform the territory in ways that are 
directly ascribable to its actions. Second, the group has to endure over time, and 
must be distinguishable from other groups even once its original members have 
disappeared. Miller suggests these to be characteristics shared by groups that are 
reasonably structured and whose members are strongly related by shared beliefs and 
practices, such as national groups, indigenous groups, and long-established 
churches.13 
Nationality is one of the most important sources of individuals’ identity, and for this 
reason it contributes to individuals’ wellbeing. If a specific territory has been the 
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setting of events that have formed the historical national identity of a group, then 
this territory is likely to be perceived by the members of the national group as 
necessary to their identity. The analogy most used to exemplify this emotional and 
symbolic connection between members of a national group and their territory is that 
of the relationship between individuals and their parents. 14  Once a significant 
relationship has been established, just like the natural relationship between father and 
son, then a natural desire to be close to the loved ones arises. In the same way, when 
a group of people establishes with its territory a meaningful relation based on 
important historical events, it is assumed that that group of people will consider that 
particular territory as their fatherland.  
The symbolic link to the fatherland must be understood as objectively as possible. It 
is not sufficient, in fact, that a group of people just believes that a territory is 
significantly theirs. The link must be developed and retraceable to historical events 
that are objectively significant for the identity of the group. This historical and 
symbolic link is necessary but not sufficient to establish rights to territory. The group 
must also show that its identity depends in important ways on the use and control of 
the particular territory that it demands for itself. 
The relationship a group establishes with its land must also represent the material 
effort that a national group has made to improve and change the territory in which it 
settled. Like the indirect collectivist Lockean theory, the liberal nationalist theory 
employs the collectivist version of Lockean principle of labor mixing according to 
which a group has a right to an external property if the value of the territory depends 
largely on the fact that the group has mixed its labor to it. The acquisition of 
territorial rights through the labor mixing principle is subject to a proviso.15 The right 
to formative territories could not, according to its proponents, justify the 
enlargement of the territory of a community much above the level needed for its 
members to meet basic needs,16 especially when other communities might lack the 
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means to achieve the satisfaction of their own members’ basic needs. But because the 
proviso must be applied to both material and community specific symbolic value, it 
is unclear to what extent the symbolic value can be stretched to include the 
protection of more extensive features of the national group’s identity, and against the 
group’s duties of global justice. 
The principle of mixing one’s labor, moreover, cannot justify property in land when 
someone else rightfully owns the land that is being labored. In other words, it does 
not override legitimate entitlements that were in place before the new occupier 
started to enhance the land with his work. The principle of labor mixing, thus, works 
in conjunction with the idea of first acquisition and just transfer.17 This requires that 
the theory provides us with a robust account of original acquisition and just transfers. 
However, this can be particularly challenging given that it is difficult to identify the 
moment of original acquisition and all the subsequent transfers. Moreover, not many 
existing national groups can take pride in a history free from wrongful appropriation, 
and reliance on a theory of just acquisition and transfer may result in the rejection of 
many existing territorial holdings. 
The labor mixing argument together with the formative territory argument 
constitutes the strongest case for territorial rights according to the liberal nationalist 
account. However, its proponents do not always wish to provide a conclusive set of 
arguments in favor of a group’s right to territory. Instead, they suggest that the 
resolution of specific controversies about land and natural resources can only be 
achieved by taking into consideration every issue case by case.18 Thus, in addition to 
the labor mixing argument and the formative territory argument, liberal nationalism 
provides a set of considerations that should be addressed in the case of territorial 
disputes. Neither one of these factors carries decisive weight, but all show a concern 
for liberal ideals and for the protection of national identities that are necessary for 
individuals’ wellbeing.  
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First, in deciding over territorial disputes one should consider who has first occupied 
the land.19 For liberal nationalism first occupancy is often considered one of those 
moments that constitutes a crucial link between the territory and the community. 
Moreover, the very first occupier of a land “did not have to disturb anyone else’s 
rights,” and any subsequent occupier, to be a rightful one, must get his title through 
voluntary transfer.20 Second, liberal nationalist argue that some rights on land seem 
to be rightfully grounded on the mere fact that the agent is currently living in the 
land or that it has lived in it during a significant period of time in the past. 
Moreover, Miller suggests that, although adding symbolic and material value gives a 
convincing moral justification to some groups’ territorial jurisdiction, these titles lose 
strength when competing with the simple fact of present occupation. First, the 
material and symbolic value that contributes to grounding the territorial right is likely 
to be stronger for the present occupiers, since they have added value to the land in 
more recent times, and are likely to be the ones that are relying on that land for their 
sustenance.21 The right of present occupiers rests on the fact that they are living their 
lives and making plans under the expectation that the place that they are currently 
occupying will be their homeland in the future. This argument echoes the occupancy 
principle, and it aims at protecting individuals’ ability to form life plans. Second, 
present occupation is the more important the more costly it is to reverting the 
territorial holding to a previous owner.22 Nevertheless, the strength of the demands 
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when a long time has passed since that group has enjoyed its title to that specific land. This is a 
limitation to the principle of mixing one’s labor, according to which once the link between the person 
and his labor fades away, the thing becomes embedded with that labor and regains independence from 
the laborer (Ibid., 17). If this is the case, the justification of past entitlements to land on the basis of 
historic injustice may be more challenging. 
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of the present occupiers does not exclude that historical claims may have to be 
addressed by restitution of territories. 
Lastly, national liberalists appeal to the principle of self-determination and suggest 
that the right to a particular territory protects the group’s interest in national self-
determination.23 According to Miller, for a national community to pursue its goals 
freely and successfully, it might need exclusive access to and control of a geographic 
area. In some cases, the community’s self-determination may be inseparable from the 
group’s territory.24 For instance, if a community has the goal to become agriculturally 
self-sufficient, it is allowed to exert exclusive control over a specific geographical 
area, and to also controls who enters and resides in that area. Since agricultural self-
sufficiency is a function of the amount of resources that a land can produce, and of 
the amount of people that consume those resources, it is necessary that a group 
might be able to exclusively control the flux of people in and out of its territory, and 
to regulate the use of land and resources.25 
None of these arguments represents a conclusive argument in favor of a particular 
right to territory. The labor mixing argument constitutes by far the strongest case for 
territorial rights; however, it is not sufficient. Other considerations must be 
addressed before territorial rights may be accorded, in particular when conflicts 
about shared territory arise. The theory does, however, favor national groups that 
have held a continuous significant relation with the land that was acquired through 
the mixing of their labor. But, the reliance on cultural homogeneity to identify a 
nation unduly restricts the club of right holders, and incurs the challenge of 
ethnocentrism. In fact, it favors national groups and fails to include other groups that 
may display similar attachment to territory, such as, for example, nations that are 
multicultural and are the product of a recent history of migration.26 
 
3.2 Sel f -determinat ion and Pleni tude Theory 
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Moore’s self-determination theory maintains that groups may legitimately hold 
territorial rights on the territory its members occupy if the group’s control of that 
territory is fundamental to its right to self-determination. She argues that a group first 
acquires occupancy rights on the basis of its members’ individual residency rights. 
Individuals acquire residency rights in virtue of the fact that their life plans rely on 
the occupation of a particular territory.27 On the basis of their members’ residency 
rights, groups acquire occupancy rights that amount to immunities from others’ 
jurisdictional powers, and some incidents of territorial jurisdiction regarding the use 
and management of land and natural resources.28 
Occupancy rights are necessary but not sufficient to acquire full titles to territorial 
jurisdiction and resources.29 Only groups subjectively defined as a people that have 
the capacity to exercise self-determination and have a history of cooperation together 
may legitimately exert full territorial jurisdiction. It may seem at this point that Moore 
is proposing an indirect theory, very much like the occupancy theory. However, for 
the self-determination theory, the lack of a capacity to exercise self-determination, or 
the lack of a history of political cooperation together, does not constitute a “blocking 
condition” that would make the group unfit to hold territorial jurisdiction. These 
requirements merely offer guidelines for the “judgment about the possession of 
qualities or characteristics that the group ought to have.”30  
It is unclear to what extent these requirements affect the group’s rights of territorial 
jurisdiction and resources. Moore argues that the lack of political capacity of the 
group to effectively carry on some collective action, or the lack of resources and 
extreme property, do not make the group’s territorial jurisdiction illegitimate but only 
somewhat weaker.31 What seems to be more important for the group’s worthiness of 
territorial jurisdiction is the history of cooperation that its members share. Even in 
this case, however, the history of cooperation must not be one of a glorious past as a 
state or a nation. As long as a group is able to demonstrate that its members have 
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had significant relationships with each other in the past, and not only a transitory 
aspiration for independence, the group should be accorded some title to territorial 
jurisdiction.32 
For the self-determination theory, the group acquires territorial rights on the basis of 
its community specific values regardless of its political ability.33 The group’s right to 
self-determination grants territorial jurisdiction and resource rights on the basis of 
the community’s understanding of what it means to be self-determining.34 This 
makes the theory well suited to avoid the charges of ethnocentrism. However, the 
balance of considerations is heavily shifted in favor of the community’s special 
interests and gives little space for the demands of global justice. Even if Moore were 
to set a limiting functionality principle according to which territorial rights were as 
extensive as needed for the group to exercise self-determination, the limitation would 
refer to what self-determination means for the community itself, and thus still favor 
the community’s special interests in the territory. The only limitation to the 
enjoyment of full territorial and resource rights that the self-determination theory 
proposes are the claims and immunities that others have in virtue of a minimal right 
of subsistence.  
Because communities hold territorial rights on the basis of their specific 
understanding of what it means to be self-determining, diverse groups’ rights to self-
determination may justify conflicting titles to territorial jurisdiction and resources. In 
this instance, Moore suggests that if the parties in conflict have a long history of 
cooperation, they will have reciprocal duties to achieve a mutually beneficial 
agreement, but only if the history of cooperation is one that was beneficial to both.35 
If no history of beneficial cooperation can be recollected, Moore argues that the 
groups are not permitted to violate each other’s right to self-determination. But given 
that the community’s special understanding of self-determination sets the scope of its 
territorial titles, the theory leaves undetermined the guidelines for the resolution of 
conflicts that arise from competing ideas of self-determination, even with regards to 
communities that are not present in the territory at issue. For example, imagine that 
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the island of Kiribati disappears prematurely due to rising oceans, and imagine that 
Tonga has the resources to incorporate Kiribati’s population, which is willing to join 
the Polynesian community. Moreover, imagine that according to the people of 
Kiribati, joining any other community aside from the Tonga would endanger their 
right to self-determination, as it would force them to change their ways of life too 
dramatically. However, imagine also that the people from Tonga are not similarly 
open to the idea of sharing their resource rights and their territorial jurisdiction with 
their neighbors in need because they feel that the integration between the two 
different cultures would slowly erode their cultural uniqueness.  
In this case, the two groups’ right to self-determination are in contrast, as the refusal 
of the people from Tonga to share their territorial rights with Kiribati violates 
Kiribati’s self-determination rights, given that Kiribati sees no other option to 
preserve their self-determination besides joining forces with Tonga. Moore gives us 
little as guidance to determine whether Kiribati has a freedom to pursue its rights to 
self-determination regardless and migrate to Tonga, or if this should be a case where 
Kiribati has simply lost the ability to pursue its rights to self-determination. In fact, 
they have no occupancy rights in the island of Tonga, and given that the two groups 
have no relevant history of cooperation, the people of Tonga have no obligations 
towards Kiribati to share their territorial holdings, besides some duties to ensure 
their survival. 
Finally, Moore’s proposal has the further limitation that it cannot be used to address 
rights on unoccupied resources. She argues that disputes regarding unoccupied 
resources should be addressed as property disputes. For these cases, Moore at times 
offers solutions based on existing international practice and law, or based on a 
Lockean theory of original appropriation, or based on principled arguments such as 
the tragedy of the commons.36 In so far as Moore relies on a theory of property 
acquisition, the theory incurs the difficulty of providing a robust theory of property 
and just transferal. 
Similar problems afflict the plenitude theory. According to Kolers, a group acquires 
territorial rights if its members share a conception of land and resources that identify 
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the particular territory of importance to the group, the reasons why that particular 
territory is important, and the principles and methods according to which it can be 
used and managed.37 The group must also be effectively using the territory its 
members occupy, have used it in the past, and have the intention to use it in the 
future to assert territorial jurisdiction there.38 
Kolers argues that it is important to ensure that our understanding of resources and 
territory respects the community’s social ontology and use patterns.39 With respect to 
Moore’s proposal, however, the plenitude theory has the added complication that it 
accords significantly more robust territorial rights to groups, reducing considerably 
the role of considerations on global justice in determining the nature and extent of 
territorial holdings.40 Moreover, as Moore points out, the plenitude theory also fails 
to offer a clear account of the rights holder. Kolers assumes that the two criteria of 
social ontology and land use patterns will always point at the same right holder, while 
in fact they may conflict.41 For example, if we concentrate on land ontology we may 
find Quebecois understand their land as the location of their defeat in their history of 
resistance against an English political and cultural project. However, if we 
concentrate on the pattern of use, we may find that the Quebecois’ use of their land 
is no different from that of their fellow Canadians.42 The confusion between the two 
standards makes it problematic to identify the holder of territorial jurisdiction. 
 
4 Individualist Direct Theories 
 
The individualist direct theory maintains that individuals, and not only collective 
agents, can legitimately demand territorial rights if they have acquired a title of 
property on that particular piece of land. For these theories, individuals acquire 
property in land if they have mixed their labor with it. By mixing their labor, 
individuals have established with the territory a special relation that is fundamental to 
                                                      
37 Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice, 3-4. 
38 Kolers speaks in this regard of ‘plenitude’ (Ibid, 111-120). 
39 Ibid., 86-87. 
40 Armstrong, Resources, Rights and Global Justice, 221. 
41 Moore, Political Theory, 74. 
42 Ibid. 





their interest in self-government. For both versions of the individualist direct theory, 
groups and states may acquire territorial rights only if their members transfer their 
titles to political institutions via means of consent. 
The two versions of the individualist direct theory are Simmons’ individualist 
Lockean theory and Steiner’s left libertarian theory. Both suggest that individuals’ 
acquisition of property must be limited by the Lockean proviso. However, Simmons 
argues that the proviso must be understood as a sufficientarian limitation, according 
to which when one appropriates land one must leave enough and as good for others 
to appropriate as well. Steiner, on the contrary, interprets the proviso as an 
egalitarian limitation to appropriation, according to which every individual must be 
able to appropriate the same amount and value of territory and resources. This leads 
Steiner to support the establishment of a global fund that ensures that the value of all 
existing and usable resources is equally distributed among each individual globally. 
Because individualist direct theories ground territorial rights on individuals’ property 
entitlements to a particular land, they offer a conclusive justification both of who can 
exert territorial jurisdiction somewhere and of the title to the particular territory that 
the agent occupies. For these theories, a state may not control an uninhabited land 
like Antarctica, unless that particular area is in some relevant way owned by its 
members: they must have mixed their labor with it, and their ownership must protect 
their fundamental interest in individual self-government. Individualist theories are 
also suited to address the demands of global justice. The appropriation of private 
property is in fact limited by the extent to which property is needed to pursue 
individual’s interest in self-government. The theories are less concerned with the 
protection of group rights, as long as individuals have a genuine opportunity to be 
self-governing. 
The reliance on a theory of property rights, however, makes the individualist theory 
subject to the charges of ethnocentrism. I will argue that the charges are weightier for 
Steiner, given that his theory considers resources and territory valuable only from a 
free market perspective. Simmons, on the other hand, argues that individuals have 
discretion on what kind of attachment they develop with their territory and values, 
and thus, also on what territorial rights their voluntary associations hold. By relying 





on property acquisition, both theories must propose a convincing account of original 
acquisition and just transfer.  
Finally, as I argue in more detail in Chapter 7, individualist theories unconvincingly 
promote a theory of secession that allows individuals to secede separately from each 
other. Although individualist theories propose a theoretically sound theory of 
territorial rights, the resulting account of territorial rights sits problematically with 
our intuitions that territorial rights protect values that are collective and relational, as 
well as of our practice in international relations. Their rejection of fundamental 
collectivist titles to land makes them unfit to address properly the question of what 
territorial rights do states and group have, without depending on a unrealistic and 
unfeasible aggregative account of territorial rights that falls short of our intuitions. 
In the following section and in Chapter 7, I also argue that Simmons’ attempts at 
reconciling the individualist approach with our intuition regarding the collective 
nature of territorial rights show that there is room for the individualist theory to 
come nearer a more probable and feasible theory of territorial rights. However, the 
reliance on a concept of individual private property is an important limitation of his 
proposal. 
 
4.1 Individual is t  Lockean Theory 
 
The individualist Lockean theory accords territorial entitlements to individuals on the 
basis of their faculty to acquire property rights in land. According to Locke, property 
entitlements can be acquired prior to the establishment of political institutions that 
enact and enforce them. The theory employs the principle of labor mixing and the 
principle of individual self-government to explain and justify individuals’ territorial 
rights. 
Individuals can acquire unowned property if they add material value to it, and thus if 
they add some element of themselves to the object of their choice. An individual can 
add value to an object by working on it and creating new products out of it (if it is 
land, a man can cultivate it or build shelter on it) or making it usable for 





consumption (if it is a fruit, a man can pick it up and peel it). The object thus 
modified becomes property of the individual who invested his time and effort in 
changing the object. By putting his time and effort in the object, the individual has 
put some of himself in it.43 The object is now infused with the material presence of 
the man. Since every individual has an entitlement to self-ownership,44 they also have 
an entitlement on whatever they mix their labor with. By transferring some of 
themselves into the object of their choice they acquire property over it.  
Once this transformation has taken place, the object that the individual has chosen 
becomes different from the land and the objects that were originally held in 
common.45 Locke’s right to property is not only natural but also does not require the 
consent of others to be justified. 46  However, for acquisition to be a justified 
imposition of duties on others, it must be limited. Acquisition is justified if limited by 
a proviso, which holds that the agent who acquires an object or a piece of land must 
leave as much and as good for others to acquire.47 This limitation ensures that all 
individuals are able to pursue their own preservation and prosperity independently by 
exercising their fundamental right to self-government. 
The individualist Lockean theory also subscribes to the efficiency principle. When 
the land is used in a way that it produces more of those products that are beneficial 
to men, then it is efficiently used. The more efficient the use of a land is, the better it 
is for the preservation of humanity. As already explained in the section on the 
collectivist Lockean theory, efficiency is an important measure of the validity of 
property holdings. However, it is not to be considered a maximizing principle, but 
only as a weighty factor in the determination of competing demands.  
The promotion of the value of efficiency and of a theory of individual property 
rights makes Simmons’ proposal subject to the charge of ethnocentrism. Only 
voluntary communities that understand their members’ relation to land as one of 
individual ownership and efficient use are regarded as worthy of territorial holdings. 
                                                      
43 Locke, Two Treatises, II, 25; Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 238. 
44 Waldron suggests that the argument for self-ownership should be intended as an argument for a 
title of individuals to their bodies and their energies. (Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 183). 
45 Locke, Two Treatises, II, 27. 
46 Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 224. 
47 Ibid., 281. 





The charge of ethnocentrism is mitigated by the fact that individuals are free to form 
any association they wish to join. Nevertheless, many existing communities that we 
may consider worthy of legitimate control and use of land and resources are not the 
result of individuals that have come together freely and voluntarily. For example, 
consider the Amish communities. These are neither voluntary, nor they are based on 
a conception of property that is individual. However, it would be difficult to 
reconcile that communities of this kind do not deserve some control on the territory 
that their members use for their self-preservation and prosperity. 
The individualist theory relies considerably on a theory of property acquisition to 
identify the right holder and the particular territory that the right holder has acquired. 
This allows the theory to address the in rem problem and the particularity 
requirement, given that the individual who acquires property rights on the particular 
territory that is unowned and with which he has mixed his own labor, also acquires 
territorial jurisdiction and meta-jurisdiction there. However, reliance on a theory of 
appropriation makes it difficult for the theory to address and explain existing 
territorial holdings, given that proving that current holdings are the result of 
legitimate original acquisition and transfer is a challenging undertaking. 
Simmons suggests that even if actual holdings will never fully satisfy the 
requirements of the moral theory that explains them, they can still be assessed 
according to how well they approximate the moral requirement of an ideal theory.48 I 
believe this to be a sensible perspective on the problem of original acquisition. Yet, if 
the theory of property acquisition is only an evaluative tool, the theory is ultimately 
unable to tell us whose title we must evaluate. If we cannot rely on an account of 
original acquisition to determine who is the rightful owner of a territory, then it is 
unclear whose title we should consider when assessing whether it fits with the moral 
requirement of the theory of acquisition. Should we give priority to existing titles? If 
so, why? If the original appropriation theory is to be understood as a guideline, then 
Simmons must also explain whether there is another principle according to which we 
must justify existing holdings or give way to alternative and revisionist territorial 
demands.  
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Because the function is that of protecting the basis for individuals’ self-government, 
the scope of territorial holdings cannot extend much further the scope of the 
property holdings of its members.49 This implies that many territorial holding, such 
as for example the deep seas and un-inhabited lands, cannot be considered 
legitimately held by any institution, and that they are still areas subject to the 
principle of original acquisition and the limits set by the Lockean proviso. Simmons’ 
idea that rights to uninhabited and unused territories are hardly legitimate is in some 
ways appealing, even if it is in sharp contrast with our present practices in 
international law. The proposal is favorable to those who have not acquired enough 
and as good to establish new property rights on unused land and resources, and to 
pursue their right to self-government. The theory is thus sympathetic to the demands 
of the global poor, and accords very limited rights to existing political institutions. 
For Simmons, once individuals have acquired property rights on a territory on the 
basis of their right to self-government, they may voluntarily transfer their titles to 
political institutions that allow them to pursue the satisfaction of their more complex 
needs. The individuals’ consent, being vague and inexplicit, 50  leaves open the 
question of to what extent the state acquires powers to control and exploit a territory 
and its resources. For this view, a state acquires any territorial rights that is necessary 
to achieve the end for which men decided to establish political institutions, which for 
Simmons is the enforcement of individuals’ natural rights to property and the 
adjudication between controversies in order to protect a peaceful and stable society.51 
Fernando Tesón proposes a version of the Lockean individualist theory and suggests 
that the state acquires additional land and resources so that it is able to provide 
“genuine public goods”.52 Tesón suggests that the notion of public good includes less 
than it is currently considered as such. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that 
the concept of public good is more extensive than the enforcement and adjudication 
of individuals’ natural rights to property, which are limited to what they can acquire 
in nature, provided that they leave enough and as good for others. The individualist 
Lockean theory, thus, employs a version of the functionality principle to justify 
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control of public land, according to which a state can legitimately demand exclusive 
control of territory if it is necessary to perform its minimal functions. 
The theory makes use of the functionality principle to justify territorial rights that 
extend past individuals’ holding and “independent of any common consent,” such as 
territorial jurisdiction over public spaces necessary for shared activities, recreation, 
and gathering. 53  States’ territorial rights are thus not a simple aggregation of 
individual legitimate entitlement to land and property. Rather, individuals together 
transfer their territorial titles to political associations that, subsequently, acquire titles 
on more extensive areas that become public land, on and all the shared territory 
needed for institutions to effectively perform the functions for which they were 
created. In this way, Simmons attempts to reconcile the individualist approach and 
our intuitions that territorial rights are in some important sense collective 
entitlements. 
At this point it is important to clarify one aspect of the individualist theory that, I 
believe, puts a strain on Simmons’ proposal. For the individualist Lockean theory, 
individuals transfer their territorial rights to the political institutions of their choice. 
Even if transferred to political institutions, territorial rights remain subject to the 
consent of the state’s subjects. Individuals retain the right to disentangle from 
institutions that they do not accept anymore and the right to take their property with 
them. I discuss the problem of individual secession in Chapter 7. However, it is 
important to anticipate another problematic aspect of considering territorial rights as 
individual entitlements.  
Simmons’ concession that territorial rights must in some sense include also titles to 
public and unowned land complicates the neat picture that the Lockean theory of 
property acquisition promotes. Simmons’ proposal relies on individuals’ property 
rights for the most part, but then it also advances the idea that some territorial rights 
may emerge independently and above individuals’ territorial holdings. These 
collective titles to public land and shared spaces emerge from a principle of 
functionality that protects the correct functioning of political institutions aimed at 
protecting people’s interest in self-government. This is problematic in two ways.  
                                                      
53 Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States, 314; Tesón, The Mystery of Territory, p. 36. 





First, it is now unclear which rights take precedence over the others, whether those 
of the state or those of its separate members in case, for example, of secession. In 
fact, it is unclear to what extent the functionality principle can be used to justify 
territorial rights that go past the individual property holdings that are aggregated, and 
what happens to these titles once individuals secede independently from their 
neighbors. Consider also that there may be cases in which the protection of the 
effective functions of a state may be in sharp contrast with the rights of one or more 
members of society to secede. In this case, does the individuals’ interest in self-
government defeat the interest of the remaining members of society in maintaining 
functioning political institutions? 
Simmons mentions that dissenters surrounded by consenters’ land may have an 
incentive to swap their property together with other members of society, and 
gradually drift away from the core of the original community, to create an area 
populated by dissenters.54 However, he does not deny that the dissenter has a right to 
separate independently from the other members, and disregard the incentive of 
joining other dissenters.  
Differently, Tesón argues that in most cases individual secession “may be wrong.” 
He suggests that individual secession will upset the agreement between property 
owners, and that the government has powers to prevent any action that will gravely 
harm others, like war and natural disasters.55 However, Tesón’s solution is in contrast 
with the individualist foundation of the individualist Lockean theory. War or natural 
disasters are external menaces to the community; on the contrary, the government’s 
legitimacy is challenged from the inside in the case of the individual dissenter. The 
dissenter disagrees with the other members of society on whether political authority 
should be accorded to the government, and wishes to exercise his or her meta-
jurisdictional authority separately, by entrusting other agents with territorial 
jurisdiction. In this case, the disagreement is precisely about the role of that particular 
government as a legislator, enforcer, and adjudicator. Thus, if individuals may 
legitimately exert meta-jurisdictional powers separately from each other, the 
government does not have powers to prevent the dissenter’s secession, given that it 
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would lack the authorization to enforce its decisions on him. In the case of the 
dissenter, the government may not adjudicate on whether the dissenter’s actions 
endanger the political community, because it may not adjudicate on matters regarding 
its own legitimacy. To maintain that the government can oppose individual secession, 
Tesón must concede that the meta-jurisdictional powers of the rest of the state’s 
members prevail over those of the individual dissenter. 
Second, it is also unclear on what basis the state should hold territorial rights that are 
more extensive than those of its members, when its members’ property rights already 
protect their rights to self-government and their chances for prosperity. If a state can 
only acquire what is needed for its members’ rights to self-government and 
prosperity, it should hold only those rights that individuals acquired in the state of 
nature, and that were subsequently transferred to political institutions. Those are the 
only rights that are necessary to the protection of their fundamental interest in self-
government. Any right acquired above the property holdings sufficient for 
preservation will contribute instead to the chances that individuals have to prosper 
and better their situation. 
The functionality principle comes in play in the individualist Lockean theory to 
establish territorial rights on public spaces, and to address the idea that property 
entitlements must in some ways be linked to each other in a territorially dense and 
continuous system of rights. 56  The functionality principle, thus, protects both 
individuals’ chances to self-government, and the interest that these people have in 
being members of a network of normative relations that is functional to enrich their 
chances for prosperity. If this is so, then on what basis may a state assert rights to 
public spaces but not also on uninhabited and unused land? To what extent should 
individuals’ interest in the benefits of their cooperation be protected, and to what 
extent instead should their demands to territories that are not included in their basic 
right to self-government be rejected? 
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4.2 Left  Libertar ian Theory 
 
The left libertarian theory proposed by Steiner is in large part similar to Simmons’ 
proposal, as it also suggests that individuals acquire property rights on particular 
territories through the labor mixing principle. Once they have acquired titles to a 
territory, individuals may freely transfer those rights to the political associations of 
their choice. Thus, a state acquires territorial rights if all its members have consented 
to its institutions and have transferred to them their property rights on territory and 
resources. 
An important difference with the Individualist Lockean theory is that for Steiner the 
Lockean proviso must be understood as an egalitarian limitation to original 
acquisition, granting a universal right to equal freedom and a claim that protects 
individuals from others’ interfering with their title to an equal share of territory and 
resources. In fact, for an individual to be free to do something, Steiner argues, he 
must own every physical space and object that that action requires.57 So for example, 
I am free to open the door of a locked room if I can walk from my location to the 
door without anyone obstructing me, and if I have in my possession the keys of the 
door. This very simple example shows the physical nature that rights have in 
Steiner’s conception of freedom. The physical conception of freedom coupled with 
the idea that individuals hold a right to equal freedom sets the basis for Steiner’s 
theory of territorial rights.  
Since individuals have a right to act equally free in the external world, and since every 
action requires the possession of the physical objects on which the action impinges, 
it follows that every individual has a right to an equal share of physical possessions, 
including territorial holdings.58 Steiner argues that the basis for calculating each 
individual’s share of resources is the amount of resources that were originally 
unowned and thus the existing resources minus the added value of labor.59 As the 
current territorial holdings represent an unjust distribution of rights, the theory 
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requires that a global system of redistribution should be implemented that ensures 
that each person accesses the resources and territory to which he or she is entitled.60  
Every title not originally acquired by taking into consideration the rights of others to 
an equal share of natural resources, or – if already owned – that is not voluntarily 
transferred, is due to the legitimate owners. The legitimate owner, in the case of 
original over-appropriation, is the under-appropriator, in other words, the person 
who owns a smaller share of what should be legitimately hers. In the case of already 
owned land, instead, the legitimate holder is the one who owned the land a moment 
before the chain of legitimate entitlements was broken.61 Because relocation is costly 
and inconvenient, however, the global fund will distribute resources on the basis of 
their market value, and the rightful owner will receive compensation on the basis of 
what he or she has lost due to over-appropriation or illegitimate transfer. 
Like Simmons’, Steiner’s proposal offers a solution to the in rem and the particularity 
problem. For the left libertarian theory, in fact, individuals acquire property titles on 
the land that they occupy and with which they mix their own labor. The territorial 
rights thus acquired also include territorial jurisdiction. In this view, only the people 
who have acquired territorial rights within a particular territory may exert territorial 
jurisdiction there, and only within the borders of the property that they have 
legitimately acquired. 
The theory is committed to addressing the demands of global justice, suggesting that 
territorial rights and resource rights should be distributed equally globally. Steiner 
recognizes that the redistribution of actual territorial holdings would require 
displacement and the disruption of existing life plans. However, he argues, if we 
evaluate the common pot of resources before the added value of labor on the basis 
of its market value, we are able to tax the over-appropriators in favor of the under-
appropriators. I wish to point out two difficulties with this view.  
First, the focus on the market value of natural resources and territory dismisses 
alternative ways to understand territory that are not easily quantifiable. Different 
people consider territory important not as an item to exchange with others for 
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money, nor as an object of material value, but as a significant part of their identity 
and meaningful relations with others. In this regard, Steiner would say that the value 
of some resource or territory could always be reconciled with the monetary value 
that others attach to it. However, the very fact of monetizing territory and land may 
lead some communities to reject any attempt to bargain and compromise. The 
exchange for money of something that they consider holy, for example, may deeply 
offend their sentiments towards the contended territory and create friction and 
resentment against those who advance competing claims. Although the theory is 
chiefly concerned with the demands of global justice, its focus on market value and 
exchange may undermine its aims making communication between deeply different 
societies and international relations harder. 
A second issue with the global fund idea resides in the very possibility of evaluating 
the common pot of resources. Things and territories become resources according to 
what people think and do with them. For example, before we were able to refine oil 
and make products out of it, oil was a resource of no value. Similarly, before we had 
the technology to venture to Antarctica, the region was of no importance for us. The 
radical change of the value of these resources at the time of discovery, and because 
of the way we make use of them, makes it very difficult to determine whether the 
resource is valuable in itself, or because of the labor, expectations, and innovation 
that people put into it. Did the first man who acquired and used oil create all the 
value that oil has today, or did oil always have the value that it has today? And if, as it 
is more reasonable to believe, it is neither one of these options alone, what is the 
ratio between added value and original value? 
These complications show how important it is for the left libertarian theory to offer 
a solid theory of original acquisition and of value. The theory must be able to address 
some of the most complicated concerns we are going to face in the not so distant 
future, when for example resources found in space will be accessible to some but not 
all of the countries or individuals on Earth. These are not easy calculations to make, 
even if we accept that the value of resources and territory should be the value 
determined by the market. 
Finally, the left libertarian theory shares with the individualist Lockean theory the 
idea that territorial rights must be understood as individual titles to land and 





resources, and that states acquire territorial rights if individuals voluntarily transfer 
their titles to states’ institutions.62 Differently from Simmons, however, Steiner does 
not make any concessions regarding the rights of states on public space. According 
to his view, states hold territorial rights only on those areas in which their members 
have property titles. Thus, states’ territorial rights are a mere aggregate of individuals’ 
property holdings. This makes it easier for Steiner to show how separate individuals 
may be able to secede from their institutions and take their property with them, 
without the difficulty to discern between states’ independent holdings and their 
members’ territorial rights. However, the resulting theory is one that is difficult to 
accept. Steiner asks us to imagine a state that has no legitimate powers on the 
publicly held territory that links its members’ property. For Steiner, the state may also 
be interrupted by many independent mini-states resulting from individual secession. 
But a state that does not maintain a locally dense and politically stable territory is not 
a state in the common sense, and may not be able to perform important functions 





In this and the previous chapter I have argued that direct theories must be preferred 
to the indirect approach to territorial rights on the grounds of their ability to address 
the particularity requirement and the in rem problem. With some exceptions, indirect 
theories fail to indicate a unique holder of powers of territorial jurisdiction and to 
explain why an agent has a right to a particular territory. For the most part, this flaw 
has to do with the central role of the principle of functionality in indirect accounts 
and the focus on a performance based account of attachment. 
Direct theories avoid the in rem problem and sufficiently address the particularity 
requirement by offering an account of attachment to a particular territory that is not 
based on the agent’s ability to give a particular institutional performance, and that 
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grounds the agent’s title to territorial jurisdiction there. However, to justify territorial 
jurisdiction, they often rely on a theory of original acquisition and just transfer. I 
have discussed some of the difficulties in developing such theory with regards to 
territorial holdings. These have to do with the fact that it is often very difficult to 
retrace the history of current territorial holdings and the value that original 
appropriators have added to their legitimate holdings. Moreover, their focus on the 
agent’s specific values in the determination of territorial holdings makes direct 
theories often neglectful of the demands of global justice, in particular if they are also 
collectivist theories. Nevertheless, I have suggested that the faults of the direct 
approach can be rectified without compromising the advantage that it has in 
addressing the in rem problem and the particularity requirement. In particular, direct 
theories can apply proper limitations to territorial rights by using a proviso or the 
functionality principle. 
I also argued that the collectivist direct approach should be preferred to the statist 
and individualist ones. Differently from the statist view, the collectivist approach is 
not ethnocentric. It also avoids the difficulties associated with the individualist 
approach with regards to secession and the control of public space. The biggest flaw 
of the collectivist direct account is that it tends to tilt the balance of considerations in 
favor of the groups that acquire territorial rights, reducing the space for 
considerations of global justice.  
A problematic balance between community specific values and global values may 
spur conflict and exacerbate the differences between groups, possibly hindering 
international cooperation. A theory that gives too central of a role to community 
specific values in defining territorial rights may encounter opposition from outsiders 
that may find the community’s demands overly self-regarding. On the other hand, a 
theory that gives a central role to one’s obligations to the global community may 
induce resentment from those who rely on the enjoyment of particular resources and 
hinder communication and debate regarding shared global obligations. 
In the following chapter, I develop my proposal. LBC is a collectivist direct theory of 
territorial rights that relies on a conventionalist theory of territorial rights that 
protects individuals’ interest in self-government. Because individuals need a stable 
relation with the territory in which they organize their lives, they acquire some titles 





to occupy, use, and control that particular territory. The conventionalist theory does 
not rely on a theory of original acquisition, but focuses its concerns on the present 
and active interests of current occupiers, favoring for the most part the group that 
has an existing significant relation with a particular territory.  
LBC also addresses the problem of balancing community specific values and global 
obligations, by employing a version of the functionality principle to limit the scope of 
exclusive territorial rights to only what is necessary for the protection of a set of 
requirements of legitimacy. I explain in Chapter 6 that legitimacy is a composite 
concept and may be met in different ways, respecting the different systems of values 
that communities use to determine their territorial holdings. For this view, although 
communities hold territorial jurisdiction for the mere fact that they rely on a 
particular territory for the protection of their members’ self-government, they 
acquire an immunity against others’ territorial jurisdiction within the same borders 
only if they meet the requirements of legitimacy, and only to the extent that they do 
so. This allows LBC to leave ample space to the demands of global justice, 
maintaining an approach that still favors a community’s specific systems of values. 
In developing my proposal, I also address a set of other concerns that I think a 
theory of territorial rights should address. A theory of territorial rights need not only 
be theoretically compelling, but also it must take seriously the effect that territorial 
control, occupation, and the exploitation of resources have on the lives of 
individuals, and offer realistic and sustainable solution to territorial disputes. These 
considerations appear in almost all the proposals that I have examined. In fact, the 
occupancy principle and the occupancy rights proposed by most of the existing 
literature are meant precisely to ensure that the first beneficiaries of our moral theory 
of territorial rights are individuals and their current expectations to lead their lives 
according to what they consider important. However, the protection of individuals’ 
interest in being self-governing, and the sustainability of the resolution of conflicts 
play a substantial role in LBC, which aims at addressing the widest range of actors 
that is possible, without compromising our commitment to fairness. 









Different communities often rely on the same territories for the protection of their 
ways of living, their values and traditions, and their members’ fundamental rights. A 
community’s assertion of their title to a land is often grounded in what their 
members believe to be a truth about their interests and attachment to that particular 
land. When two or more groups believe in incompatible narratives about their 
attachment to the same territory, conflicts are bound to appear and disrupt 
significantly the lives of their members. 
Conflicts over lands and resources have direct consequences on people’s livelihoods, 
in particular on those who inhabit the contested territories or whose lives depend on 
the enjoyment of contested resources. The conflict in Cyprus between Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots is an example of how interests on controlling a strategically 
important territory for Turkey, Russia, the UK, and Greece has affected the lives of 
those inhabiting the island. Among other reasons, the location of the island is of 
military interest for the UK and western European countries because of the influence 
that Russia may be able to exert on the Mediterranean Sea were it to settle a military 
base there. Moreover, recently significant amounts of offshore natural gas have been 
discovered, and this has increased the international interest for the island, which is 
still divided between the de facto control of Turkey in North Cyprus and the 
independent government of the South that has cultural and political ties to Greece. 
The complex network of political and economic interests has developed into a 
human rights crisis for the people inhabiting the island, with the two sides harboring 
resentment for each other. One among the many disrupting effects that these 
conflicts have had was the expropriation of Northern Cypriots’ houses and their 
relocation to the south of the island, following the Greek coup and the Turkish 
invasion in 1974. Since then, many people have lost their houses and received 
nominal compensation, which for many families meant losing a lifetime’s worth of 
savings and the principal means of livelihood. They have also in many cases lost 





contacts with their family members that had not undergone displacement, losing 
touch with the social fabric that gave meaning to their interpersonal relations. The 
Cypriot case is not a singularity in today’s international relations, where large-scale 
political programs and the associated interests in international security and nations’ 
prosperity at best ignore the most fundamental interests of those affected. 
As the example of Cyprus tells us, territorial disputes often have to do with the most 
fundamental interests of persons, their livelihoods, and the frameworks for 
meaningful interpersonal relations. However, one also needs to consider who else is 
affected and to what degree by the dispute, and thus who should be considered an 
interested party. I believe parties that should be granted some say in the 
determination of territorial rights are all those groups and individuals that have an 
existing interest in the territory, the satisfaction of which may not be attained with 
the control or use of any other territory or resource than the one currently contested.  
The agents affected may be those risking their livelihoods, but also those who have 
an interest in less urgent means for wellbeing, such as the exploitation of a natural 
resource for the prosperity of a nation. A theory of territorial rights should offer a 
way to accord different territorial rights on the basis of these different, important, 
and sometimes conflicting interests.  
Conventionalist theories of rights are a way one can identify these overlapping and 
diverse entitlements. According to this view, persons have a right to a particular land 
when this right is specified by a convention. Conventions are regularities in behavior 
of a group of individuals that are faced with recurrent situations. When a group is 
presented with a problem of cooperation, its members will spontaneously settle for 
some arrangement that is in some ways readily accessible.1 The origin of this idea can 
be found in Hume’s thought, who saw in the concept of interest a powerful tool to 
explain the emergence of social cooperation. Hume’s intuition is that individuals 
behave in accordance with their personal goals and interests, and that they 
spontaneously bargain towards some type of arrangement that they all prefer over 
continuous conflict and violence. 
In this chapter I show that the appealing features of the conventionalist approach are 
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fit to tackle the particular issues emerging from territorial disputes. In particular, the 
focus on persons’ interests emphasizes the reasons behind conflicts on territory and 
the possible avenues for resolution through compromise between interested parties. 
If individuals can assess their ambitions and desires as possible objects of 
negotiation, then they may be able to arrive at an agreement that can benefit all the 
parties to a dispute. Moreover, a conventionalist theory of rights is favorable to a 
fluid conception of entitlements that are sensitive to persons’ characters, ambitions, 
and values, but also to the fact that individuals’ reliance to some resources and 
territories can change with time, as their interests adapt to new circumstances. In 
fact, conventions will change when, for instance, new members join the community 
and participate in shaping expectations and regular behaviors. Conventions may also 
change when the same community is faced with the challenges posed by non-
renewable resources or pollution and climate change, and must modify its social 
norms to respond to new circumstances. 
In the section that follows, I describe the conventionalist approach and the theory of 
rights that it supports. I then show that the pure conventionalist approach presents 
two important flaws and is unable to offer the grounds for the establishment of 
exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and of duties upon others to respect existing 
social norms. I discuss how we can overcome these issues by introducing a legitimate 
threshold in Chapter 6 and propose that we must identify one universal 
understanding of why territory is important that limits the role of community specific 
narratives in determining exclusive territorial rights. The aim is to combine the two 
strategies to address the limitations of both and make use of the different important 
principles that they promote. 
After showing the limitations of a conventionalist approach, I put them aside for the 
rest of the chapter and argue in Section 4 that we have moral reasons to respect 
social norms, regardless of whether they are morally virtuous or not. I then discuss 
how this approach is fit to tackle issues regarding territorial rights, such as its ability 
to address the particularity requirement and the fact that it does not require an 
account of original acquisition. I conclude with the outline of my proposal for a 
legitimacy based conventionalist approach to territorial rights, which will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 








Territorial rights are not dissimilar to property entitlements. Territory is for 
individuals and groups a means to preserve and protect fundamental interests, just 
like the possession of the personal holdings that affect them directly. The rules on 
property, moreover, are the most prominent expression of how individual interests 
can be evaluated and calculated with reference to exchangeable things. Property 
exemplifies how persons come to ensure the means for the realization of their 
aspirations and their ability to appraise these aspirations in a tangible form.  
For Hume, property is a system of rules that determine and regulate the relation 
between individuals regarding the possession and use of objects. In his view, the 
adherence of agents’ behavior to a system of property that individuals settled 
through conventions is what counts as justice. 2  Justice in this view is the 
correspondence of individuals’ behavior to a set of pre-existing entitlements.3 The 
establishment of a system of entitlements is thus conceptually and morally prior to 
the determination of principles of justice. Once a group of individuals settles for a 
system of rules of cooperation, these entitlements constitute the foundations of just 
social relations. Spontaneous social arrangements grounded on bargaining and 
compromise are the source of rights, and thus also of justice. Given that different 
communities may develop different sets of entitlements, justice may differ radically 
depending on where and how its sources emerged and what type of cooperation 
problems gave rise to it. 
Social arrangements come to existence and become effective in virtue of them being 
followed and implicitly recognized. They are models, schemata,4 or scripts5 that 
people employ when facing the need to take actions in particular types of situations. 
They offer a sequence of actions that people came to believe appropriate in a specific 
situation in virtue of their beneficial consequences, or in virtue of them being 
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commonly followed in particular situations. These norms do not necessarily have to 
be fully articulated or expressly stated to exist. In fact, a social norm is in existence 
when it is followed by a sufficient number of people, generating the social benefit of 
cooperation as a matter of fact.6 Gaus describes the process involved in following a 
social norm as follows:  
once a situation is categorized as being of a certain type, a general series of 
action is seen as appropriate. When individuals come to share the same 
scripts, they have a shared understanding of the general sort of actions that 
are appropriate once they perceive this as a case of “circumstance C”. Scripts 
may be quite complicated, and individuals may share the same scripts, and 
thus rules, without being able to fully articulate them.7  
The acceptance of a social norm, just like its emergence, need not be the 
consequence of an express arrangement between individuals. However, the 
population that creates them and follows them can be said to having accepted those 
social norms.8 
Social arrangements can emerge as a solution to coordination problems or to 
cooperation problems.9 Coordination problems are those in which the parties prefer 
to harmonize their behavior with that of others, since in these cases cooperation is in 
accordance with their narrow self-interest. One example of coordination is that of 
two people on a rowing boat having a direct and immediate interest in coordinating 
their efforts for the mutually preferred end of moving the boat towards a destination. 
In fact, if they did not coordinate their actions, they would not be able to move at all. 
In coordination problems, every participant in the collective action prefers 
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coordination to non-coordination, from a private incentive point of view. The 
successful achievement of coordination, in these cases, benefits all participants.  
In cooperation problems, on the other hand, the participants’ private incentives 
favor individuals’ defection, although cooperation in repeated interactions would 
realize a higher benefit than uncoordinated activity. 10  In these situations, the 
assumption regarding individuals’ private incentives will not suffice to create a 
legitimate expectation on members of a community that most people will in fact 
cooperate. What explains generalized compliance in these cases is that the 
participants give meaning to a particular mode of social interaction and have reasons 
to blame those who don’t comply with it. In these situations, the distinction between 
private incentives and interests is of outmost importance. As persons come to realize 
that their aspirations require a long-term commitment to plans and a certain stability 
in possessions, they are led to reflect on the ways to achieve such security. Thus, they 
become interested in the cooperating with others to secure their best option at 
pursuing significant and complex personal goals. 
In the case of territorial rights, just like for property rights, we may assume that most 
of the time individuals prefer to have something to not having it. We may also 
assume that all members of a group would prefer to hold on to the territory and 
resources that they have and to acquire more if they can. So for example, one family 
takes possession of a piece of land and uses it for self-preservation. Imagine the land 
borders with a piece of land possessed by another family that for one day a month 
leaves the land unattended. The first family will have a personal incentive to take the 
fruits growing on the trees in the second family’s land when its members are not 
tending to their possessions. They may be able to acquire the fruits of that tree by, 
for example, trading with their neighbors. However, the immediate benefit of taking 
what they want is higher than that of otherwise engaging in any transaction that 
respects the second family’s possessions.  
When the families fail to respect each other’s possessions, then the chance that they 
will cooperate diminishes, making the benefit of social cooperation unachievable. 
When the two families cooperate, on the other hand, they are able to increase the 
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outcome of their work, as they do not need to continuously tend to their possessions 
to ensure that their land is not being exploited against their permission. Settling some 
form of stable property allows both families to pursue their plans more efficiently 
and to lay the ground for future beneficial cooperation. 
Noncompliance with norms defining territorial holdings is likely to be regarded as a 
very serious offence, given that it threatens people’s livelihood and future prospects 
for prosperity. Given the importance of such arrangements within a population, 
property is generally regulated by norms the compliance with which is not only 
empirically observed but also expected and the non-compliance is sanctioned. Rules 
of property and, thus, also of territorial rights, are a typical solution to cooperation 
problems adding the cost of social and, when the stakes are particularly high, of 
moral reprehension to the immediate benefit of noncompliance. 
The consolidation of social arrangements depends ultimately on individuals’ beliefs 
and interests regarding the object that they regulate.11 Persons’ convergence on a set 
of arrangements emerges as the product of people’s interaction in a particular 
situation. When the bargaining procedure necessary for a population to agree on a 
rule is too costly, its members will converge on ratifying a set of behavioral patterns 
that are somehow salient – that represent the strongest imaginative connection with a 
rule and the achievement of their interests.12 Hume suggests that the case of property 
rights is not very different from the one of a party of people at a table waiting to 
dine. When faced with the issue of distribution of resources, individuals will simply 
ratify what is already settled – either by accepting the actual current holdings, or by 
relying on precedent rules that deal with similar cases.13 So for example, if they can’t 
effectively sit at a table and decide who gets what food before they are all allowed to 
eat and drink, they will likely start by taking the food that is closest to their hands.  
The origin of the salient behaviors (how the precedent was established, or how the 
possessions were first acquired) is of little importance, as long as they represent an 
efficient system in settling secure expectations. Contract could also be the origin of a 
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convention, but its normativity does not come from the consent that has established 
the convention, but from the fact that the convention solves a problem of 
cooperation.14 Conventions on property are thus grounded not on interested obligation – 
the establishment of consented mutual obligations – but on interested recognition – that 
is the mutual recognition of each other’s interest in settling a system of secure 
expectations.15  
In section 5 I suggest that the little importance that these theories give to the origin 
of entitlements allows conventionalist theories to easily overcome the complication 
of offering a convincing theory of original acquisition. Moreover, the fact that social 
arrangements’ existence depends on their actual ability to regulate behaviors 
regarding the control of a particular territory allows these theories to also address the 
particularity requirement. Before I argue for the advantages of the conventionalist 
approach, however, I discuss its flaws to show why a legitimacy constraint is needed 
for conventions to ground exclusive titles in land. My proposal relies on 
conventionalism to establish some titles to land. However, the inability of 
conventionalist theories of rights to offer a theory of normativity and an external 
standard of evaluation of social norms, illustrates the reasons behind its little success 
in the literature on territorial rights. 
 
3 The Disadvantages of Conventionalist Theories 
 
The conventionalist account offers a convincing story about the emergence of 
relations that give rise to an effective social order. Many different types of social 
orders can emerge from individuals’ interaction: the resulting system of rules may in 
fact result in arrangements that are not only suboptimal but also repugnant. 
Moreover, the conventionalist theory only suggests that social norms are an effective 
solution to cooperation problems. However, this fact is not sufficient to show that 
titles that emerge from conventions are due respect from those who have not 
endorsed them. Their empirical existence is not sufficient to ground any normative 
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demand, and this is particularly problematic for territorial rights, as they require that 
entitlements are not merely respected within a particular community, but also that 
outsiders to that community recognize them. 
 
3.1 Unfair  Norms 
 
Conventionalism is committed to the idea that what emerges as spontaneous order 
constitutes the ground for what counts as just behavior. This view excludes that 
there can be an external moral standard of evaluation to determine a person’s 
obligations to another. As morality emerges together with the establishment of social 
norms, the conventionalist approach is unable to offer any sufficient guarantee that 
the system of entitlements emerging from conventions will secure the interests of all 
those participating in the convention.  
Social norms, for this approach, simply ratify whatever stable system of cooperation 
is in place. Regardless of our assumptions about the state of nature, it is reasonable 
to expect that different conditions will lead to different types of social conventions. 
We can expect that in some situations the actors involved will manage to acquire 
roughly what they need. In that case, the resulting system of norms would ratify a 
situation where there is no extreme dissatisfaction and individuals benefit from the 
stable and acceptable set of expectations that the system of social norms offers. 
However, we can also imagine a situation in which, for example, some chooses not 
to work the land but to steal others’ work. We can imagine that those who steal start 
plundering some pieces of land currently possessed by others. Imagine also that the 
people whose land is continuously plundered manage at some point to settle a 
convention with the aggressors according to which, without resistance, they will pay 
a fee a little lower than the value of what the aggressors manage to pillage in a 
month, in exchange for ending violence. The current victims gain the benefit of not 
being killed and raped, and the aggressors save energy and limit the risk that the 





victim will repel some of their attacks.16 This arrangement between aggressors and 
victims is indeed a step forward from the state of nature, where – in this example – 
the victims do not only lose all their possessions, but also risk losing their lives. 
Moreover, both the victim and the aggressor can now rely on a secure set of 
expected behavior and plan their future interactions accordingly.  
However, regardless of how stable this convention might be, the thought of it is 
profoundly distressing. The conventionalist account has little to say in response to 
this scenario as it must accept any norm that does the job at allowing people to rely 
on some type of stable expectation. The Humean could argue that such a situation 
would still allow the victims to survive, to work harder, and to save some resources 
after paying the fees owed to the attackers. With time they could save enough to hire 
protection and renegotiate the terms of their relationship with the aggressors. 
However, even if the influence of the aggressor were not also growing with time, 
making it harder for the victims to better their situation, it would not be extremely 
controversial to say that the emerging situation strikes us as unfair. 
The Humean could also argue that such a norm would be unsustainable if those 
oppressed were many, since the oppressed, given the opportunity, would rise and 
break the status quo. Unfortunately, we have witnessed similar situations in the 
history of men that do not always result in enfranchisement. And when they do, they 
are often the result of a violent uprising that results in other forms of oppression.17 
Without having to imagine a hypothetically bad convention of this sort, we could 
think of slavery as a social arrangement that is morally repugnant. In a scenario 
where slavery is possible, it would be harder for a Humean to argue that the norm 
will at some point undergo modification because it doesn’t fulfill everyone’s interest. 
In many countries forms of slavery are still present, and where it disappeared it was 
at the cost of conflicts and political disorder. 
                                                      
16 In fact it is not particularly difficult to imagine such a convention – Mafia’s “pizzo” works exactly 
like this, and it is such a successful convention that it has survived for more than three hundred years, 
longer than the Italian state itself. 
17 The French revolution is a classic example, but contemporary Egypt and the revolution in Syria 
offer unsettling new cases that show that violent uprising is not conductive to increased individual 
freedom. 





But even if at some point the situation would sort itself out by the emergence of 
fairer social arrangements, and thus also more stable, we would still lament that the 
first arrangement was unfair and that at best it had burdened some excessively, even 
if their sacrifice gave the population an opportunity to avoid social disorder. The 
Humean account doesn’t consider the substance of a conventional rule as morally 
assessable, given that the convention provides the standard of evaluation of existing 
normative relations. Conventions, thus, can only be evaluated by reference to their 
positive consequence in creating a system of stable expectations. This, however, falls 
short of addressing our preoccupations regarding the realistic occurrence of 
repugnant social norms that must be evaluated with regards to a standard external to 
the conventions themselves. 
 
3.2 Outsiders  
 
The second problem of a purely conventionalist account of territorial rights is that it 
is not fit to offer a theory of normativity that explains why individuals that do not yet 
participate in the conventions should respect a community’s social norms. Those 
who participate in the convention may have some prudential reasons to comply, such 
as a desire to avoid social reprehension or other types of sanctions, or an interest in 
continued cooperation with their fellow members of society. But those who have no 
repeated interaction with the relevant community and are outsiders with respect to 
the community’s norms may be incentivized to free ride, having no reasons to 
respect the social arrangements in place. The conventionalist account lacks a theory 
of normativity and is unable to explain what moral reasons one may have to respect 
and comply with existing norms. The fact that some social arrangements exist is not 
in itself a reason to respect them, and neither is it a reason to impose duties on 
others regarding the use of resources and the control of territory. 
Consider for example the case of the Russian government that takes an interest in 
Cyprus because of its geographical location, which if controlled by Russian strategists 
would give them some military advantage. Imagine that the conventional system of 
territorial rights in Cyprus is that the northern part of the country should be 





demilitarized, given the current difficult relation with its neighbor, Turkey. Imagine 
also that the Russian government has no real interest in building a long-standing 
relation with the local population but that it only needs to take control of a small 
portion of an uninhabited area in North Cyprus. The Russian government may not 
care about the benefits of continued cooperation with Cyprus, as long as it can 
ensure control over a small geographical area there. The prudential considerations of 
the Russian government only need to account for the sanctions that Cyprus would 
impose on free riders and for the chances that they will actually be imposed on its 
actions in this case. Were these prudential reasons to disappear, for example because 
Cyprus is unable to secure international cooperation to impose these sanctions, the 
existing rules on the demilitarization of Northern Cyprus would mean very little to 
Russia. 
In fact, Russia does not expect any benefits from repeated cooperation as it does not 
expect repeated cooperation at all. There is, thus, no competing reason not to prefer 
immediate benefit from free riding the convention, and settling a military base in 
Northern Cyprus. Russia, the outsider to the conventions for this account, will only 
have a reason to violate the convention and take what it needs, without regards to 
others’ expectations. Nor can the population reasonably expect Russia to follow the 
convention, as it is joining only temporarily and has not given any legitimate reason 
to expect that it will conform to the convention, given that it has never conformed 
before.  
Conventional theories of entitlements are mainly concerned with describing systems 
of cooperation that emerge within a local population. The validity of the explanation 
about the emergence of rights that they provide is limited to the relevant population 
in which the convention has actually emerged. Individuals can in fact have legitimate 
expectations that others will comply with the convention only if these others are 
engaged with each other in repeated similar situations in which cooperation is 
needed. If people are not going to benefit from existing conventions, one can have 
no legitimate expectations that they will comply with them. 
 





4 The Moral Value of Social Norms 
 
In the sections that follow I give three reasons why the social norms that a 
community develops deserve some respect, in so far as they effectively order social 
cooperation within the relevant group. What I mean with deserving respect is that 
conventions should be considered sources of social obligations. Individuals subject 
to particular conventions have a pro tanto reason to comply with an existing practice 
for the sole fact of the practice being effective. Moreover, I also suggest that 
outsiders to the practice have some obligations of non-interference with an effective 
practice. 
This, however, does not exclude that there may be other reasons that defeat the ones 
that demand compliance or non-interference with the practices. I only suggest that 
the existence of stable and settled practices establishes demands on individuals’ 
behavior that have genuine weight when contrasted with other reasons. In particular 
with respect to territorial rights, the existence of settled practices establishes on 
outsiders some duties of non-interference with individuals’ use of land and resources, 
regardless of the moral virtue of such practices. Moreover, practices establish some 
associative obligations among the members of the relevant community, in so far as 
they successfully preserve a system of stable expectations. 
In what follows, I consider the reasons why social norms deserve some respect. First, 
social norms facilitate peaceful interaction between persons. The absence of violence 
and threat is a preeminent moral value the pursuit of which warrants respect for 
effective social norms. Second, social norms offer the basis for stable expectations 
within a community of people, which allows them to pursue their plans. Finally, 




Social rules provide for an alternative to chaos and violence. Their existence indicates 
at least that the population prefers some type of order to disorder, regardless of the 
moral virtue of the particular arrangement in place. The stability that social rules 





promote is to be protected because peace is a fundamental moral value, and the 
presence of norms and social arrangements expresses one of the ways in which 
persons have successfully achieved that goal. Maintaining peace is necessary for the 
promotion of all the other morally valuable social goals. It is thus an instrumental 
moral value that draws its strength from the fact that peaceful cooperation of some 
sort is necessary if we want to realize many human goods, such as wellbeing, health, 
or the protection of fundamental rights. 
Because of its fundamental importance for the realization of our goals, and because 
of the vanity of violence and sufferance, peace should be considered a fundamental 
value of liberal political theories. This contention is more controversial than it may 
seem at first. One may ask whether a regime benefitting from the resource curse and 
upholding slavery for the purpose of mining precious stones, in any way demands 
our respect for the mere fact of it offering some grounds for peace. I do not think 
that conventions should be respected and complied with every time they offer a 
solution to a source of conflict. However, when they do, and even if they are wicked, 
our commitment to peace may demand that we refrain from interfering in ways that 
could disrupt order and escalate violence.  
This does not mean that one should not interfere with repugnant norms, or that one 
must always uphold them and comply with them. In fact, there are many ways one 
can interfere with repugnant social orders without necessarily and dramatically 
disrupting peace. Our commitment to peace requires that, when possible, 
interference should be favorable to a peaceful transition away from repugnant 
norms. For example, one can offer assistance to those who are subject to unfair 
norms; other communities may exert pressure and promote alternative values within 
the wicked community through economic interaction, diplomacy, and economic 
sanctions, among other peaceful methods. Finally, propaganda, free exchange of 
information, and education can empower those subject to unfair social norms with 
the tools for reformation and participation in the creation of new social 
arrangements, without necessarily setting the basis for violent revolutions. I suggest 
that outsiders and dissenters have a freedom to interfere with repugnant norms but 
do not have a power to forcibly substitute and reform repugnant social norms, unless 
they also uphold powers of jurisdiction within the relevant territory. 






4.2 Stable  Basis  o f  Expectat ions 
 
Social arrangements offer a stable basis of expectations that is functional to the 
establishment of the conditions for social cooperation. Even the worst distribution 
of holdings provides some type of security, allowing also the poorer individual to 
adjust his or her expectation on what others will do in a specific situation and on 
what is available to him or her. Because stability of expectations is an important 
collective good, conventions deserve some respect to the extent that they achieve 
that goal. 
Territorial rights have their origin in social arrangements and draw their moral merit 
from the beneficial consequences of settling a system of entitlements. A system of 
entitlements offers the required order, providing the community with a set of rules of 
behavior to hold towards others and with regard to their territorial holdings. These 
rules also provide individuals with a set of expectations that others will behave in 
compliance with the rules established.  
When individuals can rely on the knowledge of others’ probable behavior and others’ 
expectations regarding the actions of their fellow members’ of society, their 
cooperation becomes possible. Social cooperation is in fact only possible if people 
can be at least minimally sure that others will comply with some expected behavior. 
Such order is beneficial to the general community and works against the immediate 
benefit of defection. Regardless of the distribution that the convention ratifies, a 
system of mutual relationships grounded on the respect of rules and free from 
violence and uncertainty is a factor that brings stability and some beneficial 
consequences.  
It is of little importance for this account whether some people manage to secure a 
large amount of resources, while others instead remain with very little or nothing. 
This is because once possessions are settled in a system of entitlements even the 
poorest man can lead his life knowing what he can expect from others and what he 
can or cannot do legitimately. Settling rules of property in territory and resources 
allows people to forecast what others will or will not do – for the most part – and 





effectively make plans for the future regarding the control and exploitation of 
territorial resources. Social constructs are thus beneficial for each participant and for 
the population as a whole. 
The benefit of a stable basis of expectation, similar to our commitment to peace, is a 
morally valuable feature of a social order. And, like peace, it may demand some 
obligations of non-interference, if not obligations to comply with some of the 
existing social norms. This does not deny that some instances of social norms may 
require reformation when they violate more important moral values. However, as 
suggested earlier, one may permissibly disrupt order if interference does not preclude 
individuals’ ability to form and pursue their legitimate ambitions. 
 
4.3 Agency  
 
If you are travelling through Sweden and you need to stop for the night, you may 
consider bringing your camping gear with you. Each property owner, in fact, must 
allow travelers to camp in their property under the Right of Public Access, which 
dates back to Swedish local laws and customs of the Middle Ages. According to this 
(now codified) right, one has the freedom to camp anywhere in private and public 
land, as long as one respects some rules of courtesy, such as camping not too close 
to someone’s house and limiting one’s stay to one or two nights in the same spot. 
In Sweden, then, a property owner would have no title to deny to the traveler the use 
of a piece of his land. It would also be considered blameworthy if, after one evening 
of stay, the property owner would ask the traveler to leave. It is in fact accepted that 
the traveler should respect the privacy of the property owner, and as long as he 
exercises his freedom within the limits demanded by respect, he is free to occupy the 
property owner’s holdings. In the USA, instead, the unacceptable thing to do would 
be to trespass on someone’s property and freely camp there. The property owner 
would not only have the legal right to tell the traveler to leave, but he would also not 
encounter any social reprehension, as his behavior would be consistent with his 
community’s belief about private property. 





In many situations what is appropriate depends on the general practice accepted 
within a particular community (whether the practice is ratified in laws or not). In the 
example of the Right of Public access, the practice of travelling and enjoying nature 
that is distinctive of Scandinavian culture makes the activity of being free to camp 
anywhere a valuable one. Differently free camping is not considered as a valuable 
activity in the USA, and this is reflected in the existing norms against trespassing. 
The practice, in this example, gives definite shape and detail to a relation between 
members of a community and with respect to their use of the territory available. 
Without the practice of Public Access, the value of roaming through natural 
landscapes would have a much different role in that society. The practice has also a 
wider application, as it gives outsiders the same freedom to roam around and camp 
through Sweden freely. The practice thus reflects the community’s belief that the 
value of traveling and enjoying nature is one that can be generalized. This example 
shows that practices may have a role in validating a value and defining it for a 
particular society. Roaming freely through nature is a value recognized in the USA as 
well, but there it is defined as the public provision of spaces for camping, and it does 
not justify camping on private property, which would be considered by Americans a 
violation of a fundamental right. Conventions then may give details on how a 
community interprets a value and its weight with regards to other values. 
Because they give detail to a more fundamental moral value, the practices themselves 
are valuable. Consider the morally relevant concern of distributing resources 
according to some fair standard. Practices or institutions that address this morally 
relevant issue, such as private property or collective property, do not only offer a 
solution to the allocation of resources, but they also promote other values and moral 
principles. For example, private property may be preferred by a society that values 
individual autonomy, but collective property may be preferred if we are more 
concerned with, for example, the value of collective self-determination.18 These 
practices derive their value from basic moral concerns but develop through different 
paths depending on the community’s beliefs regarding the hierarchy of some other 
moral concern (those of individual autonomy or collective self-determination in this 
                                                      
18 Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), 356. 





example). The resulting set of conventions would then reflect in some way what 
people within a community consider acceptable or important in relation to some 
fundamental moral concern that is intelligible by outsiders as well, such as resource 
allocation. 
Conventions do not simply define generally accepted moral values or principles. 
They also make available to individuals the values that they collectively define, 
empowering them with a set of options to develop and pursue their life plans.19 For 
example, the practice of visiting Mecca for a Muslim may be explained with reference 
to the morally valuable practice of religion. By being exposed to the practice of 
pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca, Muslims access the values promoted by their 
religion and the value of meditation and mystical experience. Pilgrimage is one of the 
ways in which religious sensibility may be expressed. Different from the case of the 
institution of property, pilgrimage is not a solution to a morally relevant problem. 
Nevertheless, its relevance in the lives of individuals is tangible as it allows some to 
access to complex systems of values and beliefs. 
Practices, then, may identify the specific ways in which a community expresses its 
interpretation of a moral value that can be universally appraised, and also allow 
individuals to develop their identity by having access to a variety of systems of 
values. Respect for people’s ability to shape their moral environment thus commands 
respect for their practices, even if these practices are not the expression of values 
that every community considers chiefly important. 
According moral weight to conventions is compatible with the idea that there are 
moral values that can be appraised universally, regardless of the particular local 
sensibilities. It is also compatible with the idea that we should give the right 
consideration to the many ways individuals as members of communities pursue what 
is important to them.20 The moral weight of practices offers some reason to both 
insiders and outsiders of the practice to respect the convention itself. The fact that a 
                                                      
19 Ibid., 347. 
20 I am proposing something similar to what Scanlon calls the Principle of Established Practices that 
holds that if a “(nonrejectable) principle is generally (it need not be unanimously) accepted in a given 
community, then it is wrong to violate it simply because this suits one’s convenience” (Ibid., 339). If 
we agree with Scanlon that there is a nucleus of moral principles that can be universally appreciated, 
we can also agree with him that practices have some role in specifying those principles. 





convention shapes others’ expectations gives the members of the relevant 
community a reason, even if only prudential, to comply with the practice itself. 
Outsiders, on the other hand, have a moral reason not to undermine others’ 
practices, given that these practices define moral values that support individuals’ self-
government.21 
The extent to which insiders and outsiders should respect practices is unclear unless 
we identify the core of our moral concerns. The conventionalist theory offers only 
instrumental moral reasons to respect existing social norms and falls short of 
identifying which practices ought to be respected unconditionally. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that practices express a population’s values and their interpretation of the 
nature of social cooperation, they demand some compliance. As long as these 
practices do not violate more fundamental values, tolerance for others’ moral agency 
may demand that we abstain from judging their practices and the role that they give 
to different values through their social arrangements.  
In my proposal, such practices constitute the grounds of freedoms to use and powers 
to control territory and resources, even if they do not come accompanied with 
protective claims and immunities. Even if the incidents that social norms establish 
are not exclusive, they still denote that their holders have some relevant interest in 
those territories and that their interest grants some type of normative protection in 
the form of freedoms and powers. In the next chapter I explain how these freedoms 
and powers may become exclusive titles to territory and acquire protective claims and 
immunities. 
 
5 The Advantages of a Conventionalist Theory 
 
The conventional aspect of LBC makes it a direct theory: a group acquires territorial 
rights because they are in themselves necessary for the protection of individuals’ 
interest in being self-governing. For LBC, a group acquires territorial rights, 
including territorial jurisdiction, if these titles are expressed and defined by the 
                                                      
21 Provided that outsiders also respect individuals as project pursuers. 





community’s social norms. Existing social norms protect stability of expectations, 
peace, and express moral values that allow individuals to form and pursue their life 
plans. Thus territorial rights defined by social norms in themselves allow individuals 
to be project pursuers.  
LBC is well suited to address the particularity requirement: if a social norm that 
impinges on a territory exists, it necessarily involves one particular territory, as its 
existence depends on its effectiveness in ordering a particular set of relations in a 
defined situation. Some norms do not impinge on a geographical space. So for 
example the rule according to which one should not write obscenities on an online 
forum applies to people wherever they are. However, most social norms have validity 
within a particular geographical area. The range of effectiveness of such norms also 
identifies the resources and territories that are subject to the rule. 
Consider the example proposed by Marmor: 
Somewhere in the English countryside, there is a very narrow bridge over a 
river, built many centuries ago. Since it is not possible to cross the bridge 
from the two directions at once, a convention has evolved that if people 
approach the bridge from both sides at once, those who come from the 
north are to pass first. Since there are many travellers in this area, the local 
villagers have put up a small sign, informing the travellers of this convention. 
… The rule serves for the local villagers, who are perhaps more intimate with 
the convention, the same purpose as it serves for strangers: it simply co-
ordinates their passage over the narrow bridge. 
In this example, the rule is effective only if it is applied to that particular bridge, as 
we could assume that another narrow bridge may be regulated by a different rule –
for example that those approaching from the south have the right to go. The rule 
defines the appropriate behavior, and at the same time the area of validity of the rule 
itself, giving to a particular geographical area a specific role in the system of 
expectations that the rule establishes. 
The fact that conventions identify the object of territorial rights also ensures that the 
resulting theory of territorial rights is not overly ethnocentric. Through their system 





of social norms communities are able to express their narrative regarding territory 
and the values that they attach to it. On the basis of their practices they are able to 
communicate what resources are important to them and why. Conventionalism takes 
seriously a community’s social arrangements and does not impose a pre-made 
concept of resources that would frustrate particular groups’ sensibilities. However, 
this approach is likely to tilt the balance excessively in favor of special demands to 
territory and resources, and leave little space for the demands of global justice. In the 
following chapter I offer a solution to this problem, by introducing a limitation to 
community specific demands in the form of a threshold of legitimacy.  
The conventionalist approach is also able to address the in rem problem. By 
determining the group that holds social norms that impinge in a particular territory, 
the conventionalist theory also determines the group that can legitimately assert 
jurisdictional powers within a geographical area. Only the community that upholds a 
system of social norms within a territory may assert territorial jurisdiction there. 
There may be situations in which two communities uphold separate and tangled 
practices within the same geographical area. For example, it is possible that a 
nomadic community may use a territory that is also the location of the life plans of 
the members of a stationary community. In this case, two or more communities may 
have legitimate and overlapping demands to the use and control of the same 
territory. 
Conventionalist theories thus do not entirely exclude that in some situations two or 
more agents may have competing powers of territorial jurisdiction within the same 
borders. However, they indicate without confusion which parties hold territorial 
jurisdiction, even when the parties may have to share powers and freedoms over the 
same territory and resources. In Chapter 6, I show that the legitimacy threshold is 
able to indicate to what extent each coexisting community may be able to assert 
exclusive titles to territory. I will argue that, when a community fulfills the 
requirements of legitimacy, it may only assert exclusive titles to land and resources 
that are necessary to maintain the legitimacy of its social norms. Above the threshold 
of legitimacy, conflicts between coexisting communities and competing legitimate 
freedoms and powers will have to be resolved via a mutually beneficial compromise. 





In Chapter 7 I discuss how LBC is able to address cases of overlapping freedoms 
and powers. 
By protecting individuals’ preferred choice of social cooperation, conventional 
theories are also well suited to put individuals’ life plans and expectations at the 
center of our moral concerns and above other interests, such as national interests or 
security. Because individuals’ life plans change, moreover, the titles that a community 
is able to secure will adjust as its members’ practices and beliefs change, ensuring that 
territorial rights represent as much as possible the current interests of those who 
uphold them. 
Finally, the conventionalist approach avoids also the complication of offering a 
compelling story on original acquisition. For direct theories relying on a Lockean 
theory of property, an agent may acquire titles in land only by original acquisition or 
via valid transfer. In this second case, if the original title is invalid because it was not 
acquired through legitimate original acquisition, all the subsequent titles must be 
considered invalid as well. This framework is problematic for a theory of territorial 
rights as it is often the case that states exert political jurisdiction within territories 
that have been acquired through conquest or illegitimate transferal. A conventionalist 
theory is not concerned with the origin of titles to territory and offers the tools to 
evaluate current interests, giving them moral priority. 
With regards to territorial disputes regarding lands that were unjustly occupied in the 
past, a conventionalist theory requires that we address grievances on the basis of 
existing interests to contested territories. Those who have lost land in the past should 
be allowed to participate in the determination of new territorial rights through a 
compromise, as long as they still have an existing interest in the contested territory, 
the satisfaction of which may not be attained with the control or use of any other 
territory. As long as traces of the past violation of titles to land are detectable in the 
interests of current descendants of past victims, the weight of current interests will 
have to be taken into consideration when balancing existing legitimate and 
overlapping interests. 
 







The conventionalist theory is a good starting point for a theory of territorial rights 
that is able to address territorial disputes successfully. However, its flaws must be 
amended if it is to provide a normative foundation for exclusive territorial 
entitlements.  
As I argued in section 3, conventionalism does not offer an external standard of 
evaluation of the norms that emerge from social interaction, and thus it lacks a 
theory of normativity. For this reason, purely conventionalist theories of territorial 
rights cannot explain why there are some social arrangements that we deem unfair or 
suboptimal (such as slavery or the rule according to which women cannot have 
property) and that for this reason should be rejected. Moreover, even if the members 
of a community may have some prudential reasons to comply with the established 
rule, prudential considerations cannot apply to those who can easily free ride and 
who have no interest in repeated interaction with the relevant community. Even if 
the members of a community may converge on some type of agreement on the rules 
that apply to a certain situation, this fact says nothing about the reasons others 
should comply and respect existing social arrangements, and it is unfit to force upon 
others duties to respect territorial holdings.  
In the following chapter, I introduce a threshold of legitimacy. I argue that legitimacy 
offers a normative basis to identify which conventions create claims that others 
respect the relevant community’s freedoms to use territory and resources, and 
immunities against others’ overlapping territorial jurisdiction, and which, on the 
other hand, only establish unprotected freedoms and powers. The guidelines that a 
legitimacy threshold offers allow us to look at a territorial conflict and identify which 
of the interests at stake must be protected with exclusive titles to territory and which, 
on the contrary, must be added to those elements of the conflict on which the parties 
will have to compromise. I will argue that a system of social norms is legitimate if it 
sufficiently respects individuals’ ability to form and pursue directive ends. According 
to this account, if the system of norms that has been established does not sufficiently 
respect individuals as project pursuers, we have no reason to respect the territorial 
rights defined by existing conventions as exclusive entitlements to territory.  





So for example, imagine a norm is established that prohibits women to enjoy basic 
economic rights. We may have moral reasons to respect the existing arrangement 
because of our commitment to peace, to the benefits of a system of stable 
expectations, and to tolerating others’ existing commitments to their values and 
plans. However, when it is a challenge for women to develop and pursue their 
directive end because they are being denied the basic faculty to acquire food and 
water, members of the community and outsiders have a reason to reject the 
community’s claim against others’ interference with their resource rights, and to also 
reject its immunity against others’ territorial jurisdiction. In this case, members of 
society and outsiders have a reason to reject the demand of the community for 
exclusive territorial rights, given that the norm does not match the fundamental 
preoccupation that all members of society have at least a genuine opportunity to 
develop and pursue directive ends.  
The minimal requirements of legitimacy are compatible with the instrumental moral 
reasons to respect existing social norms that I have laid out in this chapter. Members 
of the relevant community continue to have a reason to respect the convention 
because of the existing expectations of their fellow members of the population. The 
commitment to respecting people as project pursuers works as an additional moral 
reason in favor of complying with the conventions that embody it. That is to say that 
if a convention is not legitimate it still grounds some freedoms and powers of the 
community regarding the use and control of the territory at issue, as the members of 
the population rely on the existing social norms for their plans, and in so far as these 
norms effectively achieve the goal of peace. However, if the norms fail to meet the 
legitimacy requirement, the community’s freedoms and powers on the territory may 
not be exclusive. This means that the community’s powers are not protected by 
immunities against others’ competing powers, and that the community’s freedoms 
are not protected by claims that others do not interfere with their exercise.  
The requirement of legitimacy does not demand that each community upholds values 
of equal freedom and equal moral agency, but it does require that individuals are at 
least able to value the system of social norms as one that allows each member of 
society, and outsiders, to develop and pursue their life plans. I will describe legitimate 
conventions in detail in the next chapter. In short, a system of legitimate entitlements 





should provide relief against extreme poverty and poor health for the community’s 
members, ensuring that all members enjoy a sufficient level of wellbeing. Such a level 
may change depending on the average level of wellbeing enjoyed by the whole 
community and on the resources available to its members. Individuals should also be 
able to enjoy basic economic rights that ensure their relative independence from each 
other. Finally, the system of social norms must tolerate individuals’ dissent and their 
desire to exit the association when they see fit. 
Conventionalist theories often rely on the idea of acquiescence to justify the validity 
of particular conventions: conventions are effective among a population when (and 
because) people acquiesce in them.22 Acquiescence, however, may emerge also when 
conventions are particularly bad, and even when a large part of the population is 
regularly oppressed. People may acquiesce in slavery, if their only option to feed their 
family is that of submitting themselves to the control of their master. In my 
formulation, acquiescence cannot be the justificatory ground of a system of 
conventions. What makes conventions legitimate is instead the fact that they protect 
some fundamental interests of individuals as project pursuers. One could say that, in 
this formulation, legitimate conventions realize a state of reliable acquiescence, by 
allowing all members of society to permissibly disagree and withdraw from the 
obligations that conventions may impose on them. Reliable acquiescence for the 
proposed view is a product of legitimate conventions, and not its normative 
foundation. 
At this point one could ask why we need social norms: if what matters is that 
conventions meet the threshold of legitimacy, then illegitimate conventions should 
be simply rejected and legitimate ones should be imposed. However, an illegitimate 
set of social norms still serves the important role of setting the framework on the 
basis of which peaceful cooperation may be achieved. In this model, any form of 
stability, however wicked, has the important function of making social relations 
stable. Thus, it would be against the ideas proposed here to reject an existing social 
arrangement with the intention of establishing a legitimate system of norms using a 
top-down strategy.  
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First, such strategy would likely not provide a set of norms that carries social 
normativity, as only spontaneous arrangements emerging from repeated interaction 
are the source of such system of stable expectations. Second, chaos and instability is 
to be avoided above all, and thus any strategy that entails the destruction of existing 
systems of organization and the return to a situation of unsure structures of political 
authority (such as revolution or violence) would have to be rejected. The retreat to 
violence is thus excluded among the possible solution to a situation of unfair 
conventions. Finally, no agent may legitimately assert the power to impose norms on 
a community, unless it represents the social norms that emerge from the reciprocal 
normative relations among members of the relevant group. No one besides the 
members of the community that upholds social norms may in fact assert rights to 
territorial jurisdiction or resources. 
Existing territorial rights that emerge from illegitimate social arrangements should be 
evaluated and reformed, instead of rejected all together. As it will become clearer in 
the next chapter, the minimal requirements of legitimacy are not fit to offer a specific 
solution to cooperation problems. On the other hand, current solutions to such 
problems have the advantage of being already functional and of having identified one 
possible avenue for resolution of conflicts. If our theory of territorial rights is 
concerned with the pursuit of peaceful and beneficial social arrangements, then we 
should start with what already achieves that goal, even if imperfectly, and pursue 
legitimate avenues to develop more acceptable social norms. 
 









In this chapter I elaborate on my account of legitimacy and suggest that social norms 
are legitimate if individuals subject to them are sufficiently respected as project 
pursuers. Legitimacy-Based Conventionalism maintains that legitimate conventions 
must provide for the satisfaction of individuals’ basic needs and for a domain of 
basic rights that allow them to enjoy personal and basic economic freedoms. 
Legitimate conventions also should ensure that freedom of expression is tolerated, 
and that individuals are free to leave the community if they wish to do so. The 
legitimacy test offers a standard to evaluate whether a community can be said to have 
successfully carved a sufficient space within which individuals have a genuine shot to 
form and pursue their life plans.  
The proposed requirements do not ensure that all individuals have equal 
opportunities to pursue their plans; they focus instead on ensuring that each 
individual enjoys a minimum protected sphere of basic rights and freedoms. I suggest 
that a community that may permissibly demand that others do not interfere with its 
use of territory must ensure that: 
i) provisions are made for the sustainable satisfaction of basic needs such as 
housing, nutrition, water, health, and basic education;  
ii) individuals enjoy personal freedoms and discretion on how to exercise what is 
generally referred to as basic economic freedoms. 
iii) individuals’ freedom of expression is tolerated. Some form of public 
participation in shaping the social arrangements to which individuals are subject is 
allowed, that free access to free information is in some way protected, and that the 
governing body is non-arbitrary and in some way accountable for wrongdoing. 
iv) individuals’ freedom of association is respected. They are reasonably free to 
choose their preferred political and social associations. Individuals should also be 
able to exit political associations if they do not want to be implicated in the collective 





project that their communities endorse, or if the existing social arrangements do not 
allow the pursuit of their own personal projects. 
LBC legitimizes only the community’s territorial rights and not all the incidents that 
it may demand to have. LBC, thus, does not offer a justification for jurisdiction over 
people in general, such as the right to be the exclusive imposer of law on its subjects, 
or the right to threaten all subjects with legal use of coercion.1 LBC legitimizes a 
limited set of incidents that have to do exclusively with the control and use of 
territory. I have identified these incidents in Chapter 2, but I also list them here: 
a) Territorial jurisdiction regarding land and resources: powers to legislate, 
enforce, and adjudicate regarding the use and control of land and resources 
within the territory; 
b) Resource rights: freedoms and powers to manage, use, and exploit land and 
resources within the territory; 
c) Immunity against others’ overlapping territorial jurisdiction with regards to 
territory and resources; 
d) Claim that others do not interfere with resource rights, including a claim 
that others do not enter the territory without permission. 
I will offer details of the legitimacy requirements in section 3. Before I do that, I wish 
to explain why I believe that the legitimacy requirements should amount to a minimal 
and negative standard of evaluation of already existing social norms.  
The first reason for focusing on the minimal requirements of legitimacy is that a 
minimal protection of individuals’ moral autonomy may be the best we can hope for. 
This may seem just a grim pragmatic consideration about territorial disputes. 
However, it is a concern firmly secured on the commitment of preserving peace and 
promoting cooperation. Territorial disputes are often the result of a long history of 
cultural and ideological conflicts between profoundly different societies. A stable 
solution to a conflict of this kind is to be found in the parties’ mutual acceptance of 
their conflicting but important interests in the same land. This requires that they 
address their conflicts with the moral sensibility with which they are equipped at a 
                                                      
1 Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States, 305. 





certain time in their political and cultural development, ensuring that that the 
prospects of a resolution fit the moral sets of values to which these communities are 
committed. 
Proposing minimal requirements of legitimacy increases the chances that the theory 
may effectively guide not only the resolution of territorial conflicts, but also the 
prevention of such conflicts in a wide range of situations. The legitimacy threshold 
offers a test to identify which communities may permissibly demand non-
interference with their use and control of certain territories and resources. Moreover, 
communities that uphold social norms that meet the minimal requirements of 
legitimacy are able to participate as equal partners in the determination of their more 
extensive exclusive entitlements. The minimalism of these requirements incentivises 
them to recognize other legitimate communities’ special demands upon the assurance 
that the difference in practices and beliefs will not threaten their territorial holdings, 
and their members’ beliefs about the truth of their narrative regarding their 
attachment to territory.2  
So for example, the Maori Whanganui river tribes in New Zealand have traditionally 
considered the Whanganui river a source of material and spiritual sustenance as well 
as their ancestor. For these people, the exploitation of the river resources by the 
national government is both a threat to their ways of life and to their narrative 
regarding their attachment to the river and the river’s significance. The loss of 
control over the exploitation of the river and the possible consequences of an 
ideological shift regarding the river’s role in their culture threatens the tribes’ ways of 
life, language, and their chances to stand the test of time.  
The Maori in that area identify with a series of entrenched practices that insist on 
worshipping the river and using its resources.  Even if their practices and beliefs are 
upheld only by their somewhat small community, and even if the national 
government may not be able to appreciate their attachment to the river, for LBC the 
Maori may legitimately assert exclusive rights of access to the sacred site and to 
demand that others do not disrupt their practices regarding the use of the river, as 
long as their social norms meet the minimal requirements of legitimacy. Meeting the 
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requirements would allow them to demand that others do not disrupt their territorial 
practices, as long as their wider system of social norms is legitimate, and even if it 
involves illiberal values.  
For example, in most Maori tribes the law is unwritten and left to the interpretation 
of the tribes’ chiefs, who are in charge of punishing crimes on the basis of ideas such 
as disrespect and honor. They decide the type of punishment to impart together with 
the alleged victims, given the importance in their culture of the concept of revenge, 
effectively leaving little space for unbiased and independent determinations of the 
type and intensity of the punishment. This practice is in clear violation of the basic 
liberal principles of punishment that hold that punishment should be imparted by an 
independent and uninterested party. 
Imagine now that, unless the tribes had access and control to the river, they would 
lose the opportunity to enforce rules and punish crimes related to the disrespect for 
the sacred land, endangering the complex system of social relations between 
themselves and the grounds of respect for their legal and criminal system. This loss 
would constitute a significant limitation to the community’s chances to fulfill the 
demands of legitimacy, leaving the tribe short of their traditional method of ensuring 
order, peace, and stability. The loss of control over the river also challenges the 
beliefs of the members of the community, sending the message that their attachment 
to the river, and their ways to relate to it and to each other are wrong and not 
valuable. This negative judgement on their beliefs may endanger both the stability of 
the relations between the tribes and outsiders, creating feeling of resentment and 
exacerbating conflict, and the internal stability of the community itself, challenging 
the cultural and social foundation of their mode of cooperation. Such incursion on 
the system of beliefs upheld by the community may constitute a reason for the 
community to fence in their members from any opportunity of cooperation with 
outsiders, diminishing the chances of a resolution of conflicts regarding shared 
territories with the central government of New Zealand, and the opportunities for 
the community’s members to access alternative conceptions of the good. This 
example shows that we have prudential reasons to value as much as possible every 
form of attachment to land that different communities may develop to avoid 
unnecessary conflict. 





We also have moral reasons to be tolerant of the diverse values that communities 
may uphold regarding their relation to land. Persons as well as communities should 
be able to make demands on the basis of what they consider important for 
themselves. We may not permissibly decide which life plans individuals should 
pursue, nor which plans are more valuable than others, and thus neither which type 
of attachment to territory is more apt in establishing exclusive territorial rights. We 
can only assume that if all people are concerned with pursuing the life plans that they 
have developed, they will also favor a system that ensures that they enjoy a sphere of 
basic rights and freedoms within which to promote their particular interests. 3 
Different groups of individuals will give preference and develop different sets of 
rights. As long as these respect the basic requirements of legitimacy, we can presume 
that all individuals will be sufficiently able to promote and endorse their preferred 
state of affairs. Thus, their system of territorial rights should be accepted, regardless 
of how incompatible the communities’ set of beliefs and practices may be.  
A minimal threshold of legitimacy may be the best we can hope for at certain 
historical times also because communities’ social norms are intertwined pieces of 
complex puzzles of practices and beliefs. Beliefs about family, for example, may be 
tightly interconnected with beliefs about professional achievement and the role of 
women in the workplace. A community that values family bonds over professional 
achievement, for example, will inspire its members towards forming plans that 
include having a spouse and children and maintaining close ties with the enlarged 
family. Individuals in that community may be less incentivised in moving from where 
they were born and pursue careers that will lead them abroad. On the other hand, a 
community that values professional achievements may inspire its members to follow 
their professional aspirations where they may best pursue them. 
The problem arises when the community that values family bonds also values 
particular types of family bonds over others. Some societies may value only a narrow 
conception of family, such as the one between heterosexual partners dedicated 
mainly to procreation. Where such social norms are widely upheld, we may find a 
whole array of supporting practices that offend and preoccupy us. Communities that 
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display attachment to traditional understandings of family may for example maintain 
that for the family to be properly protected, women should not be allowed to work, 
as their moral duty is that of tending to children and the house. This may then lead 
to support other practices, such as for example polygamy, which allows women to 
find husbands who can support them and their children once they are widowed but 
that perpetrate the idea that a woman is not able to take care of herself. 
Liberalism is chiefly inimical to discrimination in workplaces on the basis of gender, 
given that such discriminatory practices violate liberals’ commitment to equality of 
opportunity. However, in some communities, practices such as women’s role in 
tending to their family serve the purpose of maintaining intact the social fabric on 
which individuals’ stability of expectations rests. Customs are often intertwined with 
each other, and it may be very difficult and unsettling for a community (including 
their women) to change the way its members treat women without also undertaking 
changes that affect other social goods, such as the protection of family bonds. 
Equality and non-discrimination are goals that different societies achieve through 
different paths and at different times, consistently with the flexibility of their social 
fabric and the fluidity of their customs. Respecting the different ways in which 
communities may eventually approach just social arrangements is consistent with our 
commitment to peace, stability of expectations, and the respect we owe to individuals 
moral agency. 
The minimal nature of the requirements of legitimacy tell us only whether the 
exercise of political power regarding territory is legitimate, and thus whether and to 
what extent a group has a claim that others do not interfere with their resource 
rights, and an immunity against others’ jurisdictional powers in the same territory. 
The power to control a territory is not all a community has in terms of powers over 
its people, and territorial jurisdiction is not the only way a community can exercise 
political authority. The requirements for the legitimacy of a community’s enjoyment 
of their territorial rights may well be less demanding then the requirements for the 
legitimacy of the whole array of normative incidents that make up the community’s 
authority over its members and its rights to self-determination. The protection of 
individuals’ ability to pursue their plans ensured by these minimal requirements is not 
sufficient, for example, to address the liberal commitment against discrimination on 





the basis of sexual preferences or on the basis of race and religion. However, I 
suggest that for the purpose of controlling territory such minimal protection is 
enough. This is because territorial control and resource rights are associated mainly 
with the protection of a system of stable expectations for the members of a 
community – very much like rules regarding the appropriation of property – and 
with the basic necessary conditions for peaceful cooperation between individuals. 
Finally, different circumstances may require different systems of justice, where the 
most pressing concerns must go along with a community’s technological 
advancement, its member’s moral sensibility, and their needs. For example, in the 
past twenty years the people of Mozambique have received mosquito nets from 
international organizations concerned with the poor level of health due to the spread 
of malaria. Disregarding the net’s original purpose, Mozambican have instead used 
them as fishing nets to address what for them is a most compelling social need.4 This 
example shows that it may be unreasonable to demand of the people of Mozambique 
that they ensure that everyone enjoys a good level of health, when their collective 
efforts are instead focussed in ensuring that their families have enough to eat and 
survive. Especially when we consider the circumstances of very poor communities, it 
would be a great burden for them if we were to demand compliance with ambitious 
requirements of justice to achieve eclusive control of the territories that they occupy. 
The proposed set of legitimacy requirements should not only be minimal, but also be 
understood as negative standards of analysis and critical assessment, in so far as they 
are not meant to inform how social norms should be designed, but to guide our 
judgment regarding whether existing social norms sufficiently protect individuals’ 
moral autonomy. As I shall discuss in detail in section 3, the requirements of 
legitimacy aim at ensuring that every community takes into serious consideration the 
protection of the weakest members of society, and that each individual has sufficient 
space for his or her self-government. There are different ways in which a community 
may satisfy the requirements of legitimacy, given that the central moral concern is 
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that individuals achieve a sufficient level of independence and wellbeing with respect 
to their fellow members of society. 
The reason to prefer a negative standard is that different communities may develop 
very different acceptable sets of social norms, and may be able to achieve the 
protection of their members’ self-governement in different ways. For example some 
communities may promote and defend their members’ powers to participate in the 
political decisions that affect them by favoring political participation. At the same 
time, these communities may impose significant costs to their ability to exit particular 
social arrangements. Similarly, some communities may provide a solid system of 
social support for every member of society and fully satisfy individuals’ neeeds but 
may require unreserved allegiance to a particular form of social cooperation or 
religion. For example, some Amish communities are very good at providing their 
members with high levels of social security. The violation of some social norms are 
met with very bland punishments that often have to do with public atonement and 
community service. Famously, most Amish communities reject the penal system of 
the United States, regarding reclusion in prison an improper way to address the 
violation of rules. However, membership in such community comes at the cost of 
homogeneity of thought, religious beliefs, and strict tradional customary norms that 
many may find overly demanding, including a strict division of roles between the 
female and the male members of society. 
It would be wrong, I believe, not to accord some exclusive rights of control and use 
of territory to communities that in some way or another are able to secure for their 
members a certain set of protected freedoms to pursue their life plans. These 
communities’ rights to territory should be respected to the extent that they empower 
individuals’ in forming and pursuing life plans. A negative threshold like the one 
proposed here gives us the tools to evaluate to what extent such empowerment is 
achieved and to what extent individuals rely on their community’s customs to 
promote their personal interests.  
Depending on its members’ values, a community may develop a systems of norms 
that disregards the values that other communities consider of primary importance. 
Allowing people to concentrate on what seems most important to them and their 
fellow members of society, and to experiment with diverse ways to solve pressing 





issues, ensures that humanity undertakes the widest range of avenues towards the 
satisfaction of morally relevant social goods. In fact, people should be free to 
experiment not only regarding the avenues towards the solution of relevant moral 
issues, but also with regards to the different importance that moral issues may have 
in different circumstances. This ensures that we will know at any time, as precisely as 
possible, that some concerns are more important than others, or that they are 
important at all. As we speak and debate about different problems and act upon our 
commitments we also determine their importance for us and for those we engage 
with.  
The combination of a conventionalist theory of rights and a minimal and negative 
standard of legitimacy frames a fundamentally political approach to territorial rights. 
The proposal in short is that societies that uphold legitimate conventions may 
permissibly demand that others do not interfere with their use and control of the 
territorial resources available to them. However, the requirements of legitimacy also 
carve the scope of the legitimate demands that a community may advance regarding 
exclusive territorial titles. A community in fact has a right to exclude others from the 
enjoyment and control of their resources only to the extent that the exclusion of 
others is necessary for sustaining their social norms at a sufficient level of legitimacy.  
The requirements of legitimacy demand that only a minimal set of basic rights must 
be enforced to ensure sufficient protection of individuals’ basic interests in being 
treated as project pursuers. This means that the claims that communities hold against 
others using their territory will be very limited. Most territorial conflicts, however, 
impinge on the parties’ protection of interests that are often more extensive than the 
protection of individuals’ basic interests in being treated as project pursuers provided 
by the requirements of legitimacy. Conflicts on territory may emerge from the 
pursuit of collective self-determination, or the interest in religious freedom, or from 
conflicts regarding the military control of areas of importance for national prosperity, 
like in the case of Cyprus and the demands to control the island from Turkey, the 
UK, Greece, and Russia. The protection of these important interests, I suggest, may 
only be permissibly pursued if the parties reach a mutually beneficial agreement. The 
parties will have to agree on the extent of their legitimate territorial demands on the 
basis of their important interest, as long as the protection of these more extensive 





titles do not hurt the parties’ chances to meet the requirements of legitimacy. The 
plurality of non-fundamental but legitimate interests in the same territory may 
ground well-founded competing freedoms and competing and overlapping 
jurisdictions. I argue by the end of this chapter that conflicts emerging from 
competing freedoms and powers can be addressed successfully if the parties accept a 
duty to compromise to achieve a mutually satisfactory and stable agreement. 
The establishment of more comprehensive and exclusive territorial rights is thus left 
to systems of cooperation between communities that have overlapping interests in 
the same territory or resources. This proposal endorses a political conception of 
territorial rights that are determined by the interaction of communities and the 
resolution of conflicts. We cannot demand more than a minimal protection of 
individuals’ freedom from a theory of legitimate conventions, but we can hope to 
achieve much more if individuals and their communities focus their energies in a 
continuous and long-lasting effort to engage with others in the protection of their 
interests. 
 
2 Test of Legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy sets the minimal standards according to which existing social 
arrangements can be deemed having the force to authoritatively shape individuals’ 
normative relations and according to which coercion is justified.5 Legitimate social 
arrangements identify which protected freedoms and powers one has in particular 
situations regarding territory and resources.  
Legitimacy in general terms is a feature of an agent that exercises political authority.6 
In particular for LBC, legitimacy is a feature of a class of individuals interacting in 
the civil society that exerts political control over territory and resources by upholding 
social norms. Individuals’ normative behavior constitutes a “set of formal or 
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informal rules, norms, and decision-making procedures governing an issue area”7 that 
reflects their established practices. When I speak of legitimate systems of social 
norms, then, I refer more precisely to the community’s rightful exercise of 
jurisdictional powers within and regarding a territory through the determination of 
enforceable practices and social norms.  
LBC takes inspiration from the Rawlsian idea of political legitimacy for decent 
people. Political legitimacy for Rawls is achieved when authority is exercised 
according to a system of social cooperation that is acceptable to those subject to it. 
In a liberal society, the basic structure is acceptable to all reasonable members of 
society because it is the point of convergence of their diverse but reasonable and 
compatible comprehensive doctrines. Since these are all reasonable interpretations of 
what is a valuable directive end, we cannot derive the fundamental principles of 
legitimacy from any of the particular comprehensive doctrines that members uphold. 
The only source of principles that can serve as the basis for legitimate political 
authority is the political culture of the particular society under scrutiny.8 Because 
liberal legitimacy is grounded in the overlapping consensus of reasonable 
interpretations of equal respect, the exercise of authority in a liberal and legitimate 
community will also respect the principle of moral equality.  
As LBC is concerned with settling conflicts on territory between communities that 
may or may not be liberal, LBC’s requirements of legitimacy must be weaker. For 
Rawls in a non-liberal (but decent) society, the exercise of political authority is 
acceptable to all subjects as long as it meets four requirements: (i) it must ensure the 
procurement of human rights (among which those to subsistence, security, personal 
property, formal equality before the law, freedom from slavery and some form of 
liberty of conscience), (ii) its legal system must impose bona fide obligations above 
those required by the protection of human rights, (iii) its officials must genuinely 
believe that the law is guided by a common idea of justice, and (iv) it must give its 
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members a meaningful role in political discussion, offering opportunity for dissent, 
and for their dissent to be taken seriously by officials.9  
Liberals are compelled to respect and not to interfere with the affairs of societies that 
meet these basic criteria of legitimacy because the resulting political arrangements 
can be considered acceptable for any reasonable member of the relevant society. 
Even if the system of social norms of a legitimate but illiberal society is not one of 
the reasonable interpretations of the liberal principle of equal respect, liberals’ 
commitment to tolerance demands that decent societies are accepted as legitimate, 
and thus as upholding enforceable rights and duties. The Rawlsian approach is 
interesting for LBC because it identifies the role of legitimacy as a better tool than 
justice to tackle the vast plurality of reasonable conceptions of decent political orders 
that can give rise to normative incidents. Moreover, LBC agrees with the Rawlsian 
idea that the answer to what makes a system of social norms legitimate can only be 
found in the political culture of the particular society under scrutiny.  
LBC ultimately speaks to those who identify with liberal systems of thoughts, and it 
offers guidelines in accordance with a liberal conception of legitimacy. But it also 
aims to offer reasons to illiberal communities to join the project of legitimacy on 
terms that may be acceptable to them as well. It provides for a normative standard 
that is sufficiently minimal to be met by illiberal communities, and that also promotes 
acceptable values upon which liberal and illiberal communities can engage towards 
the resolution of territorial conflicts.  
Moreover, LBC does not demand that communities express their social 
arrangements in specific positive institutions. For example, a legitimate set of social 
norms does not need to be embodied in a constitution, nor be subject to an 
institutional process of judicial review. This allows LBC to disregard the size of the 
communities that can enjoy territorial rights. Legitimate communities for the purpose 
of establishing territorial rights can be significantly smaller than fully functional 
states. Communities such as refugees’ settlements can be considered having 
territorial rights, as well as the nomadic communities in the Sahara or the informal 
settlements in Haiti post-earthquake. These social arrangements need not be of the 
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kind that gives rise to state-like institutions. Their ability to fulfill the requirements of 
legitimacy depends solely on the successful establishment of some kind of social 
cooperation that sufficiently respects individuals as project pursuers.  
Because the principles of legitimacy must be found in the political culture of the 
relevant community, legitimate arrangements will look different in liberal and non-
liberal societies. Illiberal communities may hold beliefs about legitimate authority that 
are acceptable to most of their members, but that do not realize the principle of 
equal morality. An illiberal society may, for example, discriminate against albinos 
because they are believed to bring bad luck, or may discriminate against blacks, or 
women, on the basis of the belief that different classes of people must have different 
roles in society. In their internal justification of political authority, these communities 
may include a reference to why one class is rightfully dominating another on the 
basis of its superiority, of their inherited royal status, or because of their gender, or 
the color of their skin. Although unacceptable for liberals, such illiberal political 
arrangements may be the result of a genuine belief among most of the members of a 
community that political authority there is justified on the basis of the assertion of 
some type of superiority of a class of people over another.  
A liberal theory of territorial rights has to accept that such beliefs, although illiberal, 
may be the foundation of legitimate political authority, as long as the domination of 
one group over another is not an unacceptable violation of the fundamental 
individuals’ ability to form and pursue their directive ends. So for example, a 
chauvinist community is legitimate even if the basis of its system of norms is the 
belief that women are not fit for holding political office, as long as women have 
other significant avenues to participate in the determination of the social norms to 
which they are subject. This can happen, for example, if they have a significant role 
in the economic management of their families, and in the education of children, or if 
there are avenues for women associations to express their dissent with policies that 
hurt their interests, effectively exercising pressure for social change. This is the sense 
in which the requirements of legitimacy are to be found in the political culture of 
every particular community. Liberal communities’ internal legitimacy will be more 
demanding than the standard of legitimacy of illiberal groups, since liberal people will 
be satisfied only by a system of norms that respects them as equal moral agents. But 





to demonstrate that a community may rightfully exercise jurisdictional power within 
a territory regarding its land and resources it is sufficient that the community’s social 
norms meet the minimal threshold of legitimacy.  
The way in which members of different communities understand their attachment to 
land is ultimately the way in which their attachment should be understood and valued 
by a theory of territorial rights, if this has a chance to escape the charges of 
ethnocentrism. To strike a fair balance between universal goals of legitimacy and the 
protection of community specific ways to understand resources, I believe we must 
presume that a community’s narrative about their attachment to their territory is true. 
However, a particular narrative must also be intelligible and assessable in general 
terms by outsiders to the community. The requirements of legitimacy intended as a 
minimal and negative standard offer to outsiders guidelines to navigate and evaluate 
communities’ rights to territory. Moreover, they offer to communities a way to make 
their narratives and their interests commensurable to those of others, making their 
demands not “isolated from reality.”10  
When social norms meet the requirements of legitimacy they establish on the 
community that upholds them claims that others refrain from interfering with the 
community’s freedoms to use a territory and immunities against others’ powers to 
impose territorial jurisdiction there. Legitimacy also provides a tool to critically 
reform social norms, which must approximate as far as possible a sufficient level of 
protection of individuals’ ability to form and pursue their life plans. LBC points 
towards a system of social norms that is somehow impartial, in the sense that all 
individuals subject to it should enjoy at least the same level of minimal protection of 
their fundamental interest in being self-governing. If norms meet the minimal 
requirements of legitimacy, then, we have a guarantee that they are at least minimally 
fair. 
Moreover, whether or not individuals have a role in the identification of social 
norms, they will be able to evaluate the resulting arrangements with regards to how 
well they promote the principle according to which individuals should be free to 
form and pursue their life plans. A threshold of legitimacy derived by this basic and 
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widely shared principle of respect for individuals’ self-government provides a reason 
also for the outsider to respect (and comply with) the system of entitlements of a 
legitimate community. The fact that outsiders can evaluate social norms also ensures 
that the norms are ultimately justifiable to human beings as such, without having to 
rely on community-specific political, cultural, or religious internal values. If the 
community’s norms sufficiently respect all human beings as moral agents, even those 
who are not members have a reason to comply – as long as they also uphold the 
principle according to which all individuals should be treated with sufficient respect 
for their moral authority.11  
The legitimacy threshold offers two further reasons for compliance to outsiders to 
the social norms who are already present in the territory of the hosting community, 
such as travellers, refugees, and immigrants: the first one is a prudential reason and 
the second is an instrumental reason.12 First, legitimate conventions offer those 
present in the community’s territory the guarantee that they have at least their basic 
rights protected, given that the community’s norms treat effectively all human beings 
with a minimal concern for their basic rights. Even if the outsider is not contributing 
to the determination of the system of social norms, she will still consider compliance 
if the norm treats her with a minimal concern for her basic rights.  
Second, if the outsider has a desire to at some point join the community (temporarily 
or permanently), and eventually participate in the development of the community’s 
set of entitlements, then she also has an instrumental reason to comply with the 
legitimate set of norms of the hosting community. In fact, well-established and 
legitimate practices are the first step towards progressively just forms of social 
cooperation because they sufficiently respect members and non-members alike as 
project pursuers who can determine the nature of their reciprocal relations. 
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To illustrate this point, let me make a distinction between the case of the migrant, 
who desires to join the community, and the traveler, who’s merely passing by. Let’s 
also assume that both are reasonable people (that is, they believe that all human 
beings should be treated as project pursuers). The traveler will recognize the benefit 
of a system of entitlements that protects to a minimum standard his interest in self-
government when he is present in the territory of the legitimate community. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the institutions ensures that the community’s norms are 
intelligible and justifiable to the reasonable traveler. 
The case of the migrant is different as she desires to interact with the community 
repeatedly. In this case, I need to distinguish two situations. The first case is that of 
the refugee, whose original community insufficiently respects her basic demands for 
a legitimate system of social norms. The second case is the immigrant, who desires 
interaction with the hosting community because she considers it to fit better with her 
beliefs about justice or with her personal ends and projects.  
In the first case, the refugee would be entitled to some degree to join (not necessarily 
permanently) the community. In fact, her original community does not respect her 
sufficiently as a project pursuer, and the hosting community is likely to be the most 
suitable community to offer her what she is owed, given that the refugee is already 
present in its territory. In this event the refugee has a prudential reason to comply 
with the set of legitimate institutions, as her situation and her membership would 
likely improve if she were to comply with the hosting community’s social norms and 
become one of its members, even if only temporarily.  
In the second case, the immigrant desires to join the community because she believes 
that the hosting community respects her idea of justice better that her original 
community does. Given her explicit endorsement of the hosting community’s set of 
social norms, one can assume that the immigrant has already a reason to comply with 
the norms. The community is worthy of her membership and thus she likely has no 
reason to reject its arrangements. If she were accepted and allowed to join the 
community, then she would become a member and she would participate with her 
fellow members to the determination of the set of norms according to her sensibility.  





Moreover, the reason to comply with (and tolerate) the territorial rights of a 
legitimate community is likely to be even more compelling if the outsider (immigrant 
or refugee) who wishes to be part of the community’s membership is actually 
allowed to participate in the development of the community’s social norms.  In this 
case, the outsider would have an unconditional reason to approve of the 
community’s set of entitlements given their correspondence to what reasonable 
people would uphold, and also an instrumental reason in virtue of the fact that the 
norms represent her interaction with the members of the community. 
One may ask at this point why should the immigrant accept and tolerate the 
community’s decision not to let her enter its territory and join the community. In 
section 4, I will say more about the right to immigrate that this framework is able to 
defend and the limits of a community’s claim that others do not enter its territory. 
For now and in short, the immigrant has no claim that the hosting community allows 
her to acquire membership because she enjoys the protection of her basic 
entitlements in the community to which she already belongs. For this reason she 
might regret that the decision of the hosting community goes against her interests in 
improving her conditions, but her fundamental interests continue to be protected by 
her original community. 
 
3 The Requirements in Detail  
 
In this section I give details of the requirements that a set of social norms must fulfill 
to be legitimate. These are requirements that do not force liberal principles onto 
other communities, but that serves as a set of proto-liberal conditions for social 
arrangements that are meaningful and acceptable to liberals and non-liberals. 
According to these standards, liberals can evaluate the normative strength of the 
territorial titles produced by illiberal societies.  
Although legitimacy in LBC is a certain liberal interpretation of the answer to 
whether a system of social norms can be considered having normative force, the 
requirements of legitimacy do not demand that the order under scrutiny protects 
individuals as equal moral agents. For LBC social norms are legitimate if they 





respond to the basic legitimacy demand, which requires that the order is accepted by 
most of its subjects, that it is not continuously on the verge of revolution, and that 
the acceptance of the system of norms is somewhat genuine. The genuineness of 
individuals’ acceptance of the particular political arrangements will be a function, 
among other factors, of how stable their acceptance is in the face of influence from 
outsiders.13 
I believe that some conclusions can be drawn from the advancements of studies in 
political economy, sociology, and socio-legal studies in support of some proto-liberal 
set of requirements that allow us to evaluate whether the social norms examined can 
be said to be the product of legitimate political order, or, instead, if they are the 
product of domination. For political arrangements not to be merely devices to 
sustain the domination of the most powerful actors within a community, individuals’ 
moral agency must be protected in some way.  
LBC’s four requirements of legitimacy are intended to be one plausible way in which 
a legitimate community may look like, on the basis of what we know about the 
conditions that make a community sufficiently free, adequately prosperous, and for 
the most part able to sustain growth and meet its members basic needs. The 
requirements are to be understood as parts of a composite concept of legitimacy. It is 
not necessary that the community scores meets all the requirements in the same way, 
or performs very well with regards to either one of them in particular, but it is 
necessary that over all the community is able to sufficiently respect individuals as 
project pursuers. For example, if a community is particularly good at addressing its 
members’ needs, but is not very good at protecting their basic economic freedoms, it 
could still meet the threshold of legitimacy, as long as the balance between the two 
variables is sufficiently positive in favor of individuals’ rights to be self-governing. 
The extent to which a community meets these requirements is ultimately an empirical 
question, but the next subsections will offer some guidelines for evaluation. 
If a community’s social norms do not achieve the minimum requirements of 
legitimacy they do not establish exclusive rights to territory. The community, in this 
case, may not demand a claim that others do not interfere with its use of a resource, 
                                                      
13 Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed, 6. 





or an immunity against others’ overlapping jurisdictional powers within and 
regarding the same territory that the community occupies and controls. The inability 
to fulfill the requirements does not entail that the community may not continue to 
use and control its territory, but it means that the community’s use and control of 
resources and territory is vulnerable to others’ attempt to reform, curtail, and 
interfere with it.  
 
3.1 Basic  Needs 
Social norms are legitimate if they provide for the sustainable satisfaction of basic 
needs such as housing, nutrition, water, health, and basic education. The provision of 
basic needs ensures that members of a group do not suffer deprivation to the extent 
that they are led to accept arrangements that are in important ways suboptimal. 
When people have access to the satisfaction of their basic needs and do not suffer 
from the violation of their most fundamental interests, they will be less likely to 
acquiesce in detrimental systems of social norms. The satisfaction of basic needs is 
important for this theory because it ensures that individuals can at least consider the 
possibility of dissenting to existing social norms and against existing powerful elites, 
and that they are not preoccupied daily with the struggles demanded by extreme 
poverty and poor health.  
Basic education should be counted among the basic needs. It is now matter of 
common knowledge that basic education is highly beneficial for the prevention of 
diseases, the reduction of child mortality, and demographic control for a smooth 
transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. This has 
consequently positive effects on the wellbeing of the whole population and the 
maintenance of a sustainable economic growth. It has also been linked with impact 
on democracy, human rights protection, and non-violent political stability.14 This 
does not mean that the community needs to support a system of public education, 
but it requires that the level of wellbeing of its people is one that allows them to 
                                                      
14 “Education for All: Global Monitoring Report” in Unesco Publishing, 2015  
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002322/232205e.pdf). 





form communities that are forward-looking and are concerned with education and 
training. 
The ability of a community to meet its population’s basic needs relies on many 
factors, which depend in important ways on its social arrangements. The 
fundamental interest that individuals have in nutrition, for example, can be met only 
if the community has provisions for a sustainable use of their land and their 
resources, or, if resources are scarce, if the community is able to develop systems of 
solidarity and support for those who cannot provide for themselves. For example, in 
informal settlements in Haiti some communities of thousands of people have started 
rebuilding their lives in areas where the earthquake had destroyed the previous 
settlements. Within these settlements different communities have emerged that have 
substituted an ineffective state and have overcome a series of inefficient international 
programs for development of post-natural-disaster areas.  
The interesting bit of this otherwise tragic story is that these communities have 
established a functioning set of social norms that regulate urban planning, social 
security services, implementation of new infrastructure projects, and housing and 
land development. The rebuilding of new communities has followed a path of social 
cooperation and inclusion of each member of society, led by local experts in the field 
of urban planning, economic planning, civil engineering, and so on.15 These measures 
have tackled a situation of emergency and poverty that is relatively exceptional. 
However, this gives us an interesting example of the spontaneous emergence of 
social arrangements that display some concerns for the weaker parts of society by 
providing help and assistance to those deprived of homes and jobs. This is an 
example of a community that has been able to establish some robust entitlements to 
territorial jurisdiction in the areas that they have occupied. 
These societies have also taken steps to ensure the sustainability of their system of 
cooperation. For example, they put in place a system of division of labor and training 
programs, and a system of economic and urban planning, which show concern for 
the long-term effective functioning of their common activities. The sustainability of 
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Opportunities in Haiti (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution and the International Organization 
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the provision of basic need depends, however, not only on the management of the 
human resources, but also on the management of the natural resources supporting 
human activity. For this reason, for example, an agrarian community that was 
exploiting its fertile camps to the point of depletion might be liable of not having a 
sustainable plan to fulfill its member’s basic needs of nutrition, health, and the 
prosperity needed to ensure basic wellbeing.  
Environmental concerns should also be considered when judging whether a 
community is legitimately exercising its entitlement to territory. So for example, 
imagine the emissions from the combustion of a great amount of carbon was proven 
to pollute a region so profoundly to render it dangerous for human life. In this case, 
one could say that the way the community is exploiting its natural resources 
undermines the legitimacy of its social norms, since it puts at risk the health of the 
community’s members. This means that they do not have a claim that others do not 
interfere with the use of their deposits of carbon. 
Another case in which a community’s norms are not legitimate is when some of its 
members are systematically and continuously oppressed or mistreated. An example 
can be the practice of female genital mutilation and male circumcision by many 
communities in Africa. The Masaai of Kenya and Tanzania offer an interesting 
example of a community that has been entitled to some territorial rights in virtue of 
historical injustices. However, the community practices female genital mutilation, 
which have proven debilitating to the extent that the people subject to them often 
develop long-term illnesses that make their lives considerably shorter and painful.16 
In these cases, the group upholds social norms that violate the basic interest of their 
people in health and a reasonable level of wellbeing. This should count as an 
oppressive practice that erodes some legitimate rights of the group to the exercise of 
territorial jurisdiction to the extent that they sustain inadequate practices. 
 
                                                      
16 If the harshness of these practices weren’t enough to show that the community does not represent 
sufficiently its members’ interest, the fact that the members of that very community oppose them 
should add to their rejection. Agnes Pareyio is among the most notable activist, receiving recognition 
from the UN with the UN in Kenya Award in 2005 (UN in Kenya Award Winner, United Nation Center 
in Nairobi, http://www.unicnairobi.org/UNPOY.asp). 





3.2 Personal and Economic Freedoms 
Individuals should enjoy personal freedoms and discretion on how to exercise what 
is generally referred to as basic economic freedoms to actively pursue the protection 
of their non-fundamental interests. Personal and economic rights protect individuals 
as project pursuers by ensuring that they do not depend on powerful others in 
pursuing their life plans. Undoubtedly individuals depend on each other for the 
successful pursuit of their interests. We rely on a complex system of division of labor 
to advance complex personal goals and we associate with others for the achievement 
of social goods. The very possibility to form and pursue life plans depends on our 
ability to form stable expectations regarding others’ behavior. This being said, 
persons should not be in a situation of depending completely on one another, 
without the opportunity to exit or modify their relationship of mutual dependence. If 
one depends completely on another for the pursuit of her life plans, we have reason 
to believe that one will neither conceive nor voice her disagreement with the other’s 
behavior.  
The provision of basic economic rights is also necessary to allow individuals to 
exercise their moral authority to be authors of their lives. Being free to provide for 
themselves and to make plans to pursue one’s prosperity allows people to follow 
their aptitudes and use their abilities best, increasing their chances of success. Basic 
economic rights protect individuals’ autonomy, enhancing their opportunity to act 
autonomously and to successfully provide for themselves and their families. The 
better people do for themselves and for those they care for, the better their 
community will prosper and increase the level of wellbeing of its members. 
Different types of arrangements can achieve the protection of an individual’s domain 
of basic freedoms. A system of basic income might set a threshold that allows every 
member of the community to enjoy some independence. Similarly, the provision of 
social services that ensures that the benefits of social cooperation is distributed to 
those who lack the means for their own independence will achieve the same purpose. 
It is likely that every system that protects individuals’ minimal domain of freedoms 
and independence from others will allow them to hold private property, at least with 
regards to personal goods. Under such a system, individuals will also be able to form 
associations to assist themselves in the pursuit of their plans. They will be able to 





form families and manage their family’s economic activities independently, ensuring 
that each member of their family or narrow community is free from need and able to 
cooperate with each other. Individuals are not all well informed nor can they ever be, 
but they are the most informed with regards to what is important to themselves and 
the people they care about. 17  Individuals must be empowered to pursue 
independently the solution of their problems as much as possible, given that they 
have a better understanding of their particular needs. 
For this reason, legitimate sets of social norms will also not discriminate on the basis 
of gender in the provision of basic personal and economic freedoms. Some empirical 
studies have shown that in developing countries the biggest obstacle to widespread 
access to clear water and to the improvement in the population’s health is women’s 
lack of economic rights. In many African countries the vast majority of the farming 
population are women,18 and the exclusion of women from the management of 
property due to gender-based discrimination has importantly hindered the 
development of the affected areas, reducing the ability of a community to meet its 
members’ basic needs and to allow them to pursue their goals.19 The main reason 
why women’s access to property rights determines a higher success of the local areas’ 
development resides in the fact that women, by being the ones who traditionally 
manage the family economy and handle the family’s nutrition, are also the most 
knowledgeable about, for example, how to handle clean water and food to avoid the 
risk of it being spoiled. By protecting basic property rights for both genders these 
communities’ norms may successfully allow their members to provide for themselves 
and their families, and to have a genuine shot at pursuing their goals. 
 
3.3 Freedom of  Express ion 
For social norms to be legitimate individuals’ freedom of expression must be 
tolerated. Some form of public participation in shaping the social arrangements to 
                                                      
17 Mark Pennington, Robust Political Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 72. 
18  “Agriculture in Africa,” UN NEPAD Transforming Africa (2013), 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2013africanagricultures.pdf. 
19 “Empowerment of Women in Higher Education in Africa: The Role and Mission of Research,”  
UNESCO Forum, Occasional Paper Series Paper no.11,  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001510/151051eo.pdf. 





which individuals are subject must be allowed, free access to free information is in 
some way protected, and the governing elite is in some way accountable for 
wrongdoing. This guarantees that the people subject to a system of social norms are 
able to voice their dissent and to be taken seriously when they propose the revision 
of the norms that they find unacceptable. Many arrangements can be made for the 
protection of freedom of expression. In a liberal democracy the classic guarantees are 
freedom of the press and the right to vote and to participate in the political aspects 
of their membership.  
In populations where liberal democracy is not the preferred system of organization, 
freedom of expression can be protected indirectly by tolerating forms of dissent, like 
allowing public speeches to organized collective action in the form of protests, social 
movements, and associations. In all these cases, there is a need for the widest amount 
and diversity of information within a community, and an assurance that people are 
not silenced if they express dissent. If information circulates freely and widely, it is 
more likely that the members of a community will be able to know the details of the 
existing system of social norms and assess its effects on their lives. Together with a 
provision for basic education, this requirement ensures that a population is able to 
voice but also to conceive of dissenting and critically reforming the status quo. 
Freedom of expression is particularly valuable if it has some consequences on 
reshaping the system of existing social norms. For this reason, together with some 
system of free circulation of information, a community should also develop some 
provisions for non-arbitrary government. In particular, the expression of dissent 
should be structurally included so that people’s dissent is not effectively ignored. In 
other words, freedom of expression must be tolerated and protected to the extent 
that it may offer an effective tool towards the reformation of social norms. Social 
norms ought to be in some sense responsive to its subjects and thus not be 
determined by the consistent and systematic control of oppressive classes. For this to 
be possible, the community should develop some system of accountability of the 
governing bodies. Liberal democracies rely on the doctrine of the rule of law, but a 
smaller local community could express the ideals of the rule of law by, for example, 
developing some norms for the fair adjudication of disputes, by realizing ideals of 





impartiality and generality, and by promoting systems of balances and checks on the 
governing bodies. 
So for example, imagine that a racist group in a remote rural area in the United States 
contests the fact that the current president is black. Consider also that this group 
internally is able to accommodate diversity by treating black people with sufficient 
respect regardless of the fact that they believe that they should not be able to hold 
office. Consider also that in this community, there is no restriction for black people 
to exit the community, and that they are able to express their dissent with the racist 
social norms upheld by the community and to form their own political and cultural 
associations. For LBC this group may be considered holding legitimate social norms 
because it does not excessively deprive its members of the basic economic and social 
rights that they need to be sufficiently respected as project pursuers.  
Do these people have effective freedom of expression regarding their views on the 
unsuitability of a black president? As they belong to a community upholding a 
democratic electoral system, they may not successfully reject the authority of the laws 
passed by the federal government unless the majority of people agreed with them. As 
I discuss in the next chapter, such group may legitimately secede, given that its social 
norms are sufficiently legitimate. However, secession may not be the group’s 
aspiration as its members may regard the benefit of successfully rejecting a black 
president not exceeding the costs of secession. However, some territorial rights may 
be recognized. For example say that this community celebrates the historical battles 
of the civil law in which the separatists were successful, and that the presence of 
dissenting civil rights activists during these celebrations limits the groups’ ability to 
properly honor its cultural and historical heritage. Regardless of how despicable their 
beliefs may be, they may be allowed for example to claim that no one enters or 
modifies the memorial grounds of their heroes without their consent. 
An important ability that freedom of expression pursues is also the freedom not to 
express one’s views about the existing social norms and not to participate in the 
activities of a community. If individuals find it meaningful not to be implicated in a 
system of norms, and wish not to participate to the collective activity of norm 
formation, they should be allowed to do so. Take for example the Italian Fascism, 
where participation was forcibly imposed on the population. During elections in 





Fascist Italy, people were forced to vote in favor of the Fascist party. The Fascist 
party wanted to promote the perception that it had very high public approval. It 
wasn’t enough to win the elections, as winning elections with the approval of a small 
percentage of the population would have eroded the perception that the Fascist party 
was the most widely appreciated political party in the Italian government. Aside from 
the problem of forced compliance, this practice is problematic because it fosters a 
false representation of the preferences of a community, which partly is the reason 
why suboptimal social norms can arise and be sustained in time, even when the 
majority dissents.20 A sufficient protection of freedom of speech reduces the risk that 
bad norms emerge or pass the test of time. 
 
3.4 Freedom of  Assoc iat ion 
Freedom of speech and personal and economic freedoms are instrumental to 
permitting people to participate in shaping the social norms to which they are 
subjects. This aim may be achieved by a diversity of combinations of freedom of 
speech and personal and economic freedoms. However, also freedom of association 
plays an important role in protecting and promoting individuals’ ability to shape their 
relations and the rules to which their society abides. Thus, individuals’ freedom of 
association must also be respected for norms to be legitimate. Individuals should be 
reasonably free to choose to associate with the people they prefer and to join forces 
in the pursuit of common interests. 
Freedom of association also implies that one should not be implicated with a 
collective project that one doesn’t agree with. Freedom of association comes, thus, 
with a provision for freedom to exit an association. Since social norms are the 
product of individuals’ interactions, and the identity of the members of a group 
                                                      
20 Imposing social participation increases the chances that a community will suffer from ‘pluralistic 
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misrepresenting social support for unwanted social norms. Some examples of unwanted social norms: 
norms of discrimination against minorities, norms of revenge popular in the Mediterranean countries, 
corruption, gangs’ violent behavior (Ibid., 179). 





affects importantly the nature of the norms that the group will develop. For a system 
of social norms to be legitimate, the decision of some members to exit the 
community and its system of norms should be tolerated. For this reason, the 
proposed theory defends a relatively tolerant approach towards secession and 
political devolution, suggesting that anyone should be able to freely choose the type 
of community to which one would like to belong. This does not mean that anyone 
should also be able to join any community: freedom of association defends the 
freedom of a community to exclude some from membership. It does, however, 
suggest that anyone should be able to disengage from the community to which he or 
she belongs if he or she desires to do so. 
Freedom of exit also allows individuals to voice their dissent when other avenues are 
impracticable. The threat of exit has been considered traditionally inimical to 
beneficial social cooperation and to poison relations between groups subject to the 
same institutions.21 However, it is often the case that exiting a community may 
require a great cost for those who decide to leave. Leaving one’s community is 
difficult, and when individuals choose to distance themselves from their original 
community, they are likely to do so because they believe that it is a much greater cost 
to continue cooperation under the current system of norms. Individuals may exit an 
association by emigrating or seceding. Both options require that the exiting groups or 
individuals incur costs that are very high.  
Those who exit an association will likely have to renounce a familiar culture and 
incur the costs of relocation and adaptation, including the fact that the new 
environment may be unfamiliar and difficult to navigate. The remaining members of 
society, on the other hand, will have to establish new systems of organization that 
take in consideration the loss of part of their original membership. It is likely that 
those who want to exit will first use the threat of exit before they actually part from 
their original community, in particular in the case of secession.22 For this reason, a 
community that has weak provisions for freedom of expression may demonstrate 
that it meets the requirements of legitimacy if, for example, it allows its members to 
exit their community without incurring great costs.  
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One of the costs that groups of people exiting their original association will incur is 
that of finding another territory to settle in or another association to join. Thus 
communities that restrict freedom of expression may be considered holding 
legitimate social norms if their members have a realistic option of exercising their 
freedom to exit. If the international community is itself composed of legitimate 
communities, then individuals’ choice to exit may be easier to pursue.  
So for example, a homogenous society such as the Amish community that demands 
that all its members share the same cultural and religious values, may still uphold a 
system of legitimate social norms given their vicinity and good relations with the 
larger community of the United States. This vicinity allows members of both 
communities to interact with each other and to exit and enter the different 
communities at no unbearable cost for themselves. Communities, thus, have a 
further incentive in wanting to be part of an international system of legitimate 
communities. In fact, if their members enjoy a wide set of freedoms within the 
various existing communities, including the freedom to enter other associations and 
associate with whomever they want, then their original communities may be able to 
shape the terms of their cooperation more freely. What matters is the overall level of 
freedom that their members enjoy, which does not necessarily depend only on the 
level of freedom that each separate community provides for their members. 
 
4 Global Order 
 
The justifiability of the system of entitlements of a community on the basis of the 
fact that they respect a minimum account of legitimacy offers one reason for other 
communities to respect it as well. The fulfillment of the requirements of legitimacy is 
a sign that the community’s norms are at least acceptable to reasonable persons who 
are subject to them. This allows other groups to recognize a community as one that 
has a legitimate authority regarding its territory and whose authority enjoys some 
type of internal stability. 
LBC offers reasons to both liberal and illiberal communities to comply with the 
requirements of legitimacy and the system of mutual recognition of legitimate 





communities. For illiberal societies, the system ensures that their rights to their 
territory on the basis of their particular system of values and beliefs are respected, 
even if they do not respect the more demanding standards of liberal legitimacy. For 
liberals, the system of legitimacy offers the guarantee that the communities 
participating in and complying with it sufficiently respect individuals as project 
pursuers, ensuring that their relations with these communities do not violate the 
liberal commitment to individual self-government. Moreover, the minimal nature of 
the requirements of legitimacy is consistent with liberals’ commitment to peace and 
stability, and with their commitment to tolerating decent non-liberal societies.  
The requirements of legitimacy also indicate the scope of communities’ exclusive 
entitlements to territory. For LBC, when a community upholds legitimate social 
norms it acquires claims that others do not interfere with the use of its territory, and 
immunities against others’ overlapping territorial jurisdiction only to the extent that 
these claims and immunities are needed for the protection of the legitimacy of its 
norms. Above the protection of individuals’ interest in being project pursuers, the 
community enjoys only a freedom to use and a power to control the territory that is 
at the center of its members’ other important interests. When their freedom and 
powers conflict with those of others, the parties acquire a duty to compromise, given 
that their freedoms and powers protect incommensurable but relevant interests.  
According to LBC, then, Turkey, as well as the UK, Russia, and Greece, may 
permissibly demand exclusive control of Cyprus if and only if the jurisdictional 
control of the whole island (or of the contested North side) were necessary for either 
community to keep ensuring the minimal standards of legitimacy. Such relation with 
the territory of Cyprus would be quite difficult to demonstrate, considering also that 
currently neither of them controls Cyprus exclusively and yet is able to ensure 
sufficient internal standards of legitimacy. In this situation, the four countries may 
acquire exclusive rights on the island only if these entitlements are defined by a 
compromise that ensures that all the interested parties discuss the importance of 
their interests and evaluate others’ demands. The parties that can participate in the 
compromise are those who have an existing interest in the territory, the satisfaction 
of which may not be attained with the control or use of any other territory or 
resource than that currently contested.  





Such compromise will have to include the communities with an interest in the 
territory at issue and will have to consider that the resulting entitlements’ scope must 
not infringe the Cypriot’s territorial rights that are essential for their system of norms 
to meet the requirements of legitimacy. In the example of Cyprus, such compromise 
will likely not result in any rights of the Turkish government to expropriate and 
relocate the population occupying North Cyprus or powers of the Greek military 
forces to change the government of the island. However, Turkey and Greece may 
participate in the compromise on the basis of their current presence in the territory 
and their existing interests that depend on its control. It is likely that, on the other 
hand, Russia and the UK may be able to assert their international presence through 
the control of other territories and not necessarily through the control of Cyprus. If 
that is the case, the two countries may not participate as parties of the compromise. 
Their option is to negotiate with the rightful holders of territorial rights for the 
permission to carry on their activities there. 
The compromise will have as object all territories and resources that the 
communities do no hold exclusively, and thus that do not constitute the necessary 
basis of the legitimacy of their political arrangements. To the extent that interests 
that go beyond the protection of legitimacy are important to the communities, they 
will have to be taken into consideration when pursuing a fair compromise. This is 
also true when the communities’ political arrangements do not meet the 
requirements of legitimacy. In this case, the illegitimate community enjoys only 
freedoms to use and control the territory to which it has access but may still 
participate to the negotiations. However, given that they do not hold exclusive 
territorial rights, others may freely interfere with the control and use of their 
territory, as long as their interference does not create the conditions for internal 
violence and social unrest. 
Those who wish to interfere with the use of illegitimate communities’ territory have a 
duty towards the members of those communities to respect their freedoms and 
powers regarding territory and their system of social norms only to the extent that 
these norms offer some alternative to violence and chaos. In fact, others’ 
interference with illegitimate communities’ territorial holdings should not hurt the 





chance that the occupying population may have in establishing legitimate social 
norms. 
LBC also allows communities to enforce to a large extent the policies that they see 
fit, including policies that restrict immigration. If individuals enjoy the protection of 
the original community’s legitimate set of entitlements, they have no legitimate 
demands to exclusively use or enter other communities’ territory on the basis of their 
interest in being treated as project pursuers. The basic international structure of 
entitlements that emerges from the mutual recognition of legitimate communities 
offers each legitimate community a higher degree of control of their territories.  
In fact outsiders have a duty to respect a community’s internal system of property 
rights, given their duty to respect other individuals’ reliance on stable expectations, 
including those that derive from the stability of possession. The duty to respect 
existing arrangements is derived from the paramount importance of peace and order, 
which are necessary for the development of legitimate social norms. If the 
community upholds legitimate social norms, then the duty of immigrants to respect 
the existing system of rights correlates to the community’s claim that others do not 
disrupt the system of norms to the point that it will be difficult for the community to 
meet the requirements of legitimacy. This may allow the community to enact 
immigration policies that restrict the rights of outsiders to enter the territory, or to 
settle within the community, to avoid sudden and radical change to the community’s 
social and political arrangements (such as, for example, their reliance on national 
health systems or measures in support of unemployment). 
Outsiders and insiders may thus have overlapping and, possibly, conflicting 
freedoms: the former may have a freedom to enter the territory and make use of it. 
Members of a community on the other hand may make it harder for outsiders to 
enter and use their territory, for example by imposing demanding standards to 
become members of their community or citizens of a state. On the other hand, 
outsiders are permitted to sneak in the territory of the community and trade with 
members individually, or marry them, or advocate and promote their ideas among 
them. The community would also have to eventually protect the outsiders’ freedom 
to occupy and reside within its territory once they had acquired special interest in its 
territory by, for example, marrying one of the members of the community, or buying 





property there, or working there. Outsiders in fact have no duty not to enter the 
community’s territory, as long as their presence there is not a threat to the 
community’s legitimate system of social norms. To establish any claim and 
immunities against conflicting freedoms and powers, the parties will have to settle 
for some agreement that ensures that both significant interests in the same territory 
are protected. 
If a community’s conventions do not fulfill the legitimacy requirements, the group 
holds freedoms to use and powers to control the territory to which they have access 
that are, however, not protected by a claim that others do not interfere or immunities 
against competing powers of jurisdiction. Outsiders continue to have only a freedom 
to enter and use the community’s territory, but their freedom is more extensive as 
their concern must only be that of maintaining peace and stability. However, 
outsiders do not acquire an exclusive right to the territory of illegitimate communities 
or to the territory of legitimate communities that is not necessary for the protection 
of legitimate institutions. They merely have no duty not to enter the community’s 
territory or use their resources. To resolve conflicts arising from incompatible 
freedoms held by outsiders and the community, the parties will have to agree on 
mutually beneficial arrangements regarding the territory on which their interests and 
practices impinge.  
If non members rely on the community’s territory for the pursuit of their directive 
plans, they may have a freedom to enter that is as strong as their interest in it. There 
is a presumption, however, that the occupying community’s interest in that territory 
is stronger as it approaches the threshold of legitimacy. Its members, in fact, 
plausibly rely on that territory for their directive plans more significantly the more 
they enjoy a freedom to form and pursue directive plans. For example, imagine I 
want to pursue a career in waterskiing and that to do that I must move to a coastal 
country. I have an interest that justifies my freedom to move to another country, but 
my interest may be overcome by the fact that the community I want to join is unable 
to welcome me without having to radically compromise the wellbeing of its 
members, given that the fishing activities of that community are incompatible with 
waterskiing activities. Those particular shores, moreover, are not necessarily the only 
coasts on which I can further my interest in waterskiing. Differently, the 





community’s activities impinge on that specific coastal area, given that successful 
fishing requires familiarity with the fishing areas. In this example, provided that it 
upholds legitimate norms, the fishing community’s interest in continuing its fishing 
activities will overcome the interest of water-skiers and establish exclusive titles to 
use and control those coasts upon the members of the community. 
LBC, with its minimal requirements of legitimacy, allows communities to participate 
in a system of international cooperation that permits the establishment of rights on 
territory on the basis of diverse interests that represent in different degrees 
communities’ special interest to territory. In fact, communities may protect and 
further interests that are not limited to those necessary for the protection of minimal 
standards of legitimacy as long as they concede to their duty to compromise, and as 
long as they respect their duties of assistance towards individuals that are not present 
in their territory and do not have their basic interest protected.  
In some cases, in fact, even those who are not present in a territory and do not have 
a special interest in it, may still have legitimate demands on the benefits arising from 
its use and control. Consider the case of environmental refugees who may not enjoy 
residency in their community’s original territory because of some natural disaster, or 
the case of refugees who are forced away from their home by oppressive regimes. 
These people are left outside the system of protection of their basic rights, and do 
not enjoy minimal respect for their interest in being treated as project pursuers. For 
this reason they may have claims that other communities assist in the satisfaction of 
their basic needs and demands.  
These claims may not necessarily be rights to immigrate – in the case of refugees – or 
to use and control a territory – in the case of environmental refugees. Unprotected 
individuals and groups may demand that others assist in providing help and 
resources in establishing the conditions leading to legitimate social orders elsewhere; 
this may come in the form of providing assistance in the development of norms and 
institutions within an uninhabited territory, or assistance to the community that is 
hosting and integrating displaced individuals within their membership. A theory of 
territorial rights is not enough to establish who should provide such aid and who 
holds duties of assistance. Determining this would require an account of duties on 
the basis of more demanding requirements of global justice. I suppose that these 





duties will have to be shared fairly among those who enjoy the protection of their 
interests within legitimate communities and proportionally to their wellbeing and 
their ability to offer aid. 
LBC is consistent with a theory of global distributive justice also with regards to 
resource rights. Communities upholding conventions that impinge on particular 
natural resources can exclude others from the enjoyment of those resources only to 
the extent that such exclusion is necessary for the preservation of a threshold of 
legitimacy. Above that threshold, they have only unprotected freedom and powers 
that are grounded on their special interests on those resources. Because of these 
existing but unprotected freedoms they can participate in the compromise for the 
establishment of exclusive titles on contested resources. Imagine, then, that Norway 
needs only 70% of its oil to protect the legitimacy of its social norms. It seems that 
for LBC a country like Puerto Rico could go to the North Sea and start extracting 
the remaining 30% of the oil currently controlled by Norway, even against accepting 
a duty to compromise with the Scandinavian country. 
However, for LBC, also international practices and conventions must be considered 
grounding titles, just as much as local and national practices. The international 
community upholds an established practice supported by the principle according to 
which the resources of a country belong to the people of that country.23 This practice 
serves an important role in maintaining international peace, protecting the 
fundamental interest of individuals in being able to form and pursue life-plans. 
However, like other conventions, also the norm of popular sovereignty is limited to 
the role it serves, and demands compliance only to the extent that it is legitimate. The 
norm of popular sovereignty of natural resources may be enough to ensure that 
Puerto Rico does not sail to the North Sea and take Norway’s oil, but it does not 
make Norway invulnerable to the demands of global distributive justice. So for 
example, depending on what theory of global justice we support, Norway may have 
to devote the revenues of the surplus 30% of its oil to alleviate the problems of the 
global poor by, for example, complying with a global tax. Even if the international 
community upholds a system of conventions that is unjust because of it does not 
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sufficiently address the injustice of global poverty, LBC urges the members of that 
community to look at the possible piecemeal improvements that can be carried out, 
without disrupting the present achievements in international relations that secure 
some level of legitimacy. 
This approach settles very few exclusive rights to territory and resources, leaving the 
determination of most exclusive territorial rights to the compromise between 
interested parties and to the balancing of important interests in contested territories. 
This is true, as I tried to show in this section, for freedoms to access and occupy a 
territory, freedoms to use and manage resources, and powers of jurisdiction 
regarding territory and resources. By focusing on the need to find agreement on the 
normative incidents that protect important but non-fundamental interests, LBC 
promotes exchange, dialogue, and cooperation between parties that share legitimate 
freedoms to use and powers to control the same territories. 
The focus on agreement and compromise is likely to translate into the involvement 
of third parties, such as international organizations or non-governmental authorities 
to aid the parties in finding mutually agreeable terms, and to achieve a mutual 
understanding of their reciprocal duties. In the following chapter, I discuss the issue 
of secession and offer a particular example of how LBC addresses conflicts over 
territories. 
 









In this chapter I apply LBC to the case of secession. A theory of territorial rights 
should be concerned with secession because secession is largely a territorial 
phenomenon. To secede a group must necessarily hold titles to control the territory 
that it asserts as its own and to use and manage its resources (at least partially). 
Without territorial rights, in fact, the group that desired independence could not be 
said to have seceded.1 Surprisingly little has been said about the implications of 
theories of territorial rights for the separation of states. Much of this silence has to 
do with the fact that territorial rights are a new subject in political philosophy. But 
the oversight of secession in the literature about territorial rights is also associated 
with the widely held assumption that a state’s territorial rights come with its 
sovereignty, and thus with its legitimate exercise of jurisdictional power over its 
members without interference from outside sources of political authority or 
influence. The modern state is understood as principally a territorial entity, and 
philosophical arguments in favor of statehood have been classically taken also to 
justify territorial control. Sidgwick writes for example: 
it seems essential to the modern conception of a State that its government 
should exercise supreme dominion over a particular portion of the earth’s 
surface ... Indeed, in modern political thought the connection between a 
political society and its territory is so close that the two notions almost 
blend.2 
Similarly, in international law the state is defined as a territorial entity: 
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The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.3 
However, full control over territory and its resources is not necessarily entailed by 
the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is divisible, and its parts can be assigned to 
different agents.4 As many have illustrated, the concept of sovereignty and the 
powers that come with it have changed in the past and will continue to change in the 
future.5 Thus we cannot rely on it to define the rights of state, but we must 
understand it as the achievement of a thorough and systematic justification of its 
constituent normative incidents.6  
Sovereignty in international law refers to four distinct and independent features. The 
first, international legal sovereignty, refers to the practice of mutual recognition 
between territorial states that have formal juridical independence. The second, the 
Westphalian sovereignty, refers to the state’s right to exclude foreign interference 
within a territorial domain. The third, domestic sovereignty, refers instead to the 
state’s ability to exercise effective control domestically. Finally, the fourth, the 
interdependence sovereignty, indicates a state’s ability to regulate the flow of people, 
goods, capital, but also information, ideas, and pollutants across their territorial 
borders.7 This list exemplifies the complex array of rights and abilities that must be 
assessed to evaluate the degree of sovereignty that any given state enjoys. The 
justification of territorial rights and the scope of states’ titles to resources and land 
are only two parts of the justification of full sovereignty, which cuts across the four 
features listed above, and includes other normative incidents besides territorial 
jurisdiction regarding territory and resources, such as the right to internal and 
external self-determination, the power to make treaties, the right to make war, and 
the right to legislate and enforce rules over people within a particular territory.8 
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With regards to territory in particular, insisting that sovereignty grounds territorial 
rights, and not the other way around, overlooks the fact that the acquisition of 
territory determines the exclusion of other national groups and their members from 
the enjoyment of objects of fundamental importance for national self-determination 
and prosperity. Just like in the case of property, taking control of a territory and its 
resources has implications on the acquirer, but also on those who are excluded from 
successive acquisition of the same particular resources. So when we ask whether a 
group can secede from a state and exert territorial jurisdiction in the land that is 
controlled by the existing state we need to ask whether the group can legitimately 
acquire the territory it asserts as its own, whether this acquisition violates any existing 
titles to the same territory, and what are the limits to this appropriation. 
The disassociation of the state’s sovereignty from permanent sovereignty over 
territory and resources has been discussed recently in the literature on natural 
resources and global justice. Armstrong for example convincingly argues that full 
sovereignty over resources is not entailed by the state’s sovereignty and jurisdictional 
powers over people. In particular, he runs through some of the strongest cases in 
favor of statehood and resource rights and concludes that arguments from national 
improvement, attachment, or functionalist principles linking territorial rights to key 
state functions, all fail in supporting robust territorial rights.9  
For example, supporters of liberal nationalism argue that national communities have 
invested care and energy in developing a land and its resources, adding value to the 
territory. Moreover, national communities develop significant attachment to the land 
that they occupy and improve, making those particular territories an integral part of 
their members’ identity. Because of the value that national groups have added to a 
particular land, and because of their attachment to it, supporters of this view argue 
that national groups should enjoy extensive and robust rights to the control of 
natural resources, and that they should be able to exclude others from interference 
with their use of these resources.10 An alternative argument in favor of sovereignty 
over resources and territory is the functionalist argument, according to which the 
value of effective states and political institutions resides in them being able to secure 
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for their subjects the protection of basic rights and the satisfaction of basic needs. 
Functionalist arguments hold, then, that in so far as states are able to secure these 
basic benefits of cooperation, we must accord them control over their territory and 
resources. 
However, the liberal nationalism and the functionalist arguments fail to prove full 
sovereignty over territory, and they are all instead compatible with limited control 
over land and resources.11 With regards to the improvement argument, it is not clear 
why the fact that the national group has added value to the resource gives the group 
full property and control over the whole resource and the territory in which it is 
found. More convincingly, adding value to a territory may yield to a right to a part of 
the proceeds from the sale of resources or to a right to other types of income 
deriving from their use, but not necessarily to a robust and exclusive right to control 
and exploit them and to exclude others from their enjoyment.12  
Moreover, Armstrong argues that if the valuable function of the state is the 
satisfaction of basic needs and the protection of basic rights, it is unclear why states 
have a robust right to territorial control and to the use and exploitation of all 
resources found there, and not only those rights that are necessary for the efficient 
and effective realization of the aims of political institutions.13 On the other hand, the 
liberal nationalism argument may convincingly link only some resource rights and 
territorial control to a group on the basis of the special relation that the group has 
developed with a particular territory. However, it is often the case that a group’s 
identity and way of life depends only on some resources and geographical areas 
within the territory and not on all the possible ways in which the territory can be 
used and controlled.14 For example, a community of fishermen may very likely have 
no attachment whatsoever to the oil deposits found below the sea floor. Moreover, 
the liberal nationalism theory is likely to support territorial rights of sub national 
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groups, which are more likely to rely on specific territories and resources than the 
larger political community to which they belong.15  
To understand what territorial rights a state may demand, thus, we may not resort to 
the idea of sovereignty. On the contrary, our idea of sovereignty will be informed by 
our theories of territorial rights, self-determination, international relation, just war, 
and political authority. Given the uncertainty regarding what are the normative 
incidents implied by the idea of sovereignty, it is also somewhat unclear to what 
extent states that have successfully seceded are independent from outside 
interference. Here I offer a justification of the jurisdictional powers over people 
regarding land and resources that a group must acquire to legitimately secede. But I 
do not also address the immunities that the newly formed state enjoys against outside 
interference regarding its powers of jurisdiction over its subjects, which are part of a 
wider theory of political authority in general.  
Secession is also a point in time when the community exercises meta-jurisdictional 
authority through the establishment of new institutions, and the rejection of the 
political authority of the existing state. The declaration of independence and the 
establishment of new political institutions is a turning point for the community’s 
recognition within the international forces as an independent political unit. Before 
declaring independence, the community that legitimately exerts meta-jurisdictional 
authority is identified by its social norms, which also indicate the territory on which 
the community relies for the protection and development of its members’ self-
government.  
At secession, the community revokes its support for the existing institutions and 
expresses its aspiration to establish a new set of institutions on the basis of its 
particular social norms. As I will discuss in section 4, the newly established 
institutions will enjoy exclusive jurisdictional powers insofar as, and to the extent to 
which, they represent a set of legitimate social norms and are authorized by its 
subjects. By the end of this final chapter I side with the voluntaristic theories, and 
suggest that a community can legitimately establish new political institutions if its 
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members consent to those institutions, and if their consent has been suitably 
expressed or implicated by their actions. 
In my view, the question of secession is ultimately a territorial question and is 
independent from the question of whether the newly formed state enjoys legitimate 
political authority over its members. The limits to the exercise of authority over 
people are set by our theory of political authority, and they apply regardless of the 
territorial division. Our theory of political authority holds true whether the state 
under scrutiny is Sudan before separation, or Sudan and South Sudan after the 
secession of 2011. Moreover, powers over people in general do not necessarily entail 
powers regarding the territory that these people occupy.16 However, when a group 
secedes from a state, what becomes relevant is whether the seceding group has the 
most extensive titles on territory.17 To assess whether the group has a right to secede, 
then, the questions regarding the group’s territorial titles must be given priority: who 
can control the particular territory seized, and who owns the resources within? Who 
can decide who enters and under what conditions?  
It is possible that a group’s territorial rights may include all or a combination of the 
incidents described in Chapter 2. I suggest that a group has a right to secede when it 
has at least territorial jurisdiction regarding a territory and its resources and a 
freedom to occupy and use the territory. When asserting a right to secede the group 
is also affirming the power to unilaterally establish institutions on the particular 
territory that it occupies.18 Such institutions exerts the group’s powers to legislate, 
adjudicate, and enforce rules in its behalf regarding land and resources within a 
territory that was previously under the jurisdiction of another state.19  
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Here I will not also examine the claim that others do not enter and occupy a group’s 
territory, because a group may have a right to secede without having also a claim 
against immigration.20 As discussed in the previous chapter, the right to exclude 
others from a territory is grounded in part on legitimate territorial jurisdiction and in 
part on considerations regarding global justice.21 The justification of the claim against 
others entering a territory requires, thus, a thorough analysis and a theory of global 
justice that falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
Also, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the justification of a general right to a 
territory is different from the justification of a right to a particular piece of land.22 A 
group could be entitled to control some territory or other in virtue, for example, of 
its interest in self-determination.23 Although this might be true, it does not explain 
why the group can exercise its right to self-determination in the particular territory it 
occupies and from which it excludes all others. 
In the next section I discuss how the existing theories of territorial rights explain and 
address the issue of secession. I examine territorial rights theories on the basis of the 
distinction between indirect and direct theories introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
former maintain that a group has territorial jurisdiction if it holds legitimate authority 
over its members. Direct theories, by contrast, suggest that territorial jurisdiction is 
grounded on the fundamental interest of the group’s members on land. By the end 
of section 2, I argue that direct theories are to be preferred. 
In section 3, I discuss the direct theories and their shortcomings and propose LBC’s 
account of secession as a solution. My proposal is that a group can secede and 
acquire protective claims and immunities with regards to its territorial rights if it 
upholds a system of legitimate conventions grounding territorial rights. I show that, 
by relying on a conventionalist approach, one is able to maintain that at the outset of 
secession the parties also have a duty to compromise on matters regarding the 
division of shared territory. The resulting theory addresses groups’ conflicting 
legitimate interests in the separating territories, taking into consideration the existing 
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interdependence among individuals and their continuing need for cooperation. I also 
suggest that the seceding group’s normative incidents include a duty to compromise 
with the state from which they have separated and offer some examples of how the 
duty to compromise should be fulfilled. 
 
2 Indirect Theories 
 
In this chapter I examine the implications that indirect and direct theories have for a 
theory of secession. Recall that the distinction between the two approaches is based 
on the way they justify a group’s jurisdiction within a particular geographical area. 
For indirect theories, a group has jurisdictional powers on a territory if it holds 
legitimate authority over its members. Direct theories, on the other hand, suggest 
that territorial jurisdiction does not depend on a prior entitlement to political 
authority but is grounded on the members’ fundamental interests on land.24   
Most supporters of both approaches recognize that a group’s freedom to occupy and 
use a particular territory lies in a pre-institutional collective or individual interest, 
respectively, in self-determination or individual self-government. They disagree, 
however, with regards to the moral ground of territorial jurisdiction, which will be 
the focus of the remainder of this chapter. My aim is to show that direct theories are 
preferred. 
According to indirect theories, a group can establish territorial jurisdiction within a 
particular territory only if it has legitimate political authority over its members. The 
group acquires political authority once it has established just political institutions or 
once it demonstrates that it is able to establish just institutions. Accordingly, a group 
has territorial jurisdiction within a particular territory if it has established or if it 
demonstrates the ability to establish just institutions there. 
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For example, Buchanan’s legitimate state theory, Ypi’s permissive theory, and 
Wellman’s freedom of association theory suggest that a group must uphold just 
political institutions before it can establish territorial jurisdiction. According to 
Buchanan, such institutions must protect individuals’ basic human rights; for 
Wellman, institutions must provide the benefits of political association to all its 
subjects. Since territorial jurisdiction is needed for institutions to effectively perform 
their functions, the group also acquires the right to control the territory it occupies.25 
Ypi proposes instead that a state acquires territorial jurisdiction only provisionally 
and if its institutions realize the value of cosmopolitan justice. 
For Stilz’s occupancy theory and Nine’s collectivistic Lockean theory, on the other 
hand, a group only needs to demonstrate that it will be able to establish just 
institutions to acquire territorial jurisdiction. In particular, Stilz suggests that a group 
demonstrates such ability if it credibly protects its members’ basic rights through the 
establishment of partial institutions. These may start as a ‘separate dependency’ of 
another state, until the time when they are ready to support political independence.26 
Moreover, a seceding group must have established a history of political cooperation 
in the form of a state before it can sever from legitimate institutions.27 
Similarly, for Nine, only those groups that have upheld functioning political 
institutions have a right to secede. Sub-groups that wish to secede from legitimate 
states ought to fulfill more demanding requirements to defeat the existing state’s 
territorial jurisdiction. The fact that the group has been able to establish just political 
arrangements serves as a guarantee that it will be able to do so in the future and tilts 
the balance of considerations in favor of the group’s right to secede. 28  Such 
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institutions, however, need only be local (such as municipal governments) and meet 
the minimal requirements of justice.29  
For indirect theories, territorial jurisdiction is established by “morally salient bonds 
between [the people].”30 This relationship establishes territorial jurisdiction that binds 
only the parties involved in its creation. It is, thus, justified only to those subject to 
the group’s territorial jurisdiction. Internal political legitimacy, in fact, provides no 
reason for outsiders to the relevant community to refrain from using particular 
territories. This poses a problem for an account of the right to secede, as it does not 
offer a conclusive justification in favor of the group’s territorial jurisdiction and 
against the existing state’s competing jurisdictional powers. 
For example, the Italian region of Veneto that is actively pursuing independence is 
able to ensure that its members treat each other justly. This, however, is not a reason 
for the other Italian regions to hand over a territory whose shores we have reason to 
believe are rich of natural gas. The importance of territorial jurisdiction for the 
seceding group may be a reason for others to respect its exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction somewhere, but it cannot justify a duty of the existing state (if also 
legitimate) to refrain from using the territory it still legitimately controls.31 
In line with this, Buchanan argues that a group may never unilaterally secede unless 
the state to which it belongs is unjust. Ypi advances a similar view and argues that 
individuals have a duty to enter rightful political arrangements and that national institutions 
promote the Kantian principle of rights. For the permissive theory, unilateral secession from 
a state is a violation of the natural duty of justice, as it would lead to the temporary return to 
the state of nature.32 Similarly, for Ypi a group may never secede from a functioning 
state. As Stilz notes, however, this approach is problematic because it does not allow 
for political independence that seems appropriate, given the group’s history and 
attachment to the territory. To understand this objection it is useful to briefly 
examine a case that is not exclusively associated with secession. Stilz argues in this 
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respect that when the USA occupied German territory following the end of the war 
in 1945, there was an expectation that German people would have eventually 
regained territorial jurisdiction in Germany. Buchanan’s account, however, cannot 
explain this expectation, as the American institutions had exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction within German territory as long as their institutions continued to protect 
basic human rights there.33  
Similar to Buchanan, Wellman insists that a group acquires territorial jurisdiction 
when it upholds effective institutions within a particular territory. His theory, 
however, is able to address the German case by suggesting that the freedom of 
association of the German people overcomes their duty to respect legitimate 
institutions. However, Wellman’s freedom of association theory fails to explain why 
the USA shouldn’t be allowed to keep control of the German territory. The German 
people, in this case, would still be able to seek satisfaction of their freedom of 
association elsewhere – on unoccupied land or on territories ruled by an unjust state.  
For Wellman, Ypi, and Buchanan, the presence of a community in a particular 
territory is an arbitrary fact. This, however, does not establish any normative tie 
between the group and the land. If territorial control of a particular land is arbitrary 
and contingent, it is unclear why the seceding group has a right to establish new 
institutions in the territory it occupies. These theories are in need of a principle that 
associates a group’s presence in a territory with its right to rule that land. 
For Stilz and Nine, on the other hand, sub-groups may permissibly secede from just 
states. Their accounts also explains how a group’s presence in a particular territory is 
tied to that group’s territorial rights: when a group is located somewhere it comes to 
be attached to that particular territory, and this grounds some rights of use and 
occupancy. For both theories, attachment to particular territories can be justified on 
pre-institutional grounds. Pre-institutional attachment is grounded on the presence 
of the group’s members in a particular territory and explains why the group has a 
freedom to occupy and use that territory once it can also reject the existing 
institutions. 34  For Stilz, individuals have pre-institutional occupancy rights on a 
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territory given that their residence there is necessary to pursue their life plans.35 For 
Nine, a group has ownership rights on a land on the basis of a special relation with 
that territory, which is essential for its collective self-determination.36  
In both accounts, attachment does not provide the ground for territorial jurisdiction, 
but it merely establishes that some individuals or groups have rights to use and 
occupy certain territories. It follows, they argue, that a group that has territorial 
jurisdiction can exert such powers on a particular territory if it has a right to occupy 
and use precisely that territory. Territorial jurisdiction, on the other hand, is acquired 
on the basis of the group’s demonstrated ability to establish just institutions.37 This 
approach, however, cannot provide a conclusive justification of the group’s territorial 
jurisdiction against the same title of the state from which it has separated. The 
former may in fact display both the ability to establish just institutions and some 
form of attachment to the contested territory.  
If the state from which the group has seceded also upholds just institutions, it still 
holds territorial jurisdiction there. Moreover, it is likely that the non-seceding 
individuals belonging to the original state – actively engaging with the contested 
territory – may still display a significant attachment to the territory contested, and 
thus they may contend that they have a right to exert territorial jurisdiction there. 
The non-seceding community likely relies on that territory to exercise its right to self-
determination, and its members also likely rely on that territory for the pursuit of 
their life plans. If this were the case, attachment would not constitute a determining 
element in favor of the seceding community’s interests in the contested territory.  
Consider again the case of Veneto. Italy upholds just institutions and relies on the 
exploitation of natural gas found outside the coast of Veneto. The whole Italian 
community has exercised its self-determination by actively participating in the 
international natural gas extraction sector. Moreover, the members of the other 
Italian regions have built industries and businesses – also within the contested 
territory – in support of the natural gas exploitation activity in Veneto, thus relying 
on resources found there for their individual life plans. In addition to the natural 
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resources, Veneto is the location of important historical sites and hosts Venezia, 
which is considered by Italians one of its trademarks and a significant touristic 
attraction. 
Veneto’s ability to uphold just institutions is matched by the same ability of the 
government of the Italian Republic. Moreover, Italians display some attachment to 
the Venetian territory as well, challenging Venetians’ claim against Italians using their 
territory without permission. Even if one were to argue that Veneto displayed the 
deepest form of attachment to the territory it occupies, this would merely establish 
that the Venetians have a claim that their resource rights within the territory of 
Veneto are respected. However, such an argument would not affect the grounds of 
the Venetians’ right to territorial jurisdiction there, which depends only on their 
ability to establish just institutions. 
A pre-institutional account of territorial jurisdiction is needed to establish the group’s 
claim against the existing state using its territory without the group’s permission, and 
the group’s immunity against the state’s territorial jurisdiction. Direct theories 
provide such an account by grounding the group’s territorial jurisdiction on its 
attachment to a particular territory. In this way they are able to settle unequivocally 
that the group’s jurisdiction regarding the territory it occupies overcomes the existing 
state’s freedom to use it. Once this priority is settled, a direct theory needs only to 
stipulate the constraints on the group’s right to secede.  
 
3 Direct Theories 
 
In this chapter, I concentrate in particular on Simmons’ direct theory because with it 
LBC shares the idea that an agent acquires territorial jurisdiction on the basis of 
individuals’ right to self-government. Even if Simmons’ account is individualist and 
LBC is collectivist, the similarity between the two arguments grants a closer look at 
the individualistic Lockean theory. Before I do that, however, I wish to address some 
limitations that the collectivist and statist direct theories have in tackling the issue of 
secession. 





The utilitarian statist direct theory rejects unilateral secession if the group wishes to 
secede from a state that effectively performs its functions of upholding order and 
achieves the aggregate happiness of its subjects. In Chapter 4, section 2.1, I discuss 
the limitations of this account. In particular with regards to secession, the utilitarian 
theory is not able to address the particularity requirement, leaving unanswered the 
issue of why the existing state has a right to control the particular territory under its 
jurisdiction, and why it is able to establish robust rights there at the expenses of 
subgroups with aspirations of independence. Moreover, the theory is afflicted by the 
charges of ethnocentrism, allowing only one type of political organization to assert 
territorial jurisdiction regarding territory and resources, regardless of the many 
complex ways in which territory may be important for the achievement of 
individuals’ happiness.  
Collectivist theories are more successful in addressing the issue of ethnocentrism, 
with the exception of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism, in fact, relies on an 
unconvincing description of the group as a homogeneous national community, 
which seldom reflects the nature of existing political groups. As a result, the focus on 
national communities limits the application of the theory only to some groups 
excluding others that may present the same attachment to the particular territory at 
issue. The liberal nationalist account of territorial rights thus suffers from what 
Simmons calls the problem of ‘trapped minorities:’ those who are not included in the 
majority national group are ultimately left with no jurisdictional powers on the 
territory with which they also have established a meaningful relation. This gives some 
groups an unjustified advantage over others.38 
On the other hand, the self-determination theory and the plenitude theory provide a 
version of the collectivist direct theory that is able to address both the in rem problem 
and the particularity requirement, and do not suffer from the charges of 
ethnocentrism. According to both accounts, groups acquire territorial jurisdiction on 
the territory that they occupy on the basis of their right to self-determination. Kolers 
in particular suggests that groups that share a social ontology regarding land and a 
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pattern of land use are worthy of territorial rights. The openness of the theory 
towards different ways to understand and value territory makes it particularly 
sensitive to the issue of ethnocentrism, and one would expect that Kolers would 
support the view that communities that can hold territorial rights have a right to 
secede even from just states. 
On the contrary, Kolers argues that unilateral separation from an existing state may 
be permissible only if the seceding group does not pursue illiberal and unjust values. 
For example, he argues that the separation of the northern Italian regions is 
impermissible given the nationalist rhetoric and their wish to escape their obligations 
towards fellow Italians.39 However, if the problem of unilateral secession is the 
possibility of escaping one’s obligations, then one may argue that the northern Italian 
regions may permissibly secede if and only if they continue to maintain their special 
obligations towards Italians. The contrast between the expected acceptance of a right 
to secede from the plenitude theory and the rejection of secessions from just states 
from Kolers, I believe, rests on the problem discussed in Chapter 4, section 3.2, 
regarding the identification of the holder of territorial jurisdiction. What matters for 
Kolers is not that the existing state is just, but that the communities that wish to 
separate do not belong to the same system of plenitude, and thus that they do not 
share the same social ontology and the same land use patterns. In this way Kolers 
wishes to avoid cases of secession between communities that are significantly similar 
and whose members share strong reciprocal obligations.  
However, social ontology and land use patterns may at times conflict, and in those 
cases Kolers does not indicate which factor should take priority in determining the 
right holder. In the case of the northern regions of Italy, the use patterns are 
consistent with those of the rest of Italy, making the group entangled with the system 
of norms that the Italian Republic upholds, and thus also corroborating the existence 
of a relationship of mutual support between the two groups. Considering the land 
use patterns, then, the northern Italian regions and Italy do not sufficiently differ and 
they constitute a unitary system of plenitude. On this ground, the Italian Republic 
could demand that its territorial jurisdiction is not endangered. On the other hand, 
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the social ontology of, for example, the members of Trentino Alto Adige is 
significantly different from the social ontology upheld by the Italian Republic, 
including their language and the allegiance to the Germanic culture that was in the 
recent past consistently frustrated by attempts of Italianization of the area. 
The self-determination theory proposes a less restrictive account of secession, as 
expected given its commitment to respect communities’ right to self-determination 
and their specific territorial demands. However, the determination of the extent of a 
community’s territorial rights is left to the community’s own understanding of what 
it means for it to be self-determined. Moore offers no limiting principle to the 
demands of the community with exception of the respect of others’ rights to 
subsistence.40 In the case of secession, Moore argues that the past relation between 
the seceding group and the existing state grants some duties of reciprocity in favor of 
the remaining members of the existing state.41 However, these duties of reciprocity 
are due only if the groups that are now separated were in a mutually beneficial 
relation with each other. It is not necessary that the relationship was equally 
beneficial, but it is important that because of their past relationship, “the participants 
are better off than they would have been had there been no interaction at all.”42 
It may be very difficult to assess whether Trentino Alto Adige benefitted at all from 
its forced integration to the Italian Republic and the Italianization process that it 
underwent through the 20th Century. Moore could argue that the relation between 
Italy and Trentino was at some point beneficial, but it is not easy to determine 
whether the benefit from the most recent interactions makes up for the losses that 
historically Trentino had suffered. Would Trentino have been better off if it had no 
interaction at all with Italy? It is certainly challenging to evaluate whether the most 
recent beneficial relations between the parties compensate Trentino for the cultural 
oppression and the imposition of Italian as the official language, and the opportunity 
cost of not having been part of Austria or Switzerland. Moreover, even if it were 
determined that Trentino would have been better off without any interaction with 
Italy, it still seems that its secession would demand some duties towards Italy on the 
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basis of the fact that Trentino is currently one of the richest regions in Italy, and that 
Italians rely on its prosperity for their current life plans and self-determination. It 
seems that the relevant issue with regards to secession of richer communities is not 
what kind of relation the parties had in the past, but to what extent they rely on each 
other today. 
The idea of reciprocity proposed by Moore also permits that groups seceding from 
unjust states may leave the oppressive institutions without maintaining any bonds 
with them. For the self-determination theory, then, South Sudan seceding from 
Sudan would have no duty of reciprocity towards the Sudanese people, given that the 
history of violence and oppression clearly indicates that South Sudan would have 
been better off without any interaction with Sudan. Upon secession, the new South 
Sudanese government has only duties of global justice to ensure that Sudanese have 
enough for their subsistence.43 However, the people of Sudan rely significantly for 
their life plans on the oil found within South Sudan, and given that Sudan is an 
unjust and oppressive government, it would be unfair to trickle down the 
responsibility of the atrocities committed towards South Sudanese to all the members 
of the Sudanese community. Granted that those who have committed atrocities must 
be punished for their crimes, it is unclear why the whole population would have to 
suffer for the crimes of those responsible. Focusing on institutional reciprocity may 
be acceptable if the institutions of the parties do in fact represent their people, but in 
the case of unjust states this is not true. Some duties of reciprocity at least towards 
the existing state’s members may have to be respected, in order to ensure that the 
members of the existing state do not suffer a sudden worsening of their wellbeing, 
regardless of whether interactions between the parties were positive in balance. 
In the remaining part of this section I examine in detail the individualist direct theory 
proposed by A. John Simmons. The individualist Lockean theory shares with LBC 
the idea that territorial rights are grounded on the principle of individual self-
government. As I explain in Chapters 5 and 6, the principle of self-government 
highlights the role of communities in the determination and pursuit of individuals’ 
life plans, and defines territory as one fundamental feature of individuals’ chance to 
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be project pursuers. The individualistic direct theory is not susceptible to the in rem 
problem. For Simmons, individuals acquire natural property rights and jurisdictional 
powers in the land that they occupy on the basis of the labor mixing principle. Given 
their title, they can authorize political institutions to exert territorial jurisdiction only 
within the land that they own and by consenting to their authority. No other group 
of people can authorize political institutions on their land, nor can they exert 
territorial jurisdiction if they do not hold property rights there. A group, for 
Simmons, can always secede as long as its members have a fundamental jurisdictional 
title to that particular land, and properly authorize the group’s institutions. I argue, 
however, that Simmons’ theory has one problematic implication: the theory relies on 
a system of private property rights on land the protection of which undermines the 
values that underpin it.  
To mix one’s labor with a territory is to invest the land with a specific and strategic 
role in pursuing one’s directive ends.44  Directive ends represent an individual’s 
central goals and contribute to defining the individual’s identity.45 Having a genuine 
opportunity to form and pursue directive ends is what Simmons identifies as the 
exercise of individuals’ self-government. The fundamental interest in self-
government differs from collective self-determination, which identifies a collective 
right to pursue a common goal. 
In Simmons’ theory, individuals can acquire property in virtue of the fact that they 
hold a fundamental interest in their self-government. Self-government, Simmons 
argues, requires full control over some objects: in particular, to perform our natural 
duties (e.g. perform one’s parental duties), to pursue non-obligatory ends (e.g. the 
liberty to believe and practice a religion), and to make special obligations (e.g. the 
power to enter a contract), individuals need full control over their bodies, over the 
necessary tools to perform required actions, and over the objects that they need to 
exchange with others.46 Because they are equal moral agents, individuals have an 
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equal entitlement to acquire what they need to be self-governing. For this reason, the 
acquisition of one should not radically limit others’ freedom to do the same.47 With 
this proviso, the theory establishes property rights in land that are justifiable to all.48 
As long as the appropriation of one does not limit the opportunity of others to 
appropriate enough and as good for their own self-government, the entitlement 
created by appropriation is valid against all.  
By exercising their self-government through the acquisition of property, individuals 
also acquire territorial jurisdiction over their land and the power to transfer 
jurisdictional authority to political institutions. The state’s territorial jurisdiction over 
publicly owned land can be then justified with regard to the function that public 
spaces have in allowing shared activities of its members, such as recreation and 
gathering.49 In this model, individuals can always withdraw jurisdictional powers 
from the political institutions and secede, making possible individual secession. Thus 
a group has a legitimate right to secede every time its members desire to do so, and 
regardless of the merits of the resulting institutions, provided that its members’ 
desire to secede is expressed by valid consent and that they have property rights on 
the territory they wish to control.50  
The members of the seceding group, in Simmons’ view, can assert full property 
rights on the territory at the center of their directive ends. The seceding group has, 
thus, a claim that others, including the non-seceding members, not use its territory. 
The group’s title is valid as long as the non-seceding community’s members have the 
opportunity to acquire enough and as good to be self-governing, regardless of the 
implications that secession may have for the survival and proper functioning of their 
institutions.  
If that were correct, others’ opportunity to protect their right to self-government 
may be unnecessarily curtailed. Simmons’ theory, in fact, sets no requirements for the 
group to continue cooperation with the state from which it has seceded concerning 
land and resources that are also strategically important (although perhaps not 
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essential) to the realization of the directive ends of the state’s subjects.51 Take for 
example the case of the partition of the Indus basin following the separation of India 
and Pakistan. The Indus basin provides water for Pakistan and a large area in North 
West India. Before the separation of the two countries, the basin was developed as a 
cohesive system of canals. The source of the rivers of the Indus basin is located in 
India. Following the partition of India, Pakistan could have lost its most important 
source of water, given that the water system was suddenly under the control of its 
rival.  
Following Simmons’ approach, upon separation from Pakistan, Indians would have 
had full property rights in the sources of the Indus and the irrigation system. 
Consequently, Pakistanis would have had to endure the loss of an important source 
of water and independently develop a new irrigation network. Moreover, even if 
India was found to be under a duty to compensate Pakistan for the colossal drain on 
its economic resources and the long wait for a new irrigation system, India would 
have been the legitimate owner of all the six tributaries to the Indus, effectively 
maintaining a significant advantage over its rival in the event of a military conflict. 
However, if as Simmons argues, the interest in self-government grounds rights, 
individuals should enjoy only those entitlements that are necessary for the protection 
of this fundamental interest. Self-government does indeed require a moral space 
“within which what one has is marked off as immune from predation.”52 This space, 
however, need not be equated with full control over some particular objects.53 Self-
government justifies, at best, the emergence of some of the incidents of ownership.54  
So for example, one needs to enjoy non-interference when one needs to bring one’s 
children to school, without having to enjoy full ownership of the road. Nor does one 
need to own a stage to perform a public speech. For individuals to enjoy freedom of 
speech it is sufficient that the likelihood of their freedom to speak at certain times in 
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public is sufficiently high.55 Finally, in exercising the right to make agreements, one 
needs the ability to control something that others can rely on to make agreements, 
such as something to sell, or use to produce goods, or some type of income to serve 
as payment. However, these are only incidents of full ownership rights, which need 
not appear all at once to allow individuals to make contracts. 
Since individual self-government does not necessarily ground full property rights, the 
members of the seceding group do not necessarily have full property titles in their 
land. Accordingly, the seceding group and the members of the non-seceding 
community may have some competing legitimate interests in the same territory. It 
seems in fact that sharing the control and management of the Indus water network 
with Pakistan would not have constituted a significant obstacle to the right of self-
government of the members of the Indian community. 
The inflexibility of a pre-institutional system of property rights in land is also 
apparent when one considers another problematic implication of Simmons’ theory, 
that of individual secession. Proponents of individualist Lockean theories of 
territorial rights accept that individuals are allowed to secede separately from others 
in virtue of their property rights on land. To mitigate this troubling implication they 
suggest that it would be inconvenient for individuals to exercise their right to 
individual secession, and that for this reason this would never be a significant 
problem. 56  Although this may be true, individuals continue to hold exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction within their legitimately-owned land that allows them to secede 
with it, regardless of fact that losing control of the seceding individual’s land could 
compromise the correct functioning of the parent state’s institutions. 57  This 
contributes to show that direct theory advocates have not successfully provided a set 
of appropriate constraints on the right to secede.  
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Consider, for example, the case of the separation between Wallonia and Flanders. 
For the individualist Lockean theory, either one group may unilaterally secede, and 
the individuals owning property in Brussels may move that property and its resources 
under the new established institutions. However, this would constitute a considerable 
loss for the other group, given that both Wallonia and Flanders rely on Brussels for 
most their economic activity. In this case, even if both groups have a right to 
unilaterally secede, secession would endanger irreparably the existing political 
institutions on which individuals rely for their life plans, thus threatening their self-
government. 
Finally, ownership on a piece of land is neither necessary nor sufficient to bestow 
upon the titleholder the right to secede. Consider, the case of Scotland seceding from 
the UK. Not all Scottish residents own a piece of land there. However, it would be 
odd to suggest that only landowners were entitled to choose whether Scotland 
should secede. Persons’ power to choose the political arrangements to which they are 
subject constitutes a significant protection of their interest in self-government, 
whether or not they also enjoy ownership in the land that they occupy. Moreover, it 
would be equally odd to suggest that those who own land in Scotland can participate 
in the referendum on Scottish secession, regardless of whether their political 
participation is at the center of their directive ends. Individuals, thus, do not need to 
be landowners to also have the right to secede, nor can anyone who holds property 
in land for that only reason participate in deciding the political institutions to which 
their property is subject.  
 
4 Legitimacy-Based Conventionalism 
 
Direct theories successfully explain how individuals can establish pre-institutional 
rights on a particular territory that are valid against all. For these theories groups can 
secede unilaterally when them or their members have rights to the land that they 
occupy. Direct theories have an easy time showing why a group can establish its 
institutions in the territory its members occupy, and why it has a claim that the state 
from which it has seceded does not use its territory or an immunity against the state’s 





territorial jurisdiction there. To avoid supporting implausible secessions, however, a 
direct theory needs to provide an account of the constraints to a right to secede.  
I have argued that Simmons’ proposal offers a promising theoretical framework, 
grounding territorial rights in individuals’ fundamental interest in self-government. 
However, it does not account for different degrees of interest that the parties may 
have in a contested territory, and it grounds territorial jurisdiction on an inflexible 
system of individual property rights in land that does not always succeed in 
protecting individuals’ interest in self-government. In this section, I argue that the 
interest in self-government can support a different type of territorial rights – rights 
that are better suited to handling the disputes that arise during secession. 
My proposal rests on the conventionalist theory of territorial rights constrained by a 
legitimacy threshold developed in Chapters 5 and 6. According to conventionalist 
theories, entitlements emerge on the basis of the implicit or explicit recognition of 
the regularity in the behavior of members of a population that are faced with 
recurrent situations. Individuals comply with regular schemes of behavior in virtue of 
the fact that such regularity settles a system of stable expectation. This allows them 
to make long-term plans on the basis of expected behavior from their fellow 
members of society.58 So for example, a community will settle for a system of 
entitlements that protects current possessions because the existing distribution of 
holdings is the most accessible solution to a problem of cooperation.59 Conventions 
ensure that the entitlements established by the relevant community are recognized 
among its members, and that those subject to them have acknowledged the duties 
imposed by such entitlements.60  
The conventionalist account offers a convincing story about the emergence of 
normative relations that give rise to an effective social order. The order that emerges 
from the interaction of the members of a society is also one where the nature and 
aim of social cooperation is developed, giving concrete form to the political beliefs 
shared by the members of the community. Such a system of social norms is the first 
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expression of individuals’ exercise of self-government and offers the basis for 
peaceful social relations. Individuals’ fundamental interest in developing and 
pursuing directive ends within a settled normative framework and the value of 
peaceful social relations warrant the protection of freedoms and powers regarding 
territory defined by social norms. 
A purely conventionalist system of rights is however not necessarily just.61 The cost 
of a fully conventionalist account is the complete reliance on relations of domination 
between appropriators. This, realistically, translates into the success of the 
strongest.62 The proposed account, however, differs from purely conventionalist 
theories, as it demands that a system of conventional entitlements sufficiently 
protects all individuals’ interests in being able to form and pursue directive ends for 
it to establish a community’s exclusive titles to territory. 
For LBC, conventions establish entitlements on territory that are protected by claims 
and immunities, so long as those within the system of conventional entitlements have 
a genuine opportunity to develop and pursue directive ends. In the previous chapter, 
I suggested that conventions fulfill this role if they facilitate cooperation among 
individuals towards the protection of every member’s basic interests. This requires 
that the norms that the group upholds show concern for weaker members of society. 
In a system of legitimate entitlements the benefits of cooperation should be used to 
provide relief against extreme poverty and poor health for the community’s 
members, ensuring that all members enjoy a sufficient level of wellbeing. Such a level 
may change depending on the average level of wellbeing enjoyed by the whole 
community and on the resources available to it. The system of social norms must 
tolerate individuals’ dissent and their desire to exit the association when they see fit. 
Finally, individuals should also be able to enjoy basic economic rights that will ensure 
their relative independence from each other. 
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LBC accepts that some individual property rights may be established prior to the 
establishment of social norms. Individuals may acquire property rights prior to the 
establishment of social norms, together with the jurisdictional and meta-jurisdictional 
powers to participate in determining the social norms applicable to the territory that 
they occupy. However, differently from Simmons, individuals need not acquire 
ownership in particular pieces of land to also be able to participate in the 
determination of social norms. As long as they occupy that territory, and as long as 
their presence there is central to the determination and pursuit of their directive 
ends, they hold jurisdictional powers on that territory together with their fellow 
members of society. Territorial rights are most importantly associated with the 
preservation of a stable and collective system of expectations on the basis of which 
individuals can develop and pursue their directive ends. But because of their 
collective nature, they should not be readily equated to individuals’ property rights, 
which instead are associated with a fair distribution of resources among the members 
of a community.  
The legitimacy threshold establishes minimal requirements that conventions protect 
all members’ interests in developing and pursuing their directive ends. For this 
account, thus, communities are able to unilaterally establish jurisdictional and 
ownership rights on territory without the reliance on political institutions. For 
example, consider the case of Kurdistan. Within the borders of this geo-cultural 
region, a largely homogeneous community regulates its social practices with some 
independence from Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq – the existing governments that 
enjoy internationally recognized sovereignty over Kurdistan. Kurdish people, 
different from their neighbors, for the most part uphold the separation between 
religion and state and have incorporated some western practices in their life. Women 
and men share family roles, women can study and work, and Kurds often uphold 
practices that are forbidden for example in Iraq among the Sunni, like that of 
decorating their body with permanent tattoos. 
After the 2003 war in Iraq, most of the areas in Kurdistan that were once under the 
control of Iraq have also developed independent systems of organization that led the 
region to a peaceful recovery and to programs of education, urban planning, and 





infrastructure.63 The social cooperation that emerged after the war displayed some 
concern for the weaker parts of society by providing help and assistance to those 
deprived of jobs, and opportunities for education.64 Such arrangements offer an 
example of how a community can successfully develop legitimate norms that entitle 
its members to some robust territorial rights in the areas that they have occupied, 
allowing them to secede and to establish new political institutions. The case of 
Kurdistan also shows that these communities may acquire territorial jurisdiction and 
resource rights regardless of the poverty that vexes them and the threats of political 
instability and war from neighboring countries. 
However, their rights against others using their territory is justified only to the extent 
that such rights are needed to establish and sustain legitimate conventions. If the 
community upholds social norms that are not legitimate, it holds only freedoms and 
powers to use and manage the territory, but not also a claim that others do not 
control and use the territory without its permission or an immunity against others’ 
competing powers. Rights regarding a particular territory, then, are valid against all if 
they are determined by conventions that meet the threshold of legitimacy. 
Additionally, they are exclusive only to the extent that their exclusiveness is needed 
for the protection of the interest in self-government of the group’s members. This 
means that a community has a claim against others using its territory only to the 
extent that others’ freedom to use their territory is a threat to the preservation of the 
conventions’ minimal standards of legitimacy. 
Imagine Turkey decides to cooperate with the Kurdish regional government to 
control the borders with Syria in the attempt to pacify the area to protect Turkish 
citizens residing in the neighboring territories. Imagine that Turkey accords refugees 
from Syria rights to settle in the area of Kurdistan within Turkish borders in an 
attempt to weakening the Islamic state by supporting its opponents. Imagine also 
that Turkey’s involvement in the area has the opposite effect of empowering the 
Islamic State, which is able to smuggle Islamic State sympathizers in Kurdistan and 
weaken the Kurdish resistance. In this case, Turkey’s exercise of territorial 
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jurisdiction within the Kurdish territory has the effect of heavily disrupting the 
existing system of social relations in Kurdistan, as well as working against the local 
system of resistance against neighboring threats of war and invasion. This has the 
effect of reducing Kurdistan’s chances of sustaining a legitimate system of social 
norms. In this example, the Kurdish government that upholds legitimate social 
norms has a claim that Turkey does not exert territorial jurisdiction within the 
territory of Kurdistan and does not take control of its borders. 
However, others’ interference with the community’s territorial rights may not be so 
disruptive. If such interference is not a threat to the legitimacy of the community’s 
conventions, the community has no claim against outsiders using its territory, or 
immunity against others exerting territorial jurisdiction there. For example, if 
Turkey’s control of the border between Kurdistan and Syria does not provoke 
disruptive consequences, Turkey is free to conduct its activities to achieve the 
pacification of the area and to contribute to resolving the refugee crisis. If that is the 
case, the weight of Turkish people’s right to use and control the Kurdish territory 
will correspond to the importance of their interest in that particular territory.  
Such competing interests are the ground of competing powers liberties to control 
and use the contested territory. This can lead to one or more groups having a 
freedom to use and benefit from the same territory, as well as possible competing 
powers to modify and dispose of its resources.65 Conflicts that may arise from such 
situations will have to be addressed with an adequate system of adjudication and 
coordination. 
In the case of secession, the interest of the previous members of society is of 
particular importance in the determination of the groups’ territorial rights. In fact, it 
is more than likely that the members of the previous society had significantly relied 
on the enjoyment of the (now) contested territory for the development and pursuit 
of their directive ends. Given the reliance on that particular territory, it is also likely 
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that the members of the previous community may effectively protect their interest in 
self-government only with the control and use of the territory now contested. In this 
case, the parties must acknowledge the presence of conflicting and legitimate 
interests in the same territory. 66  I suggest that the reconciliation of competing 
legitimate liberties on the same geographical area demands that the parties 
acknowledge a duty to compromise to achieve a mutually satisfactory balance 
regarding the protection of their interests. 
The duty to compromise is grounded on the parties’ equal moral standing in so far as 
they uphold legitimate conventions. The parties ought to ensure that stability of 
expectations and peace are restored, and that the arrangements regarding territorial 
rights arising from secession respect the interest in self-government of both groups’ 
members.67 Given that their interests are incompatible but also equally legitimate, the 
parties must reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with regards to their rights to 
the contested territory, though retaining the unilateral right to establish their 
preferred political institutions.  
 
5 Compromise and Secession 
 
Conventions establish the right of the seceding group to acquire territorial 
jurisdiction regarding the territory it occupies in virtue of the protection of its 
members’ interest in self-government. The group’s right to secede, thus, is grounded 
on its members’ right to pursue their life plans by participating in the determination 
of their preferred social norms. However, the group can acquire a claim against 
others using and controlling its territory and an immunity against the existing state’s 
powers over the same territory only to the extent that the social norms that it 
upholds are legitimate. In particular, the seceding group can demand that the 
members of the state from which it has separated do not use and control its territory 
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only to the extent that this is necessary for the protection of the legitimacy of its 
conventions. This limitation ensures that secession does not necessarily entail a 
radical worsening of the wellbeing of the non-seceding community by completely 
excluding its members from the enjoyment of the contested territory. 
If the parties’ shared enjoyment of the contested territory does not endanger the 
legitimacy of either group’s conventions, they can only assert a freedom to use it, and 
overlapping jurisdictional powers over it. This amounts to a liberty that is not 
protected by a claim that others do not use the contested territory and a power that is 
not protected by an immunity against competing and overlapping powers on the 
same territory. Because of their past relations, it is likely that the two parties have 
freedoms and powers that conflict, given that they have been using and controlling 
the same territory until secession. In a situation of conflicting titles that are, 
presumably, similarly important, the parties owe each other a duty to compromise to 
determine arrangements that ought to achieve a balancing of interests.  
So for example in the case of Veneto that wishes to secede from the Italian Republic, 
Veneto has a right to secede unilaterally on the basis of its social norms that support 
a system of beneficial social cooperation. In so far as the Venetian system of social 
norms is able to maintain a sufficient standard of legitimacy, Veneto can take 
exclusive control of its territory, establishing there political institutions that, for 
example, allow it to tax property and make decisions regarding solutions to the issue 
of the sinking city of Venice. However, because its natural resources and the city of 
Venice are included in the Italian social norms, and because Italy has relied on these 
for its prosperity, Veneto may not unilaterally sever ties with Italy regarding such 
important territorial holdings. Given that Italy has some territorial rights on Veneto’s 
land and resources, the two parties will have to achieve a mutually beneficial 
agreement and probably continue cooperating. 
The system of conventions also allows us to identify the relevant territory that the 
seceding group can assert as its own, that is the territory on which the system of 
conventions impinges. This account does not lead to the problematic implication of 
individual secession. Social norms may determine individual private property rights 
on land, given that individuals within a group may develop a system of allocation that 
relies on the private allotment of land. However, such entitlements are exclusive only 





because they are embedded in recognized normative practices, which rely on a wide 
network of legitimate normative relations that protect all individuals’ interest in 
forming and pursuing directive ends. A separate individual may not isolate from such 
a system of legitimate expectations, taking territory with him, without also losing the 
moral grounds for his exclusive right to property in that particular land.  
Moreover, regardless of whether they have ownership rights on the land that they 
occupy, individuals retain jurisdictional powers to establish and participate in the 
determination of social norms. Thus, a group of individuals may secede even if 
others have property rights within the territory that the seceding group occupies. So 
far as Scotland upholds legitimate social norms, its residents may hold exclusive 
territorial rights even if they reside on land owned by English citizens residing in 
London. In this example, the English landowners would retain property rights on 
their land in Scotland but would have to accept that upon secession the Scottish 
government will have jurisdictional powers regarding, for example, the taxation of 
their property. 
Secession is chiefly an institutional change and it is not sufficient to indicate the 
grounds of a right to secede. A theory of secession should also indicate the relation 
between the right to secede that a people has, the institutions that this population 
entrusts with exerting territorial jurisdiction on its territory, and the interconnection 
of these institutions with the wider system of international relations. The proposed 
theory  shares with Simmons’ the idea that political institutions can exert territorial 
jurisdiction if their subjects consent to their authority. Consent has to be suitably 
expressed or implicated by some of the consenters’ actions.68 Individuals ought to be 
able to express their consent to political institutions to legitimately exert jurisdictional 
authority. For consent to be a legitimate source of political authority, individuals 
ought to be able to give their consent intentionally and voluntarily.69 For this to 
happen, at least three conditions must be met: (1) people must be able to know in 
general terms the situation and the consequences of their consent to the new 
institutions; (2) the expression of dissent must not be too costly; and (3) the 
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consenting individual must be to a certain degree independent from the political 
institutions, to the extent that she can form her ideas independently from 
manipulation from the political institutions.70 
It is not necessary that consent is given unanimously to the new institutions. The 
appropriate number of members whose consent is required to establish new political 
institutions will likely be determined by the type of political participation that the two 
communities see fit in the determination of major institutional changes. However, 
given that such a political decision has widespread implications on the lives of most 
members of society, it is likely that the widest participation possible would be the 
most appropriate. Because unanimity is not required to support political institutions, 
some individuals might be part of the seceding community even if they do not 
participate actively in the political act of secession. It is likely that talks of secession 
might inspire discontent with existing institutions, but that these might not translate 
into an explicit consent for the new institutions. Moreover, it is likely that large parts 
of the population, dispersed away from the political centers, might not be interested 
in participating or supporting the secession. Some people might, then, end up being 
subsumed within a new political authority by the decisions of a particularly active 
majority. According to this view, groups of people uninterested in political 
participation continue to have some political obligations. They owe political 
obligations to the state that, by territorial extension, has acquired and imposed 
control of the land that they occupy on the basis of the fact that it represents the 
existing system of social norms upheld there. 
In particular, people who have acquiesced to the secession and who have not 
expressed their discontent with the seceding group’s activity are assumed to have 
tacitly consented to the new institutions. This is true, however, only if some 
conditions apply. Silence of a person constitutes tacit consent only when five 
conditions apply: (1) it must be clear that the situation requires consent and the 
individual must be aware of what is happening; (2) people must be given a reasonable 
period of time when they can object or express their dissent, and this period must be 
known to the person; (3) it must be clear that the time in (2) is coming to an end; (4) 
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the means to express dissent must be accessible to all; and (5) the consequence of 
dissent ought not be extremely detrimental.71 A state that can legitimately and, to a 
significant extent, exclusively exert authority upon its subjects can only be one that 
allows its subjects to form their ideas about the state’s activities with sufficient 
independence. This effectively requires minimal civil liberties and political rights. So, 
for example, citizens must be able to access information about the state’s activities 
and be able to participate in these activities (and dissent) without risk of suffering 
great costs in their life and wellbeing.72 These requirements constitute the ground of 
territorial jurisdiction of the newly established political institutions and the basis for 
the international recognition of the newly established institutions. 
It is important at this point to remind the reader that the requirements for the 
legitimate exercise of territorial jurisdiction and resource rights are less demanding 
than the requirements that must be fulfilled by a community for it to be considered 
fully sovereign. As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, sovereignty is a 
complex array of entitlements the appropriateness of which must be assessed 
independently. Here I have offered only the set of requirements that ensure that the 
exercise of jurisdiction on a territory and its resources is legitimate, but the 
fulfillment of these requirements may not tell us also whether the exercise of more 
extensive political authority is also legitimate. 
I have suggested that, if the conventions are legitimate, a group has a claim that the 
state from which it has seceded not use its territory and an immunity against its 
territorial jurisdiction only to the extent that such claims and immunities are 
necessary for its members to have a genuine opportunity to form and pursue 
directive ends. If exclusion is unjustified, the seceding group acquires only freedoms 
to use and manage the territory it occupies and unprotected powers to control it. The 
group’s liberty-right to exclude others from its territory may be challenged, then, on 
the basis of the protection of the legitimate interests of the members of the non-
seceding community that are important but not essential to their own self-
government. 
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A duty to compromise requires that both parties recognize their mutual legitimate 
interest in the contested territory, and that they find agreement regarding the division 
of territorial holdings. This requires that the parties enter in what may result in a long 
process of communication and conciliation on the basis of mutual respect.73 The goal 
of such a process must be that of advancing the parties’ interests equally.74 As I 
discuss in Chapter 6, the duty to compromise is a duty of global justice, but it is likely 
to be more demanding for seceding parties given the permanence of relevant and 
conflicting interests in the once-shared territory.  
The duty to compromise may lead the parties to set up systems of adjudication and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. In the example proposed earlier, a commitment to 
balancing interests would imply that India and Pakistan negotiate the fate of the 
irrigation system of the Indus basin. The negotiation should take into consideration 
the cost of the development of a new water system, and the political risk of allowing 
one party of a conflict to keep full control of an important resource. The 
compromise may result in something like the Indus Water Treaty, the result of a long 
process of peaceful negotiations supervised by a third party arbitrator (in this case 
the World Bank).  
The treaty considered the water source to be of interest to both parties equally and 
allocated to the two countries’ control over three tributaries of the Indus each. These 
rivers are located on Indian soil; nevertheless, the compromise was brought about 
with the premise that the rivers were not owned by India, but were instead objects of 
shared ownership, given their importance for Pakistan. Moreover, the treaty 
established a permanent commission to tackle the process of cooperation that the 
two countries on the verge of war had to undergo. Since the treaty, the two countries 
engaged in two wars, neither of which had to do with the issue of water. 
When the costs that the existing state may incur are exceptionally high, the members 
of the seceding group may also have to moderate their aspirations for independence 
by giving up some of their demands. After all, the non-seceding individuals have a 
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fundamental interest in self-government that is equal to that of the seceding ones. 
The protection of such interest grounds their right to establish their institutions in 
the land that they own. However, as long as this interest is protected, the seceding 
group and the state from which it has separated have merely competing liberty-rights 
to the control and use of the contested territory. Thus, neither group’s political 
institutions may acquire absolute priority over the other. Accordingly, secession 
ought not to be an impediment to the survival of the existing state, nor should it be 
significantly burdensome for its institutions, provided that they are properly 
authorized. Thus, in some cases, the protection of the existing state’s legitimate 
institutions may require that a group renounces secession altogether and seeks 
alternative ways to fulfill its ambitions of independence. In particular, if secession 
endangers the institutions of the existing state, the seceding group might have to 
ensure continued cooperation with it to ensure the provision of basic goods and 
services.  
The group might be required to allow the state to which it belongs partial 
entitlements on its territory for the effective implementation of its functions, by for 
example resorting to federalism. These functions include the provision of basic 
goods and services, the ability to adjudicate between disputes and to enforce the law, 
and the effective coordination of all the central functions of its institutions. For 
example, Brussels is the economic center of both Wallonia and Flanders. If any of 
the two countries were to achieve independence and take control of Brussels, then 
the other would lose the economic means to be viable. The only option in this case is 
a multinational federalism.75 
Finally, if the state does not fulfill the requirements of legitimacy, the seceding party 
has no duty to ensure their proper functioning. It does, however, have some special 
duty towards the members of the non-seceding community. The separation should 
not constitute a sudden and radical worsening of the chances that the non-seceding 
individuals have to achieve self-government. In particular, the seceding party ought 
to continue honoring the contractual duties that emerge from economic activities 
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across the newly established borders. There are two ways in which secession may 
worsen the wellbeing of the original community. First, secession may erode the 
chances that the original community may have to uphold legitimate norms. So, for 
example, if secession affects negatively the original community by reducing its 
chances to successfully meet the basic needs, or protect its members’ freedom of 
association, then the right of the seceding group to separate may be curtailed.  
The second preoccupation has to do with the fact that a sudden worsening of 
wellbeing may have negative effects on social cohesion, even if the original 
community is relatively well off and meets the requirements of legitimacy. In this 
case, secession may have to be gradual to reduce the possible disruptive 
consequences of a sudden worsening of the wellbeing of the members of the existing 
state. So for example, the secession of South Sudan in 2011 created duties on the two 
parties to continue cooperation with regards to sharing (at least temporarily) oil 
revenues, as well as sharing pipelines for the transportation of the South Sudanese oil 
through Sudanese oil pipes. This cooperation was warranted in virtue of oil’s 
strategic importance for the Sudanese economy and its people’s wellbeing. The heavy 
reliance of South Sudanese and Sudanese economies on oil revenues required the 
prioritization of such negotiation.76  
The situation resulting from compromise might come in the form of economic 
settlements to finalize complete independence, by ensuring economic cooperation 
for a reasonable length of time, so that the non-seceding individuals’ wellbeing is not 
radically worsened by the separation. After a period of adjustment, the group and the 
non-seceding community achieve the status of independent communities, and the 
two groups owe to each other obligations equal to those they owe to any other 
group. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 
1 The Thesis 
  
With this thesis I hope to have achieved two goals: first, to have made some order 
within the growing literature on territorial rights, and second, to have given one 
alternative approach that successfully addresses the complications emerging from 
existing theories of territorial rights. I have proposed an account that draws in the 
strongest arguments provided by the authors that have engaged with the issue of 
territorial rights until now. Most of the existing literature shares the intuition that 
territorial rights are in some important sense accorded to protect individuals’ most 
fundamental interests in developing and pursuing their separate and collective goals. 
My proposal also appeals to this principle and makes it the central focus of a theory 
of territorial rights. 
In Chapter 2 I have used the Hohfeldian analysis of rights to show that exclusive 
resource rights and powers over territory comprise of different normative incidents 
that are grounded on different moral concerns. For LBC, groups acquire freedoms 
and powers to use and control a territory if these are determined by the located social 
norms that they uphold. In Chapter 5 I have argued that social norms, regardless of 
their conformity to principles of legitimacy, protect individuals self-government by 
maintaining peace, establishing the grounds for stability of expectations, and offering 
individuals access to systems of values. However, these freedoms and powers are 
exclusive only if they are protected respectively by claims and immunities. In Chapter 
6 I have offered the grounds of these protective normative incidents and suggested 
that social norms must be legitimate if they are to ground exclusive titles to territory.  
Distinguishing between freedoms and claims, and powers and immunities allows for 
a more nuanced view of territorial demands and their permissibility. The 
combination of a conventionalist theory grounding freedoms and powers, and the 
concept of legitimacy grounding protective claims and immunities allows LBC to 
overcome the complications found in the literature. Because a group acquires 
territorial jurisdiction on the basis of its social norms, LBC does not suffer from the 





in rem problem as only the group that occupies a certain territory may legitimately 
exert territorial jurisdiction there. Moreover, because social norms regarding territory 
and resources necessarily impinge on some particular geographical location, the 
conventionalist theory also fulfills the particularity requirement. Finally, by employing 
a conventionalist theory of rights on territory, LBC has the advantage of not needing 
a theory of original acquisition.  
However, these titles are limited in so far as and to the extent that they meet some 
requirements of legitimacy. I have argued that the threshold of legitimacy is a 
minimal and negative standard of critical evaluation of the existing social norms of a 
community. This ensures that communities’ territorial rights represent as far as 
possible the special interests and narratives regarding their attachment to territory 
making the proposal less likely to be subject to the charge of ethnocentrism and 
ensures its wide applicability. Because titles on territory are exclusive only to the 
extent that they are necessary to maintain legitimate social norms, and because the 
threshold protects minimal requirements of legitimacy, the theory is well equipped to 
respond to our intuitions that territorial holdings should be limited by the demands 
of global justice.  
In Chapter 7 I have applied my proposal to the issue of secession. I have suggested 
that a group can secede if it has powers and freedoms with regards to the territory 
that its members occupy, and that it can claim exclusive jurisdiction over its territory 
and exclusive resource rights if its practices are legitimate. Since the threshold of 
legitimacy is likely to ground very limited exclusive rights, the parties to a secession 
are likely to be left with competing and overlapping freedoms and powers on the 
same territory and resources that are grounded on their located social norms. With 
regards to conflicts arising from overlapping freedoms and powers, the parties have a 
duty to compromise and find a mutually beneficial agreement. 
I have only mentioned briefly in Chapter 7 the institutional component of secession. 
I have not examined it further because the aim of the chapter is to discuss the 
implications of LBC for a theory of the right to secede, and to show how 
compromise should look like in cases of overlapping and conflicting important 
interests. However, here I would like to expand briefly on the idea that a theory of 
secession must not only be concerned with establishing who has the right to 





unilaterally secede, but also with addressing the nature of the institutional change 
demanded by state breaking within the wider institutional setting of the international 
community. I mention in Chapter 7, section 5, that political institutions emerging 
from secession ought to be authorized by their subjects. I suggest that the 
community’s consent to the new institutions forms the basis for the international 
recognition of the new political group. The day of the declaration of independence, 
and the day in which the new political institutions acquire the support of their 
population, determines the birth of the new state in the eyes of the international 
community. 
International recognition is at the moment chiefly accorded on the basis of de facto 
control of a territory and a population. However, I believe the international 
community should shift its focus on the accountability of the new institutions 
towards their subjects and towards the parties with which they engage in 
international relations. Although territorial jurisdiction is grounded on conventions, 
and is somewhat independent from the consent of its members, political institutions 
that act as representatives of the community in the wider context of international 
relations must acquire the consent of those that they represent. The consent of those 
subject to political institutions that engage in international relations is essential in the 
process of international recognition because political institutions that have a wide 
effect on large populations should be subject to more substantial scrutiny. The more 
complex the institutions and the more technical their powers are, the more they 
should be exposed to the review of their subjects, and the more they should be 
accountable for ensuring that tacit consent is given in the most appropriate 
conditions. Moreover, it is harder to evaluate the effects that the decisions of large 
institutions have on a population than it is to evaluate the effect of smaller political 
associations and groups, such as for example the head of an Amish community or 
the decision of a Maori tribe chief. The complexity of the relations between 
institutions and the lives of their subjects should be reflected in a review process that 
must include some indicator of individuals’ preferences regarding those who hold 
power over them and, for the purpose of this thesis, regarding their territory. 
 





2 Key Ideas 
 
There are three ideas with which I engage throughout this work and that perhaps 
constitute its deeper message. It is difficult to say if these ideas informed the thesis 
from the start of this project or if they emerged as a product of the work done until 
now. However, in making them explicit here I hope to clarify the basic outlook that I 
think is proper to have with regards to territorial disputes and international relations, 
and the role that rights have in this debate.  
The first idea is that territory is not the only and central object of global relations, 
self-determination, and political authority. Because of the centrality of the territorial 
nation states in modern political thought, it may seem that territorial control is a 
central and ineliminable aspect of political authority and international relations. 
However, many actors that are not properly territorial participate in international 
relations and the regulations of central issues, such as trade and the protection of 
human rights among others. I am thinking of international professional associations, 
non-governmental organizations, research institutions, and international arbitration 
tribunals, which participate to shape significantly the nature of international practice 
and the standards to which nations and subgroups should abide. Through these 
transnational institutions individuals have gained a central role in the process of 
accountability of nation states and international associations, which has brought 
these bodies back to the attention of the global public opinion.  
Because territorial jurisdiction is not the only way a community may exert political 
authority, it should constitute only part of our concerns with regard to global 
obligations and the limits of jurisdiction over people. I do not believe that the 
territorial nation state is outdated in any relevant sense. But it is an institution that is 
constantly changing, and other structures are emerging within it and above it. When 
discussing international issues, then, we should make sure we are attentive to the 
complex power relations between different international agents, whether they are 
territorial or not, and look past and inside the nation state to address the moral 
principles guiding these alternative structures as well. If we accept that territorial 
rights do not make the whole of agents’ political authority over people, then it will be 
clearer why in this work I have tried to separate the demands over territory from 





wider demands of authority over people. The latter require that we examine 
territorial rights, but also and most importantly the reciprocal obligations that 
individuals have and under what conditions they may be permitted to coerce each 
other through the exercise of political authority. 
The second idea that I believe is at the core of this work is a particular conception of 
legitimacy. I place legitimacy at the basis of the demands for exclusive titles to a 
particular territory or resource. The idea of legitimacy that I propose is a substantial 
rather than procedural concept, and the fulfillment of its requirements must be 
evaluated with regards to how well social norms achieve the aim that legitimacy 
protects. The requirements of legitimacy proposed are not only minimal, but they 
also must be understood as making up for a composite account of legitimacy that 
may be achieved in many different ways. This ensures that communities and their 
members are able as freely as possible to express the ways in which they think their 
most fundamental interests and values should be protected. I have suggested also 
that the legitimacy of some community’s social norms will depend significantly on 
the system of legitimate communities within which it is embedded. Earlier I gave the 
example of the Amish community that meets the threshold of legitimacy because it is 
placed within the larger community of the United States, and because it accepts that 
its people may chose to renounce their role as members of the Amish and join the 
larger American community. Members of the Amish community may leave their 
community at great costs, such as losing the support of their family. However, by 
making this freedom available to their members, the Amish community ensures that 
the strict requirements that it imposes on membership are counterbalanced by the 
freedom of individuals to reject them and to join an alternative and sufficiently 
legitimate community. 
Evaluating the legitimacy of a community’s social norms by taking into consideration 
its interdependent features with the standards of legitimacy of other communities 
incentivizes groups to uphold practices of open borders and intergroup cooperation. 
In fact, if groups participate in a system of legitimate and open communities, they 
can ensure that they will have the widest discretion with regards to the requirements 
for internal membership. The interconnection of the legitimacy of social norms with 
the system of legitimate communities may further global cooperation, may offer 





individuals a diverse array of opportunities to pursue their life plans and widen their 
options, and ultimately may contribute to furthering a culture of toleration and free 
circulation of ideas. 
The third key message that I want to clarify is that communities’ territorial rights 
should be considered fluid and subject to change when the circumstances affecting 
the use and the availability of land and resources also change. I have employed a 
conventional theory of territorial rights and argued that conventions may not 
establish any exclusive title to territory without also meeting a legitimacy threshold. I 
find a theory that leaves little space for extensive exclusive rights to territory 
appealing because the assertion of claims and immunities can exacerbate conflicts. 
This is true especially when the parties to the dispute do not share a commitment to 
the same values and moral outlook, and thus when they demand rights on the basis 
of values and interests that the other party may not understand and accept. The fact 
that the assertion of exclusive rights may aggravate disputes is not per se a reason to 
reject exclusive rights altogether, but it is a reason to ensure that we are careful in 
dispensing them.  
Clarifying which interests have more weight than others to the extent that they 
should be protected by claims and immunities serves as a solid starting point for the 
pursuit of successful intergroup cooperation, despite the obstacles posed by 
resentment and disagreement. In Chapter 6, I argue that as long as rights sufficiently 
protect individuals’ ability to form and pursue their life plans, we may want to 
establish some claims and immunities against others’ intervention in communities’ 
affairs. The parceling of territory in exclusive holdings, however, can only be partial 
and subject to the changing circumstances regarding the use and availability of 
territory and resources. If everything goes as environmentalist studies suggest, then 
there is going to be less land for an increasing number of people. Thus, we need less 
conflict and less entrenched privileges, and more space for cooperation and 
negotiation. I believe LBC supports this idea by entrusting the international 
community with the role of providing the assistance needed for the creation and 
modification of titles to territory on the basis of continuously emerging demands for 
a more equitable distribution of territorial holdings. 
 





3 Further Developments 
 
This thesis is far from being the final word. Throughout the text I have set out ideas 
that need further analysis, and the development of which would enrich the debate 
about territorial rights in particular and global justice in general. Firstly, the idea of 
compromise can be developed further, in particular with regards to two aspects: the 
method to employ to evaluate the strength of important but competing interests, and 
the nature of the institutions that should carry on the task of mediating between 
parties in conflict. There is a growing literature on compromise and territorial rights 
and on how compromise must be distinguished from mere bargaining and 
negotiation. I believe that the theoretical debate about compromise could be 
enriched with the introduction of insights from the legal theory of the doctrine of the 
balance of interests and from the social sciences in identifying the key factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of norms in protecting individuals’ rights. 
Moreover, there is space for an analysis of the type of institutions that are 
appropriate in carrying on the task of aiding the negotiations between conflicting 
parties. In international practice there have been different actors entrusted with this 
role. For example, in the case of Pakistan and India I have discussed the World Bank 
involvement, which was accepted as the way out of the conflict by both parties 
(albeit with difficulty). Other examples are the African Union that has been entrusted 
with monitoring the consultations leading to the South Sudanese referendum and the 
post-secession negotiations. The case of South Sudan is particularly interesting also 
because the agreement between the two emerging states did not include the control 
of the region of Abyei. The group controlling the contested area is currently asserting 
independence and has sought different ways to further its aims, including recourse to 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The choice between the various agents that may 
aid negotiation is often made on the basis of convenience and expected results. A 
principled analysis of which actors should be called in assisting the achievement of a 
successful compromise would help uncover the values that compromise must 
further, and it would reduce the risk that the most powerful actors will see their 
interests protected at the expense of the weakest ones. 





In this work I have concentrated in proposing the foundation of a theory of 
territorial rights and I have examined only its implications for a theory of secession. 
However, a theory of territorial rights has something to say about at least five other 
issues that have to do to a large extent with the control and use of territory and 
resources. Further research will have to address the analysis of the implications of a 
theory of territorial right for immigration, for the rectification of historical injustice, 
for the issue of environmental refugees, for the discovery and acquisition of new 
land and resources, including the deep seas and outer space, and for a theory of 
military intervention. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I sketched the position that LBC has towards the issue of 
immigration and historical injustice. However, LBC needs to be integrated in a larger 
discourse regarding our global obligations to address these issues thoroughly. I have 
suggested that migrants should be divided in two classes, refugees and immigrants, 
and that the former have some claims that the hosting community allows them to 
flourish within its territory. The latter, instead, can assert some freedoms and powers 
with regard to important interests that it has developed within the hosting 
community’s territory, but these interests must be reconciled with the important but 
non-fundamental interests of the hosting community itself. The immigrant’s and the 
refugee’s titles must not endanger the interests of the community’s members in a 
stable and legitimate system of expectations and possessions, and for this reason they 
may not challenge individuals’ property rights there. But they may demand that the 
community integrates the migrants’ interests in the larger system of social norms that 
regulates the distribution of resources and the freedom to occupy and thrive within 
its territory. These intuitions ought to be integrated with a theory of immigration and 
of the benefits that it can have on the hosting community, including the benefits of 
an open border policy for the system of legitimate communities and international 
relations. 
I have also briefly indicated how LBC may address issues of historical injustice. For 
the conventionalist approach, territorial disputes regarding past wrongs must be 
addressed as a clash of existing interests in currently contested territories. Those who 
have lost land because of an injustice should be allowed to participate in the 
determination of new territorial rights and reach a compromise with the existing 





occupiers of their past territory, as long as traces of their past territorial rights are 
detectable. The weight of their current interests and the residual responsibility of the 
wrongdoers’ descendants will have to be taken into consideration when balancing 
existing legitimate and overlapping interests. The proposal sketched in Chapter 5 
needs to be developed, in particular with regards to the idea of residual responsibility 
of the descendants of the wrongdoers, as well as the idea of residual entitlements of 
the community that was wronged. These are not issues strictly related to territorial 
rights, and they have largely to do with the permanence of groups and their 
obligations throughout time. Admittedly, the conventionalist theory is not suited to 
provide a clear idea of the span of a group’s identity, given that conventions change 
as new members join the community and that the identity of the group changes with 
the conventions that emerge from new interactions. Addressing the issue of 
historical injustice may prove challenging for LBC, but it may also provide the 
opportunity to reconsider the classic literature on historical injustice with an 
alternative and potentially radical view. 
Finally, I believe that LBC has something to say also with regards to the issues of 
environmental refugees, military intervention, and the discovery and acquisition of 
unowned resources. I do not engage with any of these topics in this thesis, but these 
issues should be addressed before this work becomes a robust alternative to the 
existing literature, and a serious attempt at providing guidelines for sustainable 
policies and fairer international relations. In particular, it is crucial to identify the role 
that a debate on territorial rights may have in determining our decisions regarding 
how we should treat people dispossessed of their territory, what should be the 
principles that lead the acquisition and discovery of new land and resources, and 
whether we should respect the territorial holdings of oppressive and violent regimes. 
By the end of Chapter 6, I suggest that international practices must be considered 
grounding titles, just as much as local and national practices. I believe that regardless 
of the imperfection of the current system of international law and its practices, we 
have an interest, if not an obligation, to seriously consider the possible 
improvements that could be realized without disrupting the present achievements. 
Thus, the initial step towards the development of LBC will likely be a principled 





analysis of the practices and the law that are currently upheld with regards to the 
issues listed above.  
The international community has developed principles to address these three issues, 
and although the existing solutions are wanting, they offer a solid starting point 
towards the development of theoretically sound guidelines. For example, the 
protection of refugees currently is limited to ensuring the means of survival of the 
people that have suffered displacement because of the active violation of their basic 
rights from the political institutions to which they are subject. The literature has for 
the most part chosen to treat environmental refugees as belonging to the class of 
political refugees. However, there are important differences between these two 
classes of people, not least the fact that the status of ecological refugee is not the 
consequence of the active violation of human rights from political institutions. I 
believe that an analysis of the laws on statelessness together with the international 
law principle of self-determination may lead political philosophers to consider a 
different set of territorial rights for environmental refugees. 
Similarly, international practice provides some ideas on how to address the discovery 
and the acquisition of unowned resources. Currently, the discovery and acquisition of 
unowned resources follows at times the principle according to which the Earth is 
held in common, or the principle that holds that who discovers the resource owns it, 
or the principle for which the resources found in a territory belong to the nation of 
the people occupying that territory. There is confusion regarding which principle 
applies in which situation, but some interesting ideas can be retrieved from the way 
international practice has regulated the control of some complex issues, such as the 
open sea and the commercial air traffic. For example, the idea that resources that are 
important for everyone should be held in common has contributed significantly 
towards much of the international cooperation and the harmonization of rules 
regarding commercial air transportation. Although imperfect and tainted by power 
struggles, international agreements often hide some principled solution to pressing 
issues. I believe that pursuing the clues that successful practices provide may be of 
great aid in the development of a principled and robust set of guidelines for tackling 
emerging disputes about the discovery and use of new land and resources, including 
those found in outer space. 





Lastly, with regards to the issue of military intervention, LBC is perhaps pointing at 
solutions that are in sharp conflict with the current principles informing international 
law. First, LBC does not offer a justification of states’ territorial integrity since states 
may legitimately demand very limited exclusive titles to territory. LBC, in fact, 
permits secession as long as state breaking does not endanger individuals’ basic 
interests in self-government. Also, states may not demand extensive rights on the 
resources found in their territory, but can assert claims to natural resources only to 
the extent that these are necessary for the protection of a system of legitimate social 
norms. Second, LBC also rejects for the most part interventions aimed at disrupting 
existing social orders, regardless of the orders’ wickedness.  
In Chapter 5, I have listed three reasons why social norms, even if illegitimate, 
should demand some type of respect from outsiders. Chiefly, military intervention 
should be avoided in all those cases where it may disrupt legitimate – albeit unjust – 
social arrangements, given our commitment to ensuring that peace is maintained and 
that individuals are able to rely on a stable system of expectations and possessions. 
Moreover, existing social norms should be respected to the extent that they offer 
their subject a set of options and values that allows them to form and pursue life 
plans and directive ends. However, the issue of justified military intervention does 
not address only peaceful but unjust social orders. It addresses also cases in which 
continuous civil war is a threat to its own system of social norms and the safety of its 
population. Nevertheless, the analysis of a community’s territorial rights (or lack 
thereof) from the perspective offered by LBC may constitute the starting point of a 
wider account of the remedies that are available against the violation of the most 
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